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This dissertation consists of three essays on reputation and repeated games. Rep-
utation models typically assume players have full memory of past events, yet in many
applications this assumption does not hold. In the first chapter, I explore two different
relaxations of the assumption that history is perfectly observed in the context of Ely and
Välimäki’s (2003) mechanic game, where reputation (with full history observation) is clearly
bad for all players. First I consider “limited history,” where short-run players see only the
most recent T periods. For large T , the full history equilibrium behavior always holds due
to an “echo” effect (for high discount factors); for small T , the repeated static equilibrium
exists. Second I consider “fading history,” where short-run players randomly sample past
periods with probabilities that “fade” toward zero for older periods. When fading is faster
than a fairly lax threshold, the long-run player always acts myopically, a result that holds
more generally for reputation games where the long-run player has a strictly dominant stage
game action. This finding suggests that reputational incentives may be too weak to affect
long-run player behavior in some realistic word-of-mouth environments.
The second chapter develops general theoretical tools to study incomplete informa-
tion games where players observe only finitely many recent periods. I derive a recursive
characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs, which allows analysis of both station-
ary and (previously unexplored) non-stationary equilibria. I also introduce “quasi-Markov
v
perfection,” an equilibrium refinement which is a necessary condition of any equilibrium
that is “non-fragile” (purifiable), i.e., robust to small, additively separable and independent
perturbations of payoffs.
These tools are applied to two examples. The first is a product choice game with
1-period memory of the firm’s actions, obtaining a complete characterization of the exact
minimum and maximum purifiable equilibrium payoffs for almost all discount factors and
prior beliefs on an “honest” Stackelberg commitment type, which shows that non-stationary
equilibria expand the equilibrium set. The second is the same game with long memory: in
all stationary and purifiable equilibria, the long-run player obtains exactly the Stackelberg
payoff so long as the memory is longer than a threshold dependent on the prior. These
results show that the presence of the honest type (even for arbitrarily small prior beliefs)
qualitatively changes the equilibrium set for any fixed discount factor above a threshold
independent of the prior, thereby not requiring extreme patience.
The third chapter studies the question of why drug trafficking organizations inflict
violence on each other, and why conflict breaks out under some government crackdowns
and not others, in a repeated games context. Violence between Mexican drug cartels soared
following the government’s anti-cartel offensive starting in 2006, but not under previous
crackdowns. I construct a theoretical explanation for these observations and previous em-
pirical research. I develop a duopoly model where the firms have the capacity to make
costly attacks on each other. The firms use the threat of violence to incentivize inter-cartel
cooperation, and under imperfect monitoring, violence occurs on the equilibrium path of a
high payoff equilibrium. When a “corrupt” government uses the threat of law enforcement
as a punishment for uncooperative behavior, violence is not needed as frequently to achieve
high payoffs. When government cracks down indiscriminately, the firms may return to fre-
quent violence as a way of ensuring cooperation and high payoffs, even if the crackdown
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Reputation under Limited and Fading History
1.1 Introduction
The reputation literature has shown that even very small uncertainty about a
player’s type can have dramatic effects on equilibrium behavior and payoffs. Building on the
seminal work of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Fudenberg and
Levine (1989; 1992) show that introducing such uncertainty assures the long-run player of a
payoff arbitrarily close to the payoff that would be achievable by a credible commitment to
an action of her choice. Ely and Välimäki (2003) (henceforth EV) construct a model where
reputation has a similarly dramatic but negative effect on payoffs (of all players). These
models typically assume that short-run players see the full history of past signals.
In reality, agents often perceive reputation through only limited excerpts of the
past, raising the question: how robust are these results to relaxing that assumption? The
focus of this chapter is answering this question with regard to EV’s model, considering two
different forms of relaxation: “limited history” (modeling a public list of recent reviews) and
“fading history” (modeling word-of-mouth). I find that the full history equilibrium behavior
is robust to short-run players seeing many (but not all) past periods in both cases. When
short-run players see relatively few past periods, behavior differs between the two models:
limited history yields the repeated one-shot equilibrium, while fading history yields myopic
long-run player behavior but strictly higher ex ante payoffs for the short-run players. The
fading history results also apply to the chain store game (a typical example of the games
considered by Fudenberg and Levine (1989), where reputation is good for the long-run
player).
EV’s model, the mechanic game, has the feature that the long-run player is clearly
1
harmed by reputation.1 The rational “good” long-run player, who offers expert services
to short-run players, has payoffs that perfectly coincide with those of short-run players,
and she wants to separate herself from a “bad” type that harms short-run players; this
temptation to separate harms the short-run player, causing the whole market to fail. EV
point out these dynamics could be a concern in a number of asymmetric information settings
involving expert sellers, such as auto mechanics, lawyers, management consultants and
medical doctors. These markets generally involve consumers who are not perfectly informed
about the seller’s past. Consider motorists who solicit information about an auto mechanic
through word-of-mouth, patients who choose to see a dentist after reading the first few
reviews listed on Yelp, or a consultant who provides prospective clients with a list of only
her most recent references on her resumé. The robustness of the EV result in settings where
consumers have a limited view of the past may shed light on both positive questions, such
as when and why experts are hired in real markets with this feature, and normative issues,
such as the optimal design and welfare effects of review websites.
In the mechanic game, the “good” mechanic (rational long-run player) and the mo-
torist (short-run player) have coinciding interests in the stage game: the motorist’s car has
a problem, and both want the problem fixed correctly. Motorists do not know which repairs
their cars need (either a cheap tune-up c or an expensive engine replacement e), but the
mechanic does. The motorist would like to hire the good mechanic instead of an outside
option ∅, if she does the right repair. However, the introduction of even a tiny probability
that the mechanic is a commitment type (the “bad” mechanic, who performs an expensive
engine replacement no matter what problem the car has) impedes the ability of the me-
chanic and motorists to interact when the motorist prefers the outside option to hiring the
bad mechanic.
When motorists can see the entire history of hiring decisions and repairs, a history
with sufficiently many engine replacements and no tune-ups yields a belief that the mechanic
1Short-run players are also harmed, but this aspect is more common in other reputation games, such as
the chain store game.
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is likely enough to be bad that the outside option is necessarily preferable to hiring. All
subsequent motorists avoid the mechanic, “freezing” the “bad belief” and preventing the
mechanic from ever being hired again. At a “critical” history, where the mechanic is just
one engine replacement away from a frozen bad belief, a sufficiently patient good mechanic is
inevitably tempted into performing a tune-up (even when an engine replacement is needed),
signaling that she is good. Such signaling behavior is harmful to the motorist receiving the
unnecessary tune-up, whose best response is to avoid the mechanic. Before the critical
history, the mechanic’s anticipation of the critical motorist’s decision not to hire must lead
to a certain (possibly unnecessary) tune-up even earlier, so this previous motorist also does
not hire, and so on by backward induction, leading to a complete unraveling of the market
and no hiring on the equilibrium path of all renegotiation-proof Nash equilibria.
However, real mechanics likely do not expect that any particular action (or the signal
it generates) is certain to be observed by every subsequent customer. Even if a mechanic
knew with certainty that a customer would immediately report her actions to the world in
a review on Yelp, she knows that many future potential customers may not see the review,
either because they do not check Yelp at all, or because with time, the review is eventually
pushed out of sight on the first page. Word-of-mouth seems particularly unlikely to yield
fully informed customers due to its decentralized, random nature.
Motivated by this observation, I relax the assumption of full history observation
through two different types of limitations on the history seen by short-run players. The first
type is “limited history,” where each motorist sees a fixed number of periods into the past,
but no further. I find that when this “memory” is long enough, exactly the same equilibrium
behavior as the full history model is obtained, because the events in the beginning periods
“echo” forever through the participation decisions of the motorists. If the mechanic signals
she is good early on with a tune-up, all motorists who see that first tune-up hire her, and
the next “generation” of motorists, who do not see that tune-up but see all the hiring that
followed, infer her type and also hire (even if they only see engine replacements), and so
on forever. By contrast, if the mechanic sends bad signals by performing many engine
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replacements (and no tune-ups) early on, the first generation of motorists eventually stop
hiring, the next generation sees this lack of hiring and follows suit, and so on.
Making this memory too short for an individual motorist to learn much about the
mechanic allows an equilibrium that avoids the bad reputation result, and the stage game
equilibrium is repeatedly played. But in this equilibrium, reputation is also rendered worth-
less: it does not help the long-run or short-run players because it is too uninformative to
have any effect on behavior at all.
The second restriction on history observation I consider is “fading history,” in which
motorists see the last period with probability λ ∈ (0, 1), the second-to-last period with
probability λ2, and so on for all past periods. This can be thought of as modeling the
decentralized randomness of word-of-mouth. Like limited history with high T , fading history
yields the bad reputation result for high λ. When λ is small enough, reputational incentives
are too weak to cause bad reputation, but reputation still sometimes helps the motorists
avoid the bad mechanic; this differs from the low T limited history case, where reputation is
always useless to the motorists. This result seems reasonably realistic: the good mechanic
is not diverted from serving customers by extremely strong reputation incentives, good and
bad mechanics are both sometimes hired, and some of the more discerning customers hire
the good mechanic while avoiding the bad mechanic.
In fact, this result for fading history with low λ applies to a more general class of
reputation games: when the long-run player has a strictly dominant action in the stage
game, it causes the long-run player to behave myopically and always choose that dominant
action (as though reputation did not exist), while the payoffs of short-run players are often
greater than under the static game because they are sometimes well-informed. The upper
bound on λ is not trivially small: for a patient mechanic, it corresponds to a given motorist
talking to an average of 12 future potential customers about their experience, high enough to
cover scenarios with significant (but not totally ubiquitous) word-of-mouth communication.2
2Appendix 1.2.2 gives a higher upper bound (for the mechanic game) that allows talking to an average
of 2
3
future motorists, given some reasonable restrictions on equilibria. This upper bound can be even
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The result is also robust to correlation between observations, which allows applications to
more centralized communication like online forums where public messages “fade” over time
(see Remark 1.2.1 for a discussion). This suggests reputation may be too weak to affect
long-run player behavior in many real word-of-mouth situations.
Though fading history is intended as a model of word-of-mouth communication, it
differs importantly from existing work on word-of-mouth (e.g. Ellison and Fudenberg (1995),
Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004)) where players randomly sample some fixed number of past
events. Key differences include that under fading history, the “sample size” is random, and
that players are more likely to observe the recent past than distant past. The fading of past
events is critical for ruling out the never-ending echo that occurs in the limited (but long)
history case.
To better understand the role of these restrictions on history monitoring, I also
consider them in the context of the chain store game of Selten (1978), variants of which
have been widely used to study reputation (for example, Pitchik (1993), Aoyagi (1996) and
Wiseman (2008)). The chain store game is a typical example of a Stackelberg-type game,
where reputation bounds the long-run player’s payoff from below. The (general) result for
fading history with low λ applies directly to the chain store game, and the effect on short-
run player payoffs is actually more dramatic because they need only observe a single past
event to learn the long-run player’s type. The other results do not carry over so simply,
and in fact a “myopic equilibrium” does not exist at all for the limited history chain store
game, even when limited to seeing just one previous period.
Bounded memory repeated games without reputation have been the topic of a
number of papers — for example, Sabourian (1998), Mailath and Olszewski (2011a), and
Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2013a) — but such games with reputation are relatively un-
explored. I use the term “limited history” to distinguish it from the similar “limited records”
studied by Liu and Skrzypacz (2014a), the only difference being that limited records allow
higher (allowing talking to up to but not including an average of 1 future motorist) depending on the
parameterization of the stage game.
5
short-run players to see only the long-run player’s actions in each observed period, whereas
limited history lets them see the full outcome of each period.3 This difference can produce
starkly different results because under limited records, the long-run player can unilater-
ally “clean” her history. Liu and Skrzypacz find cyclical equilibrium behavior — “riding of
reputation bubbles” — that is qualitatively different from both the one-shot and complete
history cases. Liu (2011a) also finds cyclical equilibria in an environment where short-run
players incur a cost to observe limited records of past long-run player actions. These pa-
pers show reputation being continually accumulated, exploited and then replenished. By
contrast, this chapter finds non-cyclical behavior under limited history, because reputation
inevitably gets “stuck” in a particular state, despite only viewing the recent past.
Limited records are more realistic in certain settings; Liu and Skrzypacz point to
the example of the Better Business Bureau, which reports complaints on businesses from
the last 36 months, but does not report on the business’s volume or types of transactions.
However, in many cases long-run players need the cooperation of short-run players to es-
tablish a desirable reputation. For example, a consultant must be hired by today’s client
in order to provide a favorable reference tomorrow; she cannot do this unilaterally. In such
environments, limited history is a more appropriate assumption. A more detailed discussion
of the differences between limited history and limited records is given in Subsection 1.2.1.1.
This chapter also relates to other extensions of the mechanic game. EV show that
when the motorist is also a long-run player, an equilibrium exists where the mechanic and
motorist are able to interact. Mailath and Samuelson (2006a) consider the possibility of
random “captive consumers,” who hire no matter the history. Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine
(2008) extend bad reputation to a broader class of games, illustrating the difference between
bad and good reputation. For example, they allow a larger set of commitment types; bad
reputation is robust to the introduction of a sufficiently small probability of a Stackelberg
commitment type (who always performs the correct repair), but if the probability is high
enough relative to the probability of the bad type, reputation is no longer bad. This
3When motorists do not hire, this prevents observation of the long-run player’s action.
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assumption seems reasonable in markets where consumers have faith that experts are more
often non-strategically honest than bad, but is more problematic where consumers are more
suspicious.4 Though my results only consider limited and fading history as applied to the
original EV mechanic game, there is no apparent reason why similar results would not apply
to such generalizations.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the main results
for the mechanic game, with Subsection 1.2.1 covering limited history and Subsection 1.2.2
covering fading history. Section 1.3 considers applications and implications for the chain
store game. Section 1.4 concludes. The Appendix contains omitted proofs.
1.2 The Mechanic Game
In the mechanic game, reputation leads to a lower payoff for both the long-run and
short-run players than in the static game. A long-lived car mechanic faces a different short-
lived motorist each period. Each motorist’s car is in one of two states, each requiring a
different repair: either a cheap tune-up c or an expensive engine replacement e. The states
are drawn iid each with probability 12 . The motorist does not know which repair is needed,
but the mechanic does.
In each period, the motorist first chooses to either hire the mechanic or choose an
outside option ∅ with payoff zero. If hired, the mechanic observes the state of the car,
either θc or θe. The motorist benefits if the mechanic performs the correct repair, receiving





4Surveys by Gallup (2013) show that such faith varies widely across some of the applications suggested by
EV. Medical doctors are among those most trusted, with 69% of respondents in December 2013 rating their
“honesty and ethical standards” as “high” or “very high.” Auto mechanics are viewed much less favorably
(29%), and lawyers (20%) rank even further down the list.
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Assume w > u > 0. This insures that if the mechanic chooses the repair independent
of the state, the motorist will prefer the outside option.
The mechanic can be one of two types: good (g) and bad (b). The mechanic’s type
is denoted s. The good mechanic has the same stage payoff as the motorist (in the table
above), and wants to maximize her expected discounted average payoff, discounted at rate
δ ∈ (0, 1). The bad mechanic is non-strategic and simply performs engine replacements,
regardless of the state.5 Motorists observe the full history of repair and hiring decisions, but
not the previous motorists’ states (i.e., it is not known whether the repairs were correct),
as public knowledge. Beginning at period 0, the first motorist has prior belief µ0 that the
mechanic is bad, and subsequent motorists update their beliefs about the mechanic’s type
according to Bayes’ rule.
In the one-shot game, the motorist’s expected payoff for hiring is simply 12µ(u −
w) + (1 − µ)u where µ is the belief that the mechanic is bad (doing the right repair is
strictly dominant for the good mechanic). She will hire the mechanic only if this expected
payoff is nonnegative, which is clearly false when the belief µ is greater than critical value
p∗ ≡ 2u/(u+ w) since u < w.6
EV prove that the supremum of the mechanic’s Nash equilibrium payoffs must con-
verge to zero for δ close enough to one, so that equilibria where the mechanic is hired must
have the mechanic hired only infrequently. They point out that equilibria with such infre-
quent hiring have an implausible feature: once the mechanic performs a single tune-up, she
reveals herself to be good (with certainty) to all future motorists. After a tune-up, it makes
sense that all subsequent motorists (knowing the mechanic is good) will want to hire, and
5EV also show their result holds for a strategic bad mechanic who receives a discounted sum of period
payoffs that do not depend on the motorists’ states, receiving u for performing an engine replacement , −w
for a tune-up and 0 when not hired.
6p∗ is defined as the belief such that the motorist is indifferent about hiring when the good mechanic




+ (1− p∗)u = 0.
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the mechanic will want to perform correct repairs for them. For this reason, EV use the
following renegotiation-proofness assumption to rule out such dubious behavior.
Assumption 1 (Renegotiation-Proofness). The mechanic is hired at any history on the
equilibrium path at which she is known to be good by the motorist.
EV then find the following dramatic result.
Theorem 1.2.1. Let µ0 > 0 be given. When δ is close enough to one, any Nash equilibrium
satisfying Assumption 1 has a unique equilibrium outcome where the mechanic is never hired.
Without going into the proof here, the intuition behind it is that in any equilibrium,
if the mechanic performs some number L engine replacements and no tune-ups, the mo-
torists’ beliefs must rise above p∗ and they do not hire. If a motorist hires at any history,
the mechanic must perform an engine replacement with sufficient probability (otherwise
the motorist’s expected payoff from hiring would be negative), and this means that, with
positive probability, the mechanic performs L consecutive engine replacements on the equi-
librium path. After performing L − 1 engine replacements (and no tune-ups), an engine
replacement gives a continuation payoff of 0, compared with a continuation payoff of u for
a tune-up (since all future motorists hire). When she is sufficiently patient, the mechanic
always performs a tune-up, so she cannot be hired at a “critical” history (i.e., after L − 1
engine replacements without tune-ups); backwards induction leads to the result of no hiring
on the equilibrium path.
1.2.1 Limited History
I relax the full history monitoring assumption by allowing motorists to view finite T
previous periods. First I consider the situation when T is large, obtaining the same behavior
as Theorem 1.2.1.
At the heart of this result is making sure that a critical history can “fit” into the
memory of motorists. I formalize this with the following notation. An infinite history
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h = (h0, h1, ...) is an infinite sequence of events, where hk is the outcome at period k,
either a repair (c or e) or a no-hiring decision (∅). Often it is useful to look at a history
ending just before some period t, which I denote with a superscript: a history ht (at some




k is the event at period k < t. Since
many short-run players do not see all of the past history, I sometimes refer to this as the
“full” or “complete history” (to contrast with the “observable subhistory” defined below). I
also sometimes denote the event at period k as ηk. This notation is used when discussing
expectations for future events, given a particular history; for example, the probability that
the mechanic is not hired at period k given history hk is written P (ηk = ∅|hk), instead of
P (hk = ∅|hk), to avoid confusion about what is already part of the history and what is yet
to happen.
For periods 0, ..., T , motorists observe the full history. Given a history ht at any
t ∈ {0, ..., T} where the mechanic is hired, the expected payoff of hiring must be nonnegative






+ (1− µt(ht))(βt(ht)u− (1− βt(ht))w) ≥ 0,
where µt(ht) is the posterior belief of motorist t that the mechanic is bad and βt(ht) is the
















t) be the probability that the mechanic does repair a conditional on a being needed,
















on the probability that a mechanic performs a needed tune-up.
Each period’s motorist has a posterior belief, but after period T motorists do not
know the beliefs of previous motorists (because they do not see what those motorists saw),
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which means it is not possible to calculate posteriors by simply updating the previous
motorist’s posterior, one after another. I use the following notation to denote the limited
history that a particular motorist sees.
Definition 1.2.1. Given history ht at any period t, the observable subhistory ĥt at t is the
sequence (htt0 , ..., h
t
t−1), where t0 ≡ max{0, t−T}. The event at some period t′ ∈ {t0, ..., t−1}
is denoted htt′ .
Since the posterior after an observable subhistory is not a simple update on the
previous motorist’s posterior, it will be useful to separate the calculation into steps, period
by period across the observable subhistory.
Definition 1.2.2. For any observable subhistory ĥt at period t, the partial posterior belief
µtt′(ĥ
t) of motorist t is the probability that the mechanic is bad given prior µ0 and the
observed periods t0, ..., t
′ − 1, ignoring periods t′, ..., t − 1. Note that µtt0(ĥ
t) = µ0 because
it ignores all observations.
For t ≤ T when motorists still observe the complete history, the observable subhis-
tory ĥt and full history ht and are the same, and the partial posterior evolves according
to Bayes’ rule as it does in the full history case. If a tune-up is observed at t′ < t, then
µtt′+1(ĥ
t) = 0; if a no-hire event is observed, then µtt′+1(ĥ
t) = µtt′(ĥ
t); if an engine replace-






















t)) is a lower bound for µtt′+1(ĥ
t) (for t ≤ T , not t > T ), and inductively
define Υ1(µ) ≡ Υ(µ) and Υk+1(µ) ≡ Υ(Υk(µ)), so that Υk(µ) is a lower bound for the
posterior after observing k engine replacements and no tune-ups at t ≤ T . Finally, define
L(µ0) ≡ min k such that Υk(µ0) > p∗ (1.2.3)
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as an upper bound on the number of engine replacements that can be performed (without
any tune-ups) in the first T + 1 periods before the posterior exceeds p∗.
The result below establishes a lower bound on T sufficient for the bad reputation
result. For T > L(µ0), it is straightforward to see that the mechanic cannot perform
more than L engine replacements without any tune-ups within the first T + 1 periods on
the equilibrium path. Motorists (before period T + 1) who arrive after the Lth engine
replacement will believe the mechanic is so likely to be bad that the payoff of hiring must
be negative, preventing any hiring until at least period T + 1. Performing more than L
engine replacements in the first T + 1 periods is only possible if the mechanic first performs
a tune-up, so if motorist T + 1 observes an engine replacement in every period 1, ..., T ,
the mechanic is known to be good because an unobserved tune-up must have preceded the
observable subhistory, i.e. at period 0 (the result of Lemma 1.1.1). In fact, this “echo”
effect continues for all future periods; if motorists see the mechanic hired every observed
period, these hiring decisions signal that the mechanic must be good, even if only engine
replacements are observed.
Having ruled out equilibria where the mechanic performs more than L engine re-
placements (and no tune-ups) in the first T + 1 periods, one may wonder if there exist
equilibria where the mechanic performs L or fewer engine replacements. Such equilibria
mean there are histories on the equilibrium path where the mechanic is not hired for many
of the first T + 1 periods, reducing her continuation payoff from doing an engine replace-
ment. If T is large enough, the mechanic cannot resist the temptation to perform a tune-up
that ensures she is hired in all of those periods.
This temptation effectively forces beliefs to be either 0 or greater than p∗ by period
T + 1 in any equilibrium where the mechanic is hired with positive probability. Because
motorists in periods T + 1 and beyond know this, they need only look at their observable
subhistories to tell whether the mechanic is definitely good (they see a tune-up or hiring
in every observed period) or likely-enough-to-be-bad (motorists stop hiring at some point
in the first T periods, and never hire again afterwards). Reputation is pinned into one of
12
these two extreme states early on and frozen there by the hiring decisions, giving the large
reputational incentive that causes bad reputation.








then for any sequential equilibrium satisfying Assumption 1 there is a unique equilibrium
outcome where the mechanic is never hired when δ is close enough to one.
What happens when T is small? A “myopic equilibrium” exists where the good
mechanic always performs the correct repair, so that the mechanic always performs an engine








with Ῡt(µ) defined inductively like Υ(·). Define
L̄(µ0) ≡ min t such that Ῡt(µ0) > p∗.
Note that L̄(µ0) ≤ L(µ0) because L(µ0) is a lower bound that presumes the mechanic
performs engine replacements with maximum probability 12 +
1
2(1− β
∗) > 12 .
Theorem 1.2.3. Let µ0 > 0 and T < L̄(µ0) be given. A sequential equilibrium exists where
the good mechanic always performs the correct repair and the motorists always hire.
Proof. It is easy to show that always hiring is a best response for motorists. At any period
t, the motorists’ posterior is less than or equal to ῩT (µ0) ≤ p∗, so the payoff of hiring is
nonnegative. For the mechanic, the continuation payoff of a tune-up is equal to that of an
engine replacement (she is always hired, no matter her strategy), so performing the correct
repair always yields a greater payoff.
Theorem 1.2.3 avoids the disaster of Theorem 1.2.2, but it does so by preventing
reputation from having any effect. Reputation neither tempts the mechanic into a costly
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tune-up that harms the motorist, nor does it help the motorists sort out a good mechanic
from the bad, and the ex ante payoff for every motorist is equal to that of the one-shot
game. Reputation is only useful to motorists if it gives them a posterior greater than p∗
when the mechanic is bad, so that they can avoid hiring her; the myopic equilibrium avoids
the bad reputation outcome precisely by ruling out that possibility.
Can reputation actually be useful in the limited history environment? Though these
results do not give a complete answer to that question, they do suggest that the answer is
probably “no,” at least for equilibria that do not involve highly unrealistic behavior.
They do not tell us what behavior occurs when T is between the lower bound
of Theorem 1.2.2 and the upper bound of Theorem 1.2.3, but they do show a tension
between helping the motorist avoid the bad mechanic and limiting the reputational benefit
of signaling to the mechanic that suggests any “useful reputation equilibria” are at best
fragile and likely implausible.
Any equilibrium with useful reputation must delicately resolve this tension. Suppose
there is an equilibrium where motorist t has an ex ante payoff higher than the one-shot
or myopic equilibria. This equilibrium must avoid the “echo” effect of Theorem 1.2.2 by
preventing motorist t’s no-hiring decision at high posteriors from triggering further no-
hiring events. One way to “dampen” the echo is by making t’s decision not to hire only an
imperfect signal that his posterior is greater than p∗, which requires that he mixes when the
posterior is less than p∗. Yet if he is mixing, he must be have a payoff of zero at the observable
subhistories where he mixes,7 which is less than the myopic payoff. Adding more “noise” in
the signal requires mixing (and thus decreasing the payoffs) for more observable subhistories,
and it is unclear that the motorist can in fact come out ahead overall. An alternative is to
allow motorist t’s no-hire choice to be a perfect signal that his posterior is greater than p∗,
and dampen the echo by having his successors in periods t+1, ..., t+T mix, but having them
mix requires lowering their payoffs instead. This damping also requires very time-specific
7This would be because the good mechanic is herself mixing between the right and wrong repair, which
requires delicate balancing of her continuation payoffs.
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behavior. If motorists’ beliefs depend simply on the distribution rather than order of events
(i.e. the ratio of engine replacements to no-hire events), then useful reputation equilibria are
impossible. All such equilibria, if they exist, involve rather unrealistic coordination between
the players (they must know which periods are being used to dampen). For these reasons,
the most natural interpretation of the results is that under limited history, reputation is
either bad or useless.
1.2.1.1 Limited History vs Limited Records
The results above relate to interesting work by Liu and Skrzypacz (2014a), who
study a reputation game under “limited records” with very different behavior, which I call
the “reputation bubble game.” Their game also features a long-run player (“the firm”)
facing a sequence of short-run players (“the consumers”), with a stage game which can
be interpreted as the consumer choosing how much to trust the firm (how large an order
to purchase), followed by the firm choosing how much to honor that trust (the quality of
product to deliver). The long-run player is either a strategic type or a commitment type
who always honors the consumer’s trust (delivering a high quality product). There are a
number of differences between their environment and mine,8 but the most interesting one is
that they assume limited records, where short-run players only observe the long-run player’s
recent actions — not those of past short-run players. By contrast, limited history includes
the full outcomes of recent periods, which reveals the short-run player actions (and, in the
mechanic game, hides the mechanic’s actions when not hired).
Their main result is that all equilibria in their environment feature “reputation
bubbles,” where the long-run player “cleans” her history to mimic the commitment type,
and once the observable history is completely clean (i.e. contains only the commitment
type’s action), the long-run player exploits the short-run player. As the long-run player
8In their stage game, the long-run player has a static incentive to exploit the short-run player’s trust
(long-run incentives can prevent exploitation); in the mechanic game, there is a static incentive to honor the
short-run player’s trust (it is the long-run incentives that can lead to exploitation). Also, their consumers
prefer to interact with the commitment type rather than the strategic type; in the mechanic game, it is the
commitment type that they want to avoid.
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cleans a “dirty” history, short-run players grant her trust not because they believe she is the
commitment type (they know she is not because they see past exploitative behavior), but
because the cleaning action itself honors the trust; this is what they call “riding a reputation
bubble.” Such behavior is impossible under full history (or records) because the long-run
player cannot surprise and exploit a short-run player as the history is impossible to clean.
Their results differ from mine qualitatively in the sense that behavior under limited records
is different from both complete records and no records; by contrast, the mechanic game has
the same equilibrium behavior for both small T > 0 and T = 0, and the same behavior for
large T <∞ as T =∞.
The limited records assumption makes the model much more tractable, and Liu
and Skrzypacz point out that the assumption that only the long-run players’ actions are
observable is realistic in applications like the Better Business Bureau, which does not show
how much business a firm gets but does show complaints. In many other settings, however,
the long-run player needs short-run players to cooperate in order to send the signals she
wants. For example, a consultant or lawyer needs clients to hire her in order to provide
references to future clients; she cannot generate an observable “high quality” signal through
sheer effort alone. Instead, future prospective clients will observe that she was not hired,
and they may interpret that as a bad signal, leading to persistent unemployment. This lack
of total control over one’s reputation is critical to the bad reputation effect, giving the result
that reputation has exactly the same impact when memory is long as when it is complete.
To what extent this applies to other limited history reputation games remains an interesting
open question (this is discussed further in Subsection 1.3.1).
1.2.2 Fading History
While the limited history model avoids the bad reputation result when records are
sufficiently limited, it appears to do so at the expense of reputation being useful. The
information structure introduced in this subsection allows reputation to be weakened enough
that the mechanic can play myopically, but it is still sometimes informative enough to
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motorists that they do not hire the mechanic, achieving the “middle ground” that seems to
be lacking under limited history. This is achievable in a similar “myopic equilibrium” that
does not require such complicated strategies, and although it reduces the motorist payoff
conditional on the mechanic being good (because the good mechanic sometimes “looks bad”
and is not hired), it is outweighed by the increase in the motorist payoff conditional on
the mechanic being bad such that the ex ante motorist payoff is greater than the one-shot
payoff.
Under fading history, the motorist observes each previous period with some positive
probability. Let pt
′
t denote the probability that the motorist in period t
′ observes the actions
in period t < t′. By comparison, under full history this probability is always one; under
limited history, pt
′
t = 1 for t
′ ∈ {t + 1, ..., t + T} and pt′t = 0 for t′ > t + T . Under fading
history, this probability is never one nor zero, instead starting relatively high right after
the event and exponentially “fading” toward zero: pt
′
t = λ
t′−t for λ ∈ (0, 1). It is assumed
each observation is independent from the others, but some results are robust to correlation
between observations (see Remark 1.2.1).
This can be interpreted as roughly reflecting how word-of-mouth spreads. It is not
certain that customers hear about previous experiences, nor is it certain that they do not,
but it is more likely that they hear about recent history than the distant past.
I first show the existence of a myopic equilibrium (analogous to Theorem 1.2.3) for
fading history when λ is below a threshold. One striking feature is that the upper bound
on λ does not depend on µ0. This is because the proof does not rely on calculating beliefs.
The action at some period t affects the payoff at some later period t′ > t only if either t′
observes t directly or there exists some sequence (t1, ..., tn) such that motorist t1 observes t,
motorist tj observes tj−1 for all j ∈ {2, ..., n}, and motorist t′ observes tn. The proof bounds
the probability of such “observation chains.” Of course, the motorists in these chains would
also have to change their action in response to their observation to affect the payoff at t′
(so the bound is not as high as it could be), but the fact that this technique ignores the
actual beliefs allows using essentially the same technique for fading history in other games.
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This technique is impossible in the limited history environment because such a chain always
connects every period together even for T = 1 (period 1 observes period 0, period 2 observes
period 1, and so on).
This result is given for a more general set of games — those where the long-run player
has a strictly dominant action in the stage game — and is also stronger than Theorem 1.2.3
because it shows that every equilibrium has myopic behavior by the long-run player. Since
the stage games considered are extensive-form, this strict dominance is needed at decision
nodes for the long-run player; I define this notion as “strictly conditionally dominant.”9
Definition 1.2.3. Let an extensive-form game between players 1 and 2 be given with finite
action spaces A1 and A2. The payoff for player i of action profile (a1, a2) ∈ A ≡ A1 ×A2 is
denoted ui(a1, a2). Let the set of player 2 actions which lead to a decision node for player
1 be denoted Ã2 ⊂ A2. An action ad ∈ A1 for player 1 is strictly conditionally dominant if
and only if u1(ad, a2) > u1(a
′
1, a2) for all a
′
1 ∈ A1\{ad} and all a2 ∈ Ã2.
Restricting attention to stage games with strictly conditionally dominant actions
gives a positive lower bound for the current period benefit of playing myopically. Even less
restrictive assumptions may well be possible, but the assumptions of Theorem 1.2.4 suffice
for the games considered in this chapter, and many other participation and simultaneous-
move games.10
Theorem 1.2.4. Consider any infinitely repeated reputation game between long-run player
1 and a different short-run player 2 each period, with fading history specified by λ < 1/(2δ).
Player 1 is either a rational type θ0 or one of N ∈ N commitment types θ1, ..., θN , with
each short-run player having prior beliefs µ0(θ) on each of the types. Suppose that rational
9The definition used here is equivalent to a unique strategy that is not “conditionally dominated” under
Definition 4.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), who consider iterated conditional dominance as a solution
concept for extensive-form games.
10Indeed, the argument behind the proof of Theorem 1.2.4 holds even without the presence of commitment
types. Of course, the absence of commitment types also means the absence of useful reputation (or any
reputation for that matter), which is the motivation for this result.
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u1(a) and zd ≡ min
(a′1,a2)∈(A1\{ad})×Ã2






then any sequential equilibrium has rational player 1 playing ad at every history.
In the case of the mechanic game, z = zd = u+w, so the upper bound (1.2.5) on λ is





+ · · · = 12 future customers. Note that this upper bound does not require Assumption
1. For the mechanic game, Appendix 1.2.2 gives an upper bound between 2/(5δ) and 1/(2δ)
(depending on the ratio w/u), corresponding to a customer talking to an average between 23
and 1 future customer (for δ close to one), using Assumption 1 and an intuitive restriction
on equilibria, suggesting (1.2.5) can generally be improved upon in applications to specific
models.
The following example illustrates why the upper bound on λ is sufficient for pre-
cluding an “echo” in the mechanic game like that in Theorem 1.2.2.
Example 1.2.1. Let λ = 13 . If the motorist hires at period 0, the difference in stage payoffs
between doing the right repair and the wrong repair is u+w. The probability that motorist
1 observes the repair at period 0 is 13 . The probability that motorist 2 observes period 1 is
1
9 , and the probability that motorist 2 observes period 1 and period 1 observes period 0 is
1
9 , so the probability of a “chain” of observations between period 0 and period 2 is bounded
by 29 . The probability that period 3 observes period 0 is
1
27 , the probability that 3 observes




27 , and the probability that 3 observes 2 and that period




27 , so the
probability that such a chain exists between period 0 and period 3 is bounded by 427 . This
pattern continues so that the probability of a chain from period 0 to period t is bounded
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from above by 2t−1/3t. The maximum difference the period 0 repair can make in the stage
payoff at any future period that has a chain of observations back to period 0 is u+w,11 so















which is less than the period 0 benefit of doing the right repair (u + w). Thus, doing the
right repair is the only best response.
Remark 1.2.1. Though this section generally assumes observations are independent, The-
orem 1.2.4 (and Corollary 1.2.1) are robust to correlation between observations. This is
because the proofs rely on Boole’s inequality to bound the probability of the current repair
being “chained” to any particular future period and then use the expected discounted sum
of the effects of these chains at each future period for a bound on the continuation value. So
long as the probabilities of these observations satisfy the “fading” definition, this correlation
does not affect Theorem 1.2.4.
Correlation between observations can be interpreted as certain consumers being
more connected to each other than others (a network of friends may be more likely to offer
advice to each other than to strangers), and it does not have to be interpreted as decentral-
ized communication. For example, consider messages posted on a centralized medium like
an online forum, where it is visible to future customers while on the front page but with
probability λ it disappears from view because other unrelated messages have pushed it off
the front page.12 Others may publish replies underneath the post, sharing their own expe-
riences; when the original post is pushed out of view, so are all these replies. In this case,
if consumer t’s post disappears at the end of period t′ > t, then all consumers t + 1, ..., t′
11Intuitively, one would expect only a difference of only u because that is the maximum decrease in the
stage payoff going from being hired to not being hired (the difference between the maximum payoff and the
minmax payoff). Corollary 1.2.1 shows this intuition holds given some natural restrictions, yielding a higher
upper bound for λ.
12This, of course, ignores the possibility of searching through old posts, so this online forum model is more
appropriate for situations where consumers spend little time researching and casually check a forum to see
what others recommend (or warn against).
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will see his message, but none of the consumers after period t′ do. The ex ante probability
that period t is observed by period t+ k is still λk, which is sufficient for the bounds used
by Theorem 1.2.4 to ensure myopic long-run player behavior.
The type of equilibrium described by Theorem 1.2.4 is similar to that of Theorem
1.2.3 in that the mechanic always does the correct repair, but what differs is that the
mechanic is not always hired, even when good. Equilibrium behavior of the motorists
would be unique except for the possibility that the posterior at some observable subhistory
ĥt makes the motorist indifferent (µt(ĥt) = p∗) and therefore allows mixing at this belief.
Because motorists sometimes receive information that is useful for avoiding the bad
mechanic, the ex ante payoff for all but the first few motorists is strictly greater in this
equilibrium than under Theorem 1.2.3. Motorist t does not hire if µt(ĥt) > p∗ (where the
observable subhistory ĥt is the (random) set of observations from periods that motorist t
sees). Denoting the payoff of motorist t given ĥt as
vtSR(ĥ
t; s) =
u−w2 αt(ĥt) s = buαt(ĥt) s = g,












P (s = b|ĥt)u− w
2
+ P (s = g|ĥt)u
]
1{µt(ĥt) ≤ p∗}
where Ĥ t is the space of observable subhistories at period t, and the term in brackets is
the expected payoff of hiring at ĥt, which is negative when µt(ĥt) > p∗ (when µt(ĥt) ≤ p∗,
hiring is always a best response because the mechanic does the right repair). If there exists






















+ (1− µt(ĥt))P (s = g|ĥt)u
]
, (1.2.6)
where the right hand side of (1.2.6) is the one-shot ex ante payoff. It is easy to see for
every period t > L̄(µ0) that such an ĥt exists (at a minimum, they observe the full history
with only engine replacements with positive probability). Thus, the ex ante payoff for every
motorist t > L̄(µ0) is greater than the one-shot payoff.
When history “fades” too slowly (i.e. λ is high), the bad reputation outcome is
recovered. I first present a result that is weaker than Theorem 1.2.2 because it uses a
different order of taking limits: instead of holding λ fixed and letting δ → 1, it holds δ fixed
and lets λ → 1. A stronger result with the same order of limits as Theorem 1.2.2 is given
at the end of the section, using a mild restriction on equilibria.
Theorem 1.2.5. Let µ0 > 0 and δ > (u+ w)/(2u+ w) be given. Then for λ close enough
to one, for any sequential equilibrium satisfying Assumption 1 there is a unique equilibrium
outcome where the mechanic is never hired.
The proof of Theorem 1.2.5 shows that as λ gets arbitrarily close to one, the mechanic
who performs a tune-up at a critical history is hired with probability arbitrarily close to
one for arbitrarily many periods, while doing an engine replacement yields arbitrarily many
periods of not being hired. At some point, the “memory” of the repair will (at least directly)
fade away, and this “premium” the mechanic receives for a tune-up will eventually go away
(or at least the bounds used cannot rule that out). The proof does not rule out the possibility
that this premium for the tune-up is eventually (at periods far in the future) replaced by
an even greater premium for the engine replacement. Instead, it simply relies on λ being
high enough that any such “reverse premium” is postponed long enough that it is discounted
away.
Establishing a lower bound on λ independent of the discount factor clearly requires
ruling out such a reverse premium, which seems intuitively implausible because it requires
that motorists far into the future are somehow dissuaded from hiring because of a tune-up,
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rather than an engine replacement, that they never observe directly (if they observed it
directly they would hire, of course, because of Assumption 1). By restricting attention to
equilibria where tune-ups do not, in expectation, dissuade future motorists from hiring, a
lower bound on λ independent of δ is obtained that gives the bad reputation result. A word
about notation: I use µt (with a subscript instead of superscript t) to denote motorist t’s
beliefs about the mechanic’s type and the history (as opposed to µt, which is simply the
belief on the type).
Criterion 1. Let a sequential equilibrium be given with strategy σ∗t and beliefs µt for each
motorist t. Let σg be any best response strategy (not necessarily the equilibrium strategy)
for the mechanic, and let σ̃h
t
g be the strategy identical to σg except that the mechanic does
a tune-up with certainty at history ht. The equilibrium satisfies Criterion 1 if and only if
doing a tune-up at ht does not decrease the probability of being hired at any future period k
given the motorists’ strategies and beliefs, i.e.





for all k > t, where ηk is the event at period k, for all t, h
t and σg.
Criterion 1 is similar in spirit to the D1 Criterion (see, for example, Section 11.2
of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)), but it is about actions instead of beliefs. The proof of
Theorem 1.2.2 shows that any equilibrium satisfying its assumptions must satisfy Criterion
1, as do the myopic equilibria of Theorems 1.2.3 and 1.2.4.
Theorem 1.2.6. Let µ0 > 0 and L(µ0) be given. There exists λ∗ such that for any λ ∈
(λ∗, 1), for all sequential equilibria satisfying Assumption 1 and Criterion 1, there is a
unique equilibrium outcome where the mechanic is never hired for δ close enough to one.
1.3 The Chain Store Game
Selten’s (1978) chain store game, depicted in Figure 1.3.1, is a typical example of
a Stackelberg-type game that has been widely used to study the effects of reputation. In
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Figure 1.3.1: The chain store stage game, with payoffs at each node for the incumbent on
top and for the competitor on bottom.
light of the results of Section 1.2, this section considers the infinitely repeated chain store
game where there is probability µ0 that the incumbent is a “tough” commitment type that
plays F every time entry occurs and probability 1− µ0 that the incumbent is a normal or
“weak” (rational) type.
The classic result of Fudenberg and Levine (1989) shows that when the full history is
observed, there is a lower bound on long-run player payoffs that approaches the Stackelberg
payoff (which in this game is c) as δ approaches one. Given prior belief µ that the incumbent
is tough, with full history the posterior must increase every time the incumbent fights (so




because the weak incumbent must play A with at least probability 1 − b for entry to be
a best response by the competitor. Letting Υ1(µ) ≡ Υ(µ) and Υk(µ) ≡ Υ(Υk−1(µ)) be
defined inductively (similarly to Section 1.2), then there can be at most L(µ0) periods with
entry on the equilibrium path if A is never played, for
L(µ0) ≡ min t such that Υt(µ0) > b.
Let vI(µ
0, δ) be the infimum over the set of the incumbent’s payoff in any Nash equilibrium
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given µ0, δ. Fudenberg and Levine (1989) establish the following lower bound:
vI(µ
0, δ) ≥ δL(µ0)c− (1− δL(µ0)). (1.3.2)
The intuition of their result is that the incumbent can always play a (possibly deviation)
strategy of playing F the first L(µ0) times there is entry, thereby raising the belief above
the critical value p∗, at which the competitor would be indifferent between In and ∅ if the
weak incumbent plays A. This precludes any further entry and gives a payoff that is at
least the right hand side of (1.3.2).
The results of Section 1.2 suggest that when history is more “transparent” (meaning
short-run players likely see lots of history), equilibrium behavior is similar to that of the
full history case, and when it is more “opaque” (short-run players likely see little history) a
myopic equilibrium exists where the long-run player plays as though reputation did not exist.
I find similar outcomes for the fading history chain store game for both the transparent and
opaque cases. By contrast, the limited history chain store game has crucial differences that
prevent application of the same techniques used in Subsection 1.2.1. I discuss the nature
of these differences and show that a myopic equilibrium for limited history cannot exist, no
matter how short the memory is.
1.3.1 Limited History
As in Subsection 1.2.1, suppose that the short-run players observe only the past T
periods. It may seem that the techniques employed in the mechanic game could be used for
the chain store game to get analogous results, but such a straightforward application is not
possible.
The difficulty is that for large T in the mechanic game, participation is only infor-
mative to the extent that if motorists t > T see hiring in all observable periods, they know
the mechanic is good. If they do not see hiring every period, they know the mechanic is
too likely to be bad to be hired (their posterior is greater than p∗). Thus, hiring cannot
“subtly” signal the mechanic’s type.
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The analogue of Assumption 1, that entry occurs whenever competitors know the
incumbent is weak, would be very useful here, but it cannot be justifiably assumed in
the chain store game, so using the same method for ruling out subtle informativeness of
participation is not reasonable.13 A way of circumventing this problem is only considering
strategies involving pure actions for the competitors, so that given a subhistory, a competitor
will choose either ∅ or In with certainty. This makes the equilibrium path for a tough
incumbent deterministic, allowing the use of Υ(·) as a lower bound on the partial posterior
following an F event and giving a lower bound on incumbent payoffs similar to Fudenberg
and Levine (1989)’s (1.3.2), but it is not clear that allowing mixed actions also gives such
a bound.
Since the arguments of Subsection 1.2.1 do not carry over directly, the dynamics of
the limited history chain store game with reputation remain unclear, and a full analysis is
beyond the scope of this chapter. However, there do appear to be qualitative differences, at
least for small T .
Because of Theorem 1.2.3, one might expect the existence of an equilibrium where
the one-shot equilibrium (A, In) is played every period for small T . Surprisingly, this is not
the case, even if T = 1. To see why, suppose by contradiction such an equilibrium exists.
Consider a deviation by the incumbent of playing F in period 0. Competitor 1 must then
believe the incumbent is tough with probability 1 and must play ∅ as a best response at that
history. This means that competitor 2 also believes the incumbent is tough with probability
1 (even if T = 1) because she observes h1 = ∅ and P (h1 = ∅|Weak) = 0, so she also does
not enter, and so on for every subsequent period. This means that the continuation payoff
for playing F in period 0 is c, while the continuation payoff for playing A is 0. For δ close
enough to one, −(1− δ) + δc > 0, so A is not a best response, a contradiction. Thus, there
13The problem the good mechanic and the motorists face is simply the temptation to signal, which is
why the mechanic game has a unique equilibrium if uncertainty about the mechanic’s type is removed.
Assumption 1 says that if the mechanic’s type is revealed in the middle of a repeated game that began with
uncertainty, play then proceeds as if there had never been such uncertainty because all players are better
off, i.e. renegotiation-proofness. There is no such coincidence of interests in the chain store game.
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is no result for the limited history chain store game equivalent to Theorem 1.2.3, so the
incumbent’s payoff is bounded away from 0 (the one-shot payoff as well as minmax payoff)
due to reputation, even if history is as limited as possible without eliminating the history
observation entirely.
Using their stage game, Liu and Skrzypacz (2014a) point to the existence of an
equilibrium under limited history (not limited records) where the long-run player always
mimics the commitment type on the equilibrium path with a simple grim trigger threat of
Nash reversion. A similarly simple grim trigger equilibrium does not exist for the chain
store game, but a more complicated equilibrium without entry on the equilibrium path
exists in the T = 1 case, constructed in Appendix 1.3.1. This equilibrium requires mixing
off the equilibrium path such that the incumbent always be indifferent between fighting and
acquiescing. By contrast Liu and Skrzypacz’s limited history equilibrium does not require
such indifference by the long-run player (nor do the equilibria of Theorems 1.2.2 and 1.2.3).
This similarity on the equilibrium path and dissimilarity off of it raise interesting questions
about how limited history affects reputation games more generally.
1.3.2 Fading History
This subsection assumes the fading history assumed in Subsection 1.2.2 specified by
λ. Unlike limited history, the intuition of fading history largely carries over to the chain
store game. Theorem 1.2.4 applies directly to the chain store game, and Theorem 1.2.5 uses
arguments that do not rely crucially on the specifics of the mechanic game, so an analogous
result in the chain store game can be found using these techniques. (Theorem 1.2.6 does
rely crucially on the particulars of the mechanic game and also on Assumption 1, for which
there is no justifiable analogue for the chain store game, so I do not attempt a similar result
here.)
For low λ, Theorem 1.2.4 shows that in any equilibrium the weak incumbent always
acquiesces. In this case, z = c−1 and zd = 1, so the upper bound (1.2.5) on λ is 1/[δ(c+1)].














Figure 1.3.2: The ratio of the ex ante payoff E[vtSR] for competitor t = 20 to the one-shot
payoff vSR in any chain store game equilibrium with µ
0 = 15 , b =
1
4 (note that E[v
t
SR] = vSR
at λ = 0) is plotted for values of λ ∈ [0, 13 ], which satisfy (1.2.5) for c = 2 and any δ. These
payoffs do not significantly change for periods past 20 (because ψ(λ, 20) ≈ ψ(λ,∞)).
the short-run players above that of the one-shot game. The increase here is more dramatic
than in the mechanic game because a competitor need only observe one previous period to
know if the incumbent is tough (all periods will be either F or ∅) or weak (all periods are
A). Thus, the ex ante payoff of competitor t is
E[vtSR] = ψ(λ, t)(µ
0(b− 1) + (1− µ0)b) + (1− ψ(λ, t))(1− µ0)b,
where ψ(λ, t) ≡
∏t
k=1(1− λk) is the probability of competitor t observing no history at all,
which is strictly greater than the one-shot payoff for all competitors except at period 0.14
This is straightforward to calculate and plotted in Figure 1.3.2 for some example parameters.
Finally I find a lower bound on incumbent payoffs similar to (1.3.2) for high λ.
Theorem 1.3.1. Let µ0 > 0, L(µ0) and any ε > 0 be given. Then there exists λ∗ ∈ (0, 1)
such that for any λ ∈ (λ∗, 1), the infimum vI of the set of incumbent payoffs in any sequential
equilibrium satisfies
vI(µ
0, δ, λ) ≥ δLc− (1− δL)− ε.
14ψ(λ, t) converges absolutely as t→∞ to a value in the set (0, 1) when λ ∈ (0, 1) (Apostol, 1976).
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1.4 Conclusion
For the mechanic game with limited history, reputation is bad when short-run players
have a long enough memory T . This is because early events that tarnish the mechanic’s
reputation“echo”for all following periods through the refusal of subsequent motorists to hire,
which is observed by the following motorists who consequently also refuse to hire, and so
on. When T is small enough, a myopic equilibrium exists, where the good mechanic always
plays her stage game dominant strategy (doing the correct repair). This equilibrium avoids
the bad reputation result at the expense of making reputation irrelevant — motorists never
see enough information to change their hiring decisions. In summary, for limited history,
equilibrium behavior is the same for small T as the one-shot game, and the same for large
T as the full history game. This differs qualitatively from the cyclical behavior for limited
records found by Liu and Skrzypacz (2014a).
Under fading history, when λ is less than a critical value, an equilibrium with myopic
behavior by the mechanic exists, but reputation still has an effect — sometimes motorists
are informed enough that they do not hire. This increases the short-run players’ ex ante
payoffs. The result holds generally for reputation games where the long-run player has a
strictly dominant action in the stage game: when λ is less than a critical value, the long-run
player’s equilibrium strategy is always to play the dominant action. This is because fading
history bounds the probability of an “observation chain” from the current period t to future
period t̂, where t′ > t observes t, t′′ > t′ observes t′, etc., which bounds the reputational
payoffs of any signaling strategy. By contrast, such a chain always exists in limited history,
even when T = 1, because period 1 always observes 0, period 2 always observes 1, etc. For
high λ, the bad reputation result is recovered. The result for fading history with small λ
applies directly to the chain store game, leading to a more dramatic increase in short-run
player payoffs because they need only observe one past period to learn the long-run player’s
type.
Equilibria under limited history seem qualitatively different in the chain store game
versus the mechanic game; in particular, no myopic chain store equilibrium exists like that
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of the mechanic game for small T . The folk theorems of Mailath and Olszewski (2011a) and
the purifiability result of Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2013a) offer intriguing clues for an
investigation. An interesting question is whether limited history equilibria in Stackelberg-
type games (like the chain store game) can exhibit the cyclical behavior under limited records
found by Liu and Skrzypacz or have the non-cyclical behavior of the mechanic game. More
generally, behavior in other limited history reputation games remains largely unknown and
is an interesting topic for future research.
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Chapter 2
Bounded Memory, Reputation, and Impatience
2.1 Introduction
Consider a market where a seller faces a sequence of different buyers. The buyers
choose how much to trust the seller (that is, how large of an order to place), and the
seller chooses whether to honor that trust by incurring a cost to provide a high quality
good, or instead betray it with low quality; the one-shot outcome is low trust and low
quality. Because the seller never faces the same buyer again, any incentive to provide high
quality must come from the threat of punishment by future buyers informed about today’s
action. Hence, markets often maintain records of past performance to counteract the myopic
temptation to exploit.
Most reputation models assume that the full history of past behavior is observable,
yet in many real world settings this glimpse into the past goes only so far. For example,
events on credit histories are deleted after a certain time period in many countries, as are
infractions on driving records; workers typically provide only recent references to prospective
employers when applying for jobs; and many online markets display only recent reviews of
sellers.1 Even when the full list of reviews is available, online markets often make the most
recent ones most prominent on their website (e.g. eBay); it may be safe to assume buyers
simply glance at a few of the latest reviews instead of reading all of them. Recently the
Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in Google v. Costeja that individuals have
a “right to be forgotten” and may demand that search engines remove links to certain old
1A number of these examples are pointed out by Liu and Skrzypacz (2014b), who also study a bounded
memory reputation environment.
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information “in light of the time that has elapsed.” What happens when agents know that
today’s behavior will some day be forgotten?
The first half of this chapter introduces general tools to study such environments.
The primary contribution is a recursive characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs
for a general class of bounded memory games with incomplete information (multiple player
types), presented in Section 2.3. This dynamic programming method allows analysis of
both stationary and non-stationary equilibria for the first time. Section 2.4 introduces
an equilibrium refinement I call “quasi-Markov perfection” (an extension of the standard
notion of Markov perfection from complete information games), which rules out some fragile
equilibria that are not “purifiable,” meaning they do not survive the addition of small,
independent private shocks to payoffs.
The second half of the chapter (Section 2.5) demonstrates these tools in two appli-
cations. This first is a product choice game (between a firm and a sequence of consumers)
with a Stackelberg (“honest”) commitment type and 1-period memory of the firm’s actions,
where the recursive method yields a complete characterization of the exact minimum and
maximum purifiable equilibrium payoffs for almost all discount factors and prior beliefs
on the commitment type, showing that allowing non-stationary equilibria expands the set
of equilibrium payoffs. The second application looks at the same game with very long
memory, where the dynamic programming state space grows very large and so studying
non-stationary equilibria is difficult. Fortunately, stationary equilibria have a very simple
interpretation in my framework, which is used to show that when memory is sufficiently
long, the firm receives exactly the Stackelberg payoff in all purifiable, stationary equilibria,
given any fixed discount factor (above a threshold dependent on the stage game payoffs) and
a positive prior. Both results show that introducing even very little incomplete information
has a big impact on the equilibrium set; a difference from previous results is showing that
this is true even when the long-run player is not particularly patient.
The recursive characterization builds on the dynamic programming methods of
Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) (hereafter APS) and Doraszelski and Escobar (2012)
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(hereafter DE). For the complete information case (e.g., the seller’s type is known), APS
characterize the equilibrium set for full memory, while DE characterize it for bounded mem-
ory; in both full and bounded memory, the recursive structure of these games allows the
set of equilibrium payoffs to be calculated as the largest fixed point of a “generating (set)
operator” that transforms sets of objects containing payoffs;2 this fixed point is the “largest
self-generating set.” However, the assumption of complete information is restrictive: even a
slight relaxation can dramatically change the equilibria (as shown in the applications).
I extend these techniques to incomplete information (“reputation”) under bounded
memory. More formally, I characterize the set of weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (wPBE)
payoffs of repeated games under imperfect monitoring where a long-run player, who is one
of finitely many commitment types, faces a sequence of short-run players who observe only
the K most recent periods. This presents two main challenges. The first is that in addition
to playing best responses, players must also form beliefs consistent with Bayes’ rule. I
show how these games also have a recursive structure, allowing the construction of an
analogous generating operator that, roughly speaking, transforms sets of objects containing
both payoffs and beliefs. This also yields an algorithm for computing the largest fixed point
by repeatedly applying the generating operator. The second challenge is that the first K
periods (where players still see the full history) are qualitatively different from later periods,
and so the largest fixed point of the generating operator (largest self-generating set) does
not directly give the equilibrium payoffs. Instead, the full game’s equilibrium payoffs are
found by solving for certain equilibria of a set of finitely repeated K-period games, with
payoffs augmented according to this fixed point.
This framework is necessary for studying non-stationary equilibria, where strategies
may depend on the calendar date. Previous papers studying bounded memory reputa-
tion assume stationary strategies, which requires hiding the date from short-run players.3
Though this makes the analysis much simpler, there are a variety of real-world applications
2In APS, the objects are payoffs. This is discussed in greater detail on page 37 and in Section 2.3.
3This is because although the strategies are time-independent, the beliefs and therefore best responses
may not be.
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where short-run players know the time: creditors know the age of borrowers even when
credit histories are bounded, auto insurers know the age of drivers, and buyers can observe
the age of a seller’s account on eBay. The framework enables us to explore the impact of
assuming stationarity (the application to a 1-period memory example shows that assuming
stationarity is restrictive for some priors). Nevertheless, for long memory, this dynamic pro-
gramming method becomes increasingly intractable due to the curse of dimensionality, and
so solving for non-stationary equilibria may not be possible in practice. Stationary equi-
libria have a particularly simple interpretation in this context as “self-generating points”
rather than “self-generating sets;” that is, instead of the more complicated task of find-
ing the largest set of many points that generates itself, computing stationary equilibria
means searching for individual points which generate themselves (I use this method in the
long-memory example).
To simplify application of the recursive framework, I introduce the notion of quasi-
Markov perfection. For complete information dynamic games, attention is often restricted
to Markov perfect equilibria, where players do not condition on payoff-irrelevant histories,
instead conditioning only on the payoff relevant “Markov state.” Quasi-Markov perfection
naturally extends this notion to the incomplete information environment.4 It particularly
simplifies games with one commitment type and perfect monitoring of the long-run player’s
actions. To support the argument that the simplicity of quasi-Markov equilibria does not
come at the expense of realism, I show that all non-quasi-Markov equilibria are “fragile,”
meaning they are not purifiable in the sense of Harsanyi (1973) because there are no nearby
equilibria if we add small, independent (across actions and time) private shocks to the
payoffs. That is, even very tiny private payoff information destroys all non-quasi-Markov
equilibria. This result is an extension of Bhaskar, Mailath, and Morris (2013b) (hereafter
BMM), who show that Markov perfection is a necessary condition for purifiability in a gen-
eral class of complete information, sequential-move games with bounded memory. As BMM
4I use the term “quasi-Markov” instead of “Markov” to distinguish it from the use of beliefs as Markov
states, as is often done in the literature (see Section 18.4.2 of Mailath and Samuelson (2006b) for an example).
Using beliefs as states is too coarse for the results presented here, as discussed in Section 2.4.
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argue, purifiability can be motivated by the notion that games are only approximations of
reality and so real payoffs are generally at least slightly different from the model.
These tools are then applied to a repeated sequential-move product choice game with
a sequence of short-lived consumers, who first choose between either a small or large order,
facing a long-lived firm, choosing between providing low and high quality. The firm is either
a “normal” strategic type (with a myopic incentive to exploit) or an “honest” Stackelberg
commitment type always providing high quality. The K most recent firm’s actions are
observed but those of the consumers are not.5
To put the application results in context, what does the existing literature tell us
about this game? The complete information case (only the strategic type) is well under-
stood. Under full memory, cooperation is simple to achieve via grim trigger strategies. In
fact, all payoffs between the low one-shot equilibrium payoff and the high Stackelberg pay-
off are achievable with full memory (using arguments from Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin
(1990)). However, imposing a bound on memory is disastrous. BMM show that any bound
K, no matter how high K is, means all cooperative equilibria are fragile (non-purifiable);
the only purifiable equilibrium is the repeated one-shot equilibrium.
The literature has less to say about the incomplete information case (adding the
honest type). For full memory, the standard reputation result (due to Fudenberg and Levine
(1989; 1992) and improved by Gossner (2011)) is that the firm is guaranteed a payoff close
to the high Stackelberg payoff when very patient (the discount factor δ → 1). The intuition
is that by persistently playing “honestly,” the firm could eventually convince consumers to
expect honest behavior (high quality), thereby guaranteeing a payoff close to the honest
(Stackelberg) payoff when sufficiently patient. Such full memory games are difficult to solve
beyond such bounds. With K-period memory, it is possible to achieve a similar bound via
similar arguments, by making memory long and then making the firm very patient (i.e.,
“limδ→1 limK→∞”). For a similar product choice game, Liu and Skrzypacz (2014b) improve
5This type of monitoring is called “limited records” by Liu and Skrzypacz (2014b).
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on this with a time-independent bound on stationary equilibrium payoffs. However, in both
cases the order of limits is crucial: in reverse order (“limK→∞ limδ→1”), these arguments
provide no meaningful bound. I also know of no papers that bound the payoffs for small
K.6
The first application considered is the 1-period memory case, which is appealing
because it is both the most restrictive limit on memory possible and yields a simple state
space in which to apply the recursive algorithm, yielding a complete characterization of the
minimum and maximum quasi-Markov equilibrium payoffs for all prior beliefs on the honest
type and almost all discount factors.
The analysis yields several insights. First, this technique obtains the actual mini-
mum and maximum payoffs rather than lower and upper bounds because it relies on the
convergence of the recursive algorithm instead of the traditional argument bounding the
payoff of repeatedly playing the commitment action (which may not be an equilibrium
strategy). Second, even a little bit of incomplete information (a small but positive prior
belief on the honest type) resurrects non-fragile cooperation, allowing a purifiable equilib-
rium with the Stackelberg payoff.7 Third, assuming stationary equilibria is restrictive; that
is, allowing non-stationary equilibria expands the set of equilibrium payoffs. For a range of
priors, the minimum payoff is not given by stationary equilibria, but rather by equilibria
where players and beliefs condition on the time in periodic cycles. When consumers have a
sufficiently high prior on the honest type, the maximum payoff (higher than the Stackelberg
payoff) is given by a non-stationary equilibrium where strategies have a two-period cycle.
In even periods (starting with period 0), the firm exploits “naive” cooperative customers; in
odd periods, customers know the firm is not honest, but still cooperate knowing the firm
will provide them high quality in order to exploit the next customer in the following even
6In their version of the product choice game, Liu and Skrzypacz (2014b) show that equilibrium behavior
changes, but do not show how the payoffs change for small K. This appears to be because their continuous
action spaces allow qualitatively different behavior whose corresponding payoffs are more difficult to calculate.
7Although the general result shows only that purifiability implies quasi-Markov perfection (rather than
the converse), I show in Appendix 2.3.2 that these minimum and maximum payoffs correspond to purifiable
equilibria for almost all priors.
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period.
The second application studies the effect of K growing large. For long memory, the
state space for the algorithm becomes intractably large, so I restrict attention to station-
ary equilibria by finding self-generating points instead of self-generating sets. When the
memory is long enough (K exceeds some threshold dependent on the prior), the long-run
player receives exactly the Stackelberg payoff in any stationary, purifiable equilibrium when
the discount factor is above a bound that depends only on the stage game payoffs (not the
prior). Imposing purifiability shows that reputation effects are even stronger than the pre-
vious literature suggests, since the standard “patience lower bound” on equilibrium payoffs
allows the possibility that the complete information game is robust to slightly incomplete
information so long as the long-run player is not extremely patient. In this game, less than
extreme patience is not enough to allow low payoffs — the memory must also be sufficiently
short (or totally unbounded).
This work relates to a variety of papers on repeated games and reputation. As
mentioned above, the recursive characterization is closest to DE, who extend the APS tools
(for full memory in complete information games) to equilibria where players condition only
on summary statistics of the histories — bounded memory is a special case of this.8 To
expand on the previous discussion slightly more formally (detailed discussion is saved for
Section 2.3), for full memory APS show that the equilibrium payoffs are given by the largest
self-generating set of payoff vectors (with a payoff for each long-run player). For bounded
memory, DE show the equilibrium set is given by the largest self-generating set of vector-
valued payoff functions (mapping histories to payoff vectors). The extension to incomplete
information shows that the appropriate notion is self-generating sets of objects I call HBPs,
each containing a History distribution, Belief mapping, and Payoff function. A history
distribution is a vector of probability distributions on the space of (bounded) histories
8The APS framework has been extended to a variety of other settings in the literature; a few examples
are Atkeson (1991) and Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), who study games with dynamic payoff relevant states,
and Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski (2005), who characterize belief-free equilibrium payoffs in games with private
monitoring.
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conditional on each type of long-run player; the belief mapping, which maps beliefs on
those types to each history, is only necessary for histories not in the support of the history
distribution (i.e. off the hypothetical equilibrium path). The payoff function serves the
same purpose as in DE — to keep track of continuation payoffs while breaking dependence
on past play beyond the bounds of the memory.
Other work on bounded memory and complete information under perfect monitor-
ing includes Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009), who prove a folk theorem for 1-period
memory with rich action sets, and Mailath and Olszewski (2011b), who prove a folk theorem
for bounded memory strategies. It is worth noting that bounded memory with complete
information is effectively a restriction on strategies, while bounded memory with incom-
plete information is a restriction on learning as well. For complete information, all bounded
memory equilibria are also full memory equilibria; for incomplete information, this is not
true. Under incomplete information, Monte (2013) uses the term “bounded memory” in a
different sense, but his result shows how limits on learning can lead to qualitatively different
equilibria.9 Ekmekci (2011) also studies a product choice game under incomplete informa-
tion, constructing a finite rating system that translates the history into a rating observed by
short-run players. Both papers show how restricted learning can result in permanent rep-
utation even under imperfect monitoring, in contrast to the “temporary reputation” result
of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004).
The product choice game application of Section 2.5 is closely related to that of Liu
(2011b) and particularly Liu and Skrzypacz (2014b), who both study stationary equilibria
(calendar dates are unobserved) in product choice type games. Liu (2011b) studies behav-
ior (rather than payoffs) in a model where monitoring of past firm actions is endogenous
as a costly action available to consumers; monitoring is limited by the increasing cost of
obtaining older information (instead of a fixed bound), yielding “random auditing” and rep-
utation cycles. Liu and Skrzypacz (2014b), who have a continuous stage game, assume
9Monte models “bounded memory” for a long-run player as a finite set of memory states, where a player’s
strategy is to choose an action for each state and transition rules between the states.
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a fixed bound on monitoring of past firm actions (as in this chapter), showing that all
(stationary) equilibria have consumers “riding reputation bubbles” by helping a firm that
they know is not honest build reputation to exploit future consumers. Their focus is also
on behavior, but also show a time-independent bound on payoffs which has bite for the
“limδ→1 limK→∞” limit discussed above. I focus on characterizing payoffs rather than be-
havior, but the proofs indicate that behavior in the game studied here differs from that in
Liu and Skrzypacz’s model, suggesting that a continuous action space may allow substan-
tially different dynamics.10 Where stationarity is assumed (the long-memory case), I follow
Liu (2011b) in assuming that short-run players have the improper uniform prior on the
calendar date. Liu and Skrzypacz (2014b) provide results more generally for an arbitrary
prior on the date, treating the improper uniform prior as an interesting and particularly
tractable special case.
2.2 Model
I consider a two player sequential-move stage game G, with the infinite repetition
of G denoted G∞, starting at period 0. G∞ is referred to as the full game. In keeping
with (perhaps here counter-intuitive) convention, player 1 is a long-run player (who moves
second) and player 2 is a short-run player who moves first, choosing an action from finite
action space A2. Player 1 observes player 2’s action a2 ∈ A2 and then player 1 chooses
action a1 from finite action space A1. A public signal y from finite set Y is generated
according to probability distribution ρ(y|a2, a1).
The space of action profiles is A ≡ A2 × A1 with typical action profile a. For any
finite set X, let ∆X be the set of probability distributions over X. Denote a mixed action
profile as α ∈ ∆A.
Player 1 observes the full history of actions and signals (formalized in the next
10See Footnote 28 for a more detailed explanation. It is interesting that while reputation bubble behavior
is ruled out for stationary equilibria, the 1-period memory non-stationary maximum payoff equilibrium for
“naive” consumers (with very high priors) has a similar flavor, with odd-period consumers knowingly helping
the non-honest firm exploit even-period consumers.
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Figure 2.2.1: An example stage game with two player 2 actions A2 ≡ {b1, b2}, two player 1
actions A1 ≡ {c1, c2}, and two signals Y ≡ {y1, y2}. The dotted box is used for reference in
Figure 2.3.1, enclosing the part of the game where players move rather than nature.
paragraph). Player 2 observes the K most recent public signals, but receives no other






The ex ante payoff given mixed action profile α ∈ ∆A is ui(α). Figure 2.2.1 depicts a simple
example stage game.
The set of full histories at period t is Ht ≡ (A×Y )t; let H ≡
⋃
t H
t. The focus will
primarily not be on full histories (as discussed below), so I do not use the term “history” to
refer to these. The set of full semipublic histories at some period t is Ht ≡ Y t with typical
element ht (superscript t is used to make clear the length of such a history), with the set
of all full semipublic histories H ≡
⋃∞
t=0 H
t. These are called “semipublic” because each
element of the history was public at some point in the past. Denote the concatenation of
full semipublic history ht and some signal y as hty.
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Both players observe the date, thereby allowing non-stationary behavior.11 Player
2 observes only the last K periods, which I call the public history. For period t, the
set of public histories is Y t for t < K and Y K for t ≥ K. Since short-run players are
in information sets containing a public history and the date, such pairs are called date-




t denote the set of all date-histories. This chapter is primarily concerned with
the public histories instead of the full histories (due to Lemma 2.2.1), so I often refer to a
public history simply as a “history.”
To reflect the fact that the elements of the public history h have happened in the
past, I index its elements with negative indices: h ≡ (h−K , h−K+1, ..., h−1). For periods
t ≥ K, at the end of each period the oldest element h−K is deleted, every subsequent
element is “pushed back” one space, and the newly generated signal y from the current
period’s play is appended. I denote this as hy ≡ (h−K+1, ..., h−1, y) and say y is pushed on
h.
The long-run player is one of the types in the set Θ ≡ {θ0} ∪ Θ̂, where θ0 is the
“normal type” with payoffs u∗1(a, y) given above, and Θ̂ is a finite set of “commitment types,”
where each θ̂ ∈ Θ̂ is committed to playing a (possibly mixed) action α̂θ ∈ ∆A1 every period.
Each player 2 has prior belief µ0(θ) ∈ [0, 1] for each type θ ∈ Θ, and updates those beliefs
based on the date-history according to Bayes’ rule.
A strategy for player 2 at period t is a mapping σt2 : H
t → ∆A2; that is, it depends
only on the date and public history, which I call a public strategy. For convenience, denote
the vector (σ02, σ
1
2, ...) of all player 2 strategies as σ2 : H → ∆A2, so that σ2(t, h) = σt2(h).







11I discuss stationary equilibria in an alternative specification in Section 2.3.5, where player 2 does not
observe the date and instead has the improper uniform prior on the date where she enters.
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but because of the focus on payoffs I can and will restrict attention to only public strategies
σ1 : Θ×H × A2 → ∆A1 (see Lemma 2.2.1 below). I denote the value of a strategy profile
σ ≡ (σ1, σ2) to player 1 as V (σ).
Definition 2.2.1. (σ∗, µ∗) is a weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (wPBE) if σ∗ are mutual
best responses with beliefs µ∗, and µ∗ is consistent with Bayes’ rule on the equilibrium path.
σ∗ is stationary if strategies at periods t ≥ K are independent of the calendar date.
Denote the set of strategy profiles as Σ, the set of wPBE strategy profiles as Σ∗,
the set of public strategy profiles as Σ̂, and the set of wPBE public strategy profiles as Σ̂∗.
Focus on public strategy profiles is not restrictive with respect to payoffs because of the
following lemma.
Lemma 2.2.1. Let any wPBE with strategy profile σ̃ ∈ Σ∗ be given. There exists public
wPBE strategy profile σ̄ ∈ Σ̂∗ such that V (σ̄) = V (σ̃).
2.3 Recursive Characterization of Equilibrium Payoffs
The literature on bounded memory reputation thus far has restricted attention to
stationary equilibria, where strategies depend on the public history but not the calendar date
(starting at period K). In the model here, this assumption greatly simplifies the analysis
by making the strategy space finite.12 By contrast, allowing non-stationary behavior means
players may also condition on the calendar date, making the strategy space infinite.
Assuming stationary equilibria generally requires hiding the calendar date from the
short-run player, since the equilibrium distribution of play need not be constant through
time (even with stationary strategies), so the beliefs and therefore expected payoffs (for
the short-run player) also depend on time. Hiding the date ensures that beliefs are also
constant through time, so the set of best responses is the same at all periods K,K + 1, ....






t initial histories plus the
|Y |K possible histories at periods t ≥ K, while the long-run player chooses |A2| times as many actions.
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Such models must assume short-run players arriving on and after period K have a common
prior on the current date, typically the improper uniform prior, as is done in Sections 2.3.5
and 2.5.2.
The problem of finding equilibrium payoffs in an infinite strategy space is resolved by
transforming it into a dynamic programming problem. In full-memory, complete information
repeated games — the environment of APS — the strategy space is also infinite (the space
of histories is itself infinite). The key to their framework is the strategic equivalence of
the full game and the continuation subgame; the strategies starting at any (full) history
constitute a perfect public equilibrium (PPE), and so continuation payoffs must themselves
be equilibrium payoffs.
The framework introduced here is best understood by drawing analogies between its
definitions and those of APS. I start by stating the APS approach with deliberately vague
language (with more concrete descriptions in parentheses) to hint at the intuition of my
approach.
1. Let a set of hypothetical summary statistics of future equilibrium play (continuation
payoffs) be given.
2. Given these hypothetical futures, what sort of current play (action profiles) is possible
today?
3. Combine the possible current play and hypothetical futures into a new set of hypo-
thetical summary statistics of equilibrium play (average the payoffs of the current
action profile and the hypothetical continuation payoffs to get a new set of payoffs).
APS show that if the output of step 3 yields the hypothetical input in step 1, that hypo-
thetical input describes (non-hypothetical) equilibria; this is because full memory, complete
information games have a recursive structure. I show that bounded memory, incomplete
information games also have a recursive structure, and so it is possible to use more com-
plicated “hypothetical summary statistics” and “current play” to find actual equilibrium
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values. To assist in drawing these analogies, I provide brief sketches of APS13 and DE
before discussing the incomplete information framework in Section 2.3.2.
2.3.1 Recap of APS and DE
For simplicity, assume two long-run players 1 and 2 playing a simultaneous-move
stage game with finite action spaces A1, A2, respectively, and restrict to pure strategies,
letting A ≡ A1 × A2. Assume perfect monitoring so the appropriate solution concept is
subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE). The stage payoff for player i is ui(a). Let E ⊂ R2 be
the set of pure-action SPE payoffs for each player. For any v ∈ E , there exists SPE σv with
payoffs v = V (σ), where V (σ) is the vector of values of σ to players 1 and 2.
Let F † ⊂ R2 denote the set of feasible payoffs, and let W ⊂ F † be some set of
feasible but not necessary equilibrium payoffs. If we can construct a continuation payoff
function γ : A → W on the set of hypothetical (i.e. not necessarily credible) continuation
payoffs W so that action profile a is incentive compatible for both players, the action profile
a is enforced by γ on W .
Definition 2.3.1. Let W ⊂ R2 be given. An action profile a ∈ A is enforced by γ : A→ W
if
(1− δ)ui(a) + δγi(a) ≥ (1− δ)ui(a′i, a−i) + δγi(a′i, a−i)
for all i, a′i ∈ Ai. We say that a is enforceable on W if such a function γ exists.
For a given payoff vector v ∈ F †, if there exists an action profile a enforced by some
γ on W such that the discounted average payoffs for a and the continuation payoffs γ(a)
are equal to v, i.e. for both i
vi = (1− δ)ui(a) + δγi(a), (2.3.1)
then v is decomposable on or “generated by” W . APS construct the set operator B so that
13Here I follow the notation of Section 2.5.1 of Mailath and Samuelson (2006b).
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B(W ) is the set of all payoff vectors decomposable on W .
Definition 2.3.2. Let W ⊂ R2 be given. Define
B(W ) ≡ {v ∈ R2 : ∃a ∈ A,∃γ : A→ W such that
a is enforced by γ and vi = (1− δ)ui(a) + δγi(a)}.
Any set W that generates a superset of itself, i.e. W ⊂ B(W ), is a self-generating
set. Every self-generating set is a subset of the equilibrium payoffs, and the set of equilibrium
payoffs is the largest fixed point of B.
Proposition 2.3.1 (Theorems 1 and 2, APS). The following holds:
1. Self-generation: Let any set W ⊂ R2 be given. If W ⊂ B(W ), then W ⊂ E .
2. Factorization: B(E ) = E .
APS also give an algorithm for computing E , showing that repeatedly applying B(·)
to the set of feasible payoffs converges to the set of equilibrium payoffs. This algorithm is
the basis of Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin (2003), who develop a numerical implementation
of Proposition 2.3.2.
Proposition 2.3.2 (Theorem 5, APS).
⋂∞
m=0 B
m(F †) = E .
DE extend the APS tools to equilibria which condition on summary statistics of
past play, where bounded memory is a special case. They show that the appropriate notion
is self-generating sets of vector-valued (continuation) payoff functions, rather than payoff
vectors. Why?
Consider the example model depicted in Figure 2.2.1 satisfying the specification in
Section 2.2, but leave out reputation by only allowing the normal type θ0. I recycle the
notation above by letting E ⊂ R be the set of player 1 PPE payoffs. For expositional
clarity, this discussion uses the term “decompose” informally for 1-period memory since
Section 2.3.4 (which incorporates reputation) formalizes this as a special case.
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When dealing with sets of payoffs instead of payoff functions, the APS framework
allows the freedom to choose any equilibrium payoff as a continuation payoff for any action
profile played today. Consider the“Full Game G∞”part of Figure 2.3.1 (for now ignoring the
“Pσ∗(· · · )”notation and“Variant Game”parts). The dotted boxes indicate the player actions
of each stage game, corresponding to the dotted box in Figure 2.2.1. With full memory,
continuation play at the history y1y2 at period 2 can be different from continuation play at
the history y2y2, since players may always condition on the outcome of period 0. Hence the
continuation payoff V (y1y2) can differ from V (y2y2). Define functions γ
y1 : Y → R, γy2 :
Y → R so that γy(y′) = V (yy′). Thus, the continuation payoffs following period 1 for history
y1, specified by γ
y1 , may be different from those at history y2, specified by γ
y2 ; that is, APS
allow γy1 6= γy2 . Instead of keeping track of these continuation payoff functions, APS
keep track of the individual payoffs {γy1(y1), γy1(y2), γy2(y1), γy2(y2)} ⊂ E , constructing
(possibly different) continuation payoff functions at each history for each period. Knowing
that four payoffs W 2 ≡ {ṽ1, ṽ2, ṽ3, ṽ4} ⊂ E is sufficient to know that any two payoffs
W 1 ≡ {v1, v2} decomposable on W 2 are also PPE payoffs starting at period 1, which can
serve as continuation payoffs for play at period 0, decomposing some v as the payoff for the
whole equilibrium.
With 1-period memory, the only time players may condition on the outcome of period
0 is period 1. In Figure 2.3.1, the nodes labeled with“B1”are strategically equivalent to each
other, as are the nodes labeled with “B2.” Thus, 1-period memory imposes the restriction
that V (y1y1) = V (y2y1) and V (y1y2) = V (y2y2). Thus, we are forced to pick a pair of
continuation payoffs at period 1, rather than four, so that the continuation payoff functions
above are equal: γy1 = γy2 . Put another way, we must choose one continuation payoff
function, instead of two. Let E ⊂ R denote the set of 1-period memory PPE payoffs for
player 1, and let E denote the set of continuation payoff functions in all PPEs: that is,
γ ∈ E if and only if there exists some 1-period memory equilibrium σ′ and some period t
such that the continuation payoffs V (σ′|t, y) at period t satisfy V (σ′|t, y) = γ(y) for both
y ∈ {y1, y2}. The fact that four payoffs W 2 ≡ {v1, v2, v3, v4} ⊂ E is insufficient to know






































































— perhaps so that γ2(y1) = v
1, γ2(y2) = v
2 — then we can decompose another payoff
function γ1 at period 1, so that γ1 gives the continuation payoffs for play following period
0. Finally, a single payoff v (rather than another payoff function) for the whole equilibrium
can be calculated by finding actions for period 0 that are enforced by γ1, giving v as the
discounted average payoff, similarly to (2.3.1).
2.3.2 Overview of the Framework
The dynamic programming methods of APS, DE, and this chapter are all driven by
the recursive aspects of their environments. Summarizing, the key insight used by APS is
that the continuation game at any history is strategically equivalent to the full game; the
key insight used by DE is more cumbersome to state but similar: with K-period memory,
the |Y |K-length vector of continuation games for each public history at period t ≥ K is
strategically equivalent to the analogous vector at any other period t′ ≥ K.14
The central insight used by this chapter’s framework is that with bounded memory
and incomplete information, continuation play is almost strategically equivalent to the full
repeated game. In fact, it is equivalent to a slightly modified version of the full game where
period 0 is endowed with an exogenous, fictitious initial history of length K, randomly
drawn from a distribution dependent on the long-run player type. I show how to rephrase
the DE insight in the following useful way, for now assuming complete information (no
reputation). Construct a modified version of the full game that I call a variant game, where
nature randomly picks a fictitious initial history of length K before play begins. Without
reputation, this initial history is payoff irrelevant, but players may condition on it. Since
nature’s choice is payoff irrelevant, the probabilities with which nature picks each initial
history are also payoff irrelevant. Suppose that the variant game is defined so that nature
picks the initial history according the equilibrium distribution of play at some period t ≥ K
in some equilibrium σ∗ of the full game. More formally, let Pσ∗((t, h
t) = (t, h0)) denote
14These vectors are equivalent to functions mapping public histories to continuation games, hence “self-
generating payoff functions.”
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the probability that the period t public history is h0 under strategy profile σ∗. In the
variant game, nature picks initial history h0 with probability Pσ∗((t, h
t) = (t, h0)). Define
strategy profile σ̃ for the variant game so that for each public history hk in period k,
σ̃|(k,hk) = σ∗|(t+k,ht+k) — that is, σ̃ starting at period 0 is identical to σ∗ starting at period
t. Then the equilibrium distribution of play in σ̃ will be identical to that of σ∗, shifted t
periods earlier.
The equilibrium distribution of play is payoff irrelevant with complete information,
but when the long-run player’s type is unknown, it is critical because it determines beliefs. If
the fictitious initial history is drawn according to a distribution conditional on the type, the
initial history affects beliefs. If these conditional distributions are equal to the conditional
distributions of public histories in some period t ≥ K in an equilibrium σ∗ of the full game,
then the beliefs in the variant game at period 0 are the same as the beliefs specified by
σ∗ at t for histories on the equilibrium path.15 Furthermore, defining a strategy profile σ̃
for the variant game as in the previous paragraph ensures that the conditional equilibrium
distributions are identical, shifted t periods earlier, so beliefs on the equilibrium path are
also identical, shifted t periods earlier. Roughly speaking, an equilibrium of the full game
starting at period t specifies an equilibrium of a variant game, and an equilibrium of a
variant game specifies possible period t continuation play in an equilibrium of the full game
whose probability distribution over public histories at period t matches the initial history
distribution of the variant game.
2.3.3 Preliminaries and Variant Games
The usefulness of APS stems from the fact that given a set of hypothetical payoffs
W , we can prove that these are actually equilibrium payoffs by applying B(·) and check-
ing that W ⊂ B(W ) (i.e. W is self-generating). Similarly, this section constructs objects
that are hypothetical properties of an equilibrium — specifically hypothetical probability
distributions over public histories, hypothetical beliefs on public histories, and hypothet-
15I ignore off-equilibrium beliefs for now, dealing with them later.
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ical continuation payoff functions. I begin by introducing these three main hypothetical
“primitives,” which are subsequently combined.
Definition 2.3.3. A history distribution (HD) φ : Θ→ ∆Y K is a function mapping a type θ
to a conditional probability distribution φ(·|θ) ∈ ∆Y K over public histories, giving a proba-
bility φ(h|θ) for observing history h conditional on type θ ∈ Θ, such that
∑
h∈Y K φ(h|θ) = 1.
The support of φ is suppφ ≡ {h ∈ Y K |∃θ ∈ Θ, φ(h, θ) > 0}. The set of all HDs is Φ.
Let some history distribution φ be given. In a hypothetical equilibrium whose prob-
ability distribution over public histories at period t matches φ, for any h on the equilibrium
path (i.e. h ∈ suppφ) the belief of player 2 that the type is θ upon observing history h is
given by Bayes’ rule, updating from the prior µ0. For off-equilibrium histories, beliefs must
be defined but are not restricted, so I construct an object to store hypothetical beliefs that
are consistent with φ on its support. Note that when φ has full support (suppφ = Y K),
this is redundant.
Definition 2.3.4. Let any history distribution φ ∈ Φ be given. A function µ : Θ× Y K →





, ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Denote the set of all belief mappings consistent with φ as Mφ.
Note that I do not construct hypothetical beliefs for the full history (unknown
to short-run players) because such beliefs are payoff irrelevant: the long-run player (who
knows the full history) does not condition on it. Finally, I introduce the third hypothetical
“primitive.”
Definition 2.3.5. A payoff function (PF) is a function γ : Y K → R that maps from a
public history to a payoff. The set of all PFs is denoted Γ.
Since all three pieces of hypothetical “continuation information” are needed to know
what kind of current period behavior can be “enforced,” I combine the three primitives into
the following composite objects.
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Definition 2.3.6. A history distribution and belief mapping (HB) is a pair (φ, µ) where
φ ∈ Φ and µ ∈Mφ. Denote the set of all HBs as M ≡ {(φ, µ) : φ ∈ Φ, µ ∈Mφ}.
Definition 2.3.7. A history distribution, belief mapping and payoff function object (HBP)
is a triplet (φ, µ, γ) containing the HB (φ, µ) ∈ M and a payoff function γ ∈ Γ. The set of
all HBPs is denoted W.
An HBP is the analogue of a payoff vector in APS and the analogue of a payoff
function in DE (indeed, with only one long-run player type the HB part becomes irrelevant,
effectively simplifying to a payoff function). In APS language, characterizing the “largest
self-generating set” of HBPs (defined formally in Section 2.3.4) is the central aim.
For each HB (φ, µ), I construct a modified version of the full game where an exoge-
nous, fictitious history is drawn according to φ.
Definition 2.3.8. Let any HB (φ, µ) ∈ M be given. Define the (φ, µ)-variant game G∞φ,µ
as follows.
1. Starting in period 0, a different short-run player 2 enters each period and plays the
stage game G with long-run player 1 (as in G∞).
2. Just before period 0, nature exogenously sets the public history to some initial history
h0 ∈ Y K with probability φ(h0|θ) conditional on player 1’s type θ ∈ Θ. The first
short-run player (in period 0) observes h0, and the period 0 signal y0 is pushed on
h0, yielding public history h0y0 for the period 1 player, and so on (just as in the full
game G∞ at period K and later).
3. For any wPBE (σ∗, µ∗) of the variant game G∞φ,µ, strategies and beliefs are required
to be defined at all initial histories, even those chosen with probability 0 by nature,
so that µ∗(θ|h0) = µ(θ|h0) for all h0 ∈ Y K .
The third condition is a bit unusual because it is nature’s choice, not player behavior,
that keeps a history h /∈ suppφ off the equilibrium path, yet I still require strategies and
beliefs to be defined there.
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Variant games are “real” games in their own right, but they are of interest because
continuation play in any equilibrium of the full game is strategically equivalent to the
beginning of some variant game. This strategic equivalence is illustrated more precisely in
Figure 2.3.1. Focus first on the left half of the figure. Let some wPBE (σ∗, µ∗) be given
for the full game G∞. At the labels A1, A2, B1, and B2, I list the probability Pσ∗(h|θ) of
reaching the corresponding public history h conditional on type θ under strategy profile σ∗,
along with the belief µ∗(θ|h) on the type θ upon reaching public history h. Note that both
nodes labeled with “B1” have the same beliefs and are strategically equivalent, as are the
two nodes labeled “B2.”
Turn now to the right half of the figure. Define HB (φ1, µ1) ∈M so that φ1(h1|θ) =
Pσ∗(h
1|θ) and µ1(θ|h1) = µ∗(h1|θ) for each h1 ∈ Y and θ ∈ Θ. Similarly define HB
(φ2, µ2) ∈ M so that φ2(h2|θ) = Pσ∗(h2|θ) and µ2(θ|h2) = µ∗(h2|θ) for each h2 ∈ Y and
θ ∈ Θ. Note that σ∗|y1 (i.e. σ∗ starting at the A1 node in the full game) defines a PBE
for the variant game G∞φ1,µ1 starting at the A1 node. Conversely, given any wPBE (σ̃, µ̃) of
the variant game G∞φ1,µ1 , it can be “plugged into” σ
∗ starting at period 1 — replacing the
strategies and beliefs at periods 1 and later — and the newly merged strategy profile will
constitute another wPBE of the full game.16
I now construct the primary set of interest D ⊂ W, which is shown in the next
section to be the “largest self-generating set” in the next section. In APS terms, it is the
analogue to the set E of equilibrium payoffs; in DE terms, it is the analogue to the set E
of equilibrium continuation payoff functions. Let Σφ,µ denote the set of strategy profiles
16This is more precisely stated as follows. Define “merged” wPBE (σ̄, µ̄) so that:
1. At period 0, take the strategies from the original full game strategy profile: σ̄(∅) = σ∗(∅).
2. Period 1 beliefs are taken from the original full game beliefs (which are the same as those specified
for the variant game): µ̄(h1|θ) = µ∗(h1|θ) = µ1(h0|θ).
3. For periods 1, 2, ..., the strategies are taken from the variant game strategy profile, shifted 1 period
back: σ̄t(h) = σ̃t(ht−1) for all t ≥ 1, h ∈ Y .
4. For periods 2, 3, ..., the beliefs are taken from the variant game beliefs, shifted 1 period back:
µ̄(θ|(t, h)) = µ̃(θ|(t− 1, h)) for all t ≥ 2, h ∈ Y .
It is straightforward to see that µ̄ must be consistent with σ̄, and that σ̄1, σ̄2 are mutual best responses.
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for variant game G∞φ,µ, and denote Σ
∗
φ,µ as the set of wPBE strategy profiles for G
∞
φ,µ (not
the full game). Let V (σ̃|h0) denote the value of strategy profile σ̃ ∈ Σφ,µ to player 1,
conditional on the realization of h0 as the initial history. For each σ̃ ∈ Σφ,µ, define payoff
function γσ̃φ,µ : Y
K → R so that γσ̃φ,µ(h) = V (σ̃|h). Define Γ∗φ,µ ≡ {γσ̃φ,µ : σ̃ ∈ Σ∗φ,µ} as the
set of payoff functions for wPBEs of the (φ, µ)-variant games; note that without reputation,
Γ∗φ,µ would be the same as E from DE (see Section 2.3.1).
Definition 2.3.9. For each HB (φ, µ) ∈M, define Dφ,µ ≡ {(φ, µ, γσ̃φ,µ) ∈W : σ̃ ∈ Σ∗φ,µ;∀y ∈
Y K , γσ̃φ,µ(y) = V (σ|y)} as the set of all HBPs containing HB (φ, µ) and the payoff function
γσ̃φ,µ, where for each h ∈ Y K , the value γσ̃φ,µ(h) gives player 1’s payoff for a wPBE of the
(φ, µ)-variant game, conditional on initial history realization h. Define D ≡
⋃
(φ,µ)∈MDφ,µ
as the set of all such HBPs for all the variant games.
It is worth pausing to clarify the purpose and meaning of the above constructions.
An HBP (φ, µ, γ) is a hypothetical description of the properties of an equilibrium of the
full game G∞ at some period t ≥ K; this is similar to how, in APS, a payoff vector v ∈ R2
is a hypothetical description of an equilibrium at some history in a complete information
repeated game with full memory. Those hypothetical properties are the probability distri-
bution over the public histories conditional on type, the beliefs at each public history, and
the payoffs of the long-run player starting at each of those histories.
Given an HB (φ, µ), the (φ, µ)-variant game is an actual game, but it is useful be-
cause of its strategic equivalence to continuation play at some period t ≥ K of a hypothetical
equilibrium of the full game, whose equilibrium distribution of play and beliefs at t “match”
the hypothetical description given by (φ, µ). The set Dφ,µ is the set of all HBPs contain-
ing HB (φ, µ) and an equilibrium payoff function for the (φ, µ)-variant game, meaning a
function mapping initial histories to the payoffs conditional on that initial history being
realized; this can alternately be stated as Dφ,µ = {(φ, µ)} × Γ∗φ,µ. Finally, D is the union
over all these HBPs.
Any element (φ, µ, γ) ∈ D tells us that in the (φ, µ)-variant game, there exists an
equilibrium where player 1 receives payoff γ(h) if initial history h is realized. It also tells
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us that if there exists an equilibrium of the full game whose equilibrium distribution and
beliefs over the histories at some period t match (φ, µ), then there also exists an equilibrium
that matches (φ, µ) and has payoff γ(h) upon arriving at history h in that period.
2.3.4 Self-Generation
This section defines the notions of enforceability, decomposition and self-generation,
followed by the main results for Section 2.3. Before proceeding, one more hypothetical
primitive must be defined. For full memory, APS use action profiles as a description of
“current play,” but this is insufficient for my purpose: I cannot pick just any action profile for
each full history, since players only condition on the most recent K periods. This is similar
to the reason we must use payoff functions rather than payoffs themselves. For complete
information, DE use functions mapping from the public history to an action profile. I abuse
notation by reusing α, using context to indicate whether it is a mixed action profile versus
an “action profile mapping.”
Definition 2.3.10. An action profile mapping (AM) α : Y K × Θ → ∆A2 × (∆A1)A2 is a
mapping from a public history h and type θ to mixed actions for each player α(·|h, θ) ≡
(α2(·|h), α1(·|ha2, θ)), where α(a|h, θ) denotes the probability of pure action profile a be-
ing played given h and θ. This is often written as α(h, θ) for brevity. For each θ̂ ∈ Θ̂,
α1(ha2, θ̂) = α̂θ̂ for all ha2 ∈ Y
K ×A2. The set of all AMs is denoted A.
With full memory, the APS notion of “enforceability” captures the requirement that
hypothetical current behavior (an action profile) is consistent with hypothetical future be-
havior (continuation payoffs). With complete information, the only consistency needed is
incentive compatibility. Reputation adds the additional issue that current behavior deter-
mines future beliefs (and therefore future payoffs), and so requires an additional consistency
requirement besides incentive compatibility.
I call this requirement “inducibility.” Call the current period “today” and the next
“tomorrow.” Let some HBP (φ̃, µ̃, γ̃) be given, serving as a description of hypothetical
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future behavior starting tomorrow, including the hypothetical tomorrow’s distributions over
histories and beliefs (φ̃, µ̃). Today’s hypothetically consistent play must not only be enforced
by the payoffs starting tomorrow; it must also yield a distribution of histories that matches
what tomorrow’s players expect (i.e. φ̃). However, today’s play, described by an action
profile mapping α, is not sufficient to give this consistency since players condition on the
public history observed today, which is itself random (generated by yesterday’s players).
Let the HB (φ, µ) describe the probability distribution for the history observed today (i.e.
the probability distribution of yesterday’s play) and today’s beliefs. Together, (φ, µ) and α
specify the (unique) probability distribution of the histories observed tomorrow. Thus, it
will be useful to combine HBs and AMs in a composite object I call an “HBA,” analogous
to the an action profile in APS.
Definition 2.3.11. A history distribution, belief mapping and action profile mapping ob-
ject (HBA) (φ, µ, α) is a triplet containing an HB (φ, µ) combined with an AM α. The set
of all HBAs is denoted X ≡M×A.
Define τ(h′) ≡ {h ∈ Y K : ∀k ∈ {K, ..., 2}, h−k+1 = h′−k} as the set of public histories
that can “be followed by h′,” i.e. the K − 1 oldest elements of h′ are the same as the K − 1
most recent elements of h.
Definition 2.3.12. The set of new HBs that are inducible by the HBA x ≡ (φ, µ, α) is









φ(h|θ)α2(a2|h)α1(a1|ha2, θ)ρ(y|a2, a1) (2.3.2)
and µ̃ ∈Mφ̃ (i.e. µ̃ is pinned down by Bayes’ rule on the support of φ̃).
This completes the definition of hypothetical description of current play, the HBA
(analogous to an action profile in APS), and Section 2.3.3 constructed the hypothetical
description of future play, the HBP (analogous to a continuation payoff vector in APS). It
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is now possible to define the incomplete information notion of enforceability, which requires
that current and future play be consistent in terms of incentives (as in APS and DE) as
well as in terms of beliefs (captured by inducibility).
Definition 2.3.13. For any W ⊂ W, an HBA x ≡ (φ, µ, α) ∈ X is enforceable on W if
there exists HBP w̃ ≡ (φ̃, µ̃, γ̃) ∈W such that
1. Inducibility: the distribution over histories and beliefs must be consistent: (φ̃, µ̃) ∈
Υ(x) (see Definition 2.3.12).













for all a′2 ∈ A2.
3. Long-run player incentive compatibility: player 1 has no profitable deviations:
for all h ∈ Y K , a2 ∈ A2, a′1 ∈ A1,











where Va2(x, w̃) ∈ Γ is a payoff function.
The HBP w̃ enforces the HBA x.
The function Va2(x, w̃)(h) defined in (2.3.4) gives the discounted average player 1
payoff upon arriving at public history h, conditional on player 2 action a2. Define V(x, w̃) ∈
Γ to give the actual expected player 1 payoff upon arriving at h by averaging over player




I now define corresponding notion of “decomposability.” Roughly speaking, an HBP
w ≡ (φ, µ, γ) is decomposed or “generated” by another HBP w̃ ≡ (φ̃, µ̃, γ̃) if there exists an
HBA (φ, µ, α) enforced by w̃, so that the payoffs of those in α and γ̃ “average” out to those
in γ.
Definition 2.3.14. An HBP w ≡ (φ, µ, γ) ∈W is decomposable on W ⊂W if there exists
action profile mapping α ∈ A such that
1. x ≡ (φ, µ, α) is enforced by some w̃ ≡ (φ̃, µ̃, γ̃) ∈W , and
2. for all h ∈ Y K , γ(h) = V(x, w̃)(h).
The HBP w is decomposed (or “generated”) by the pair (x, w̃) (on W ).
The following is my version of the APS B(·) operator (from Definition 2.3.2) and
“self-generation.”
Definition 2.3.15. For any W ⊂W, define
B(W ) ≡ {(φ, µ, γ) ∈W : γ = V(x, w̃) for some x ∈ X enforced by some w̃ ∈W}.
Definition 2.3.16. A set of HBPs W ⊂W is self-generating if W ⊂ B(W ).
It is now possible to state the self-generation and factorization results (analogous to
Proposition 2.3.1 from APS), showing that D is the largest self-generating set. Recall from
Section 2.3.3 that the set D is, roughly speaking, the set of all HBPs (φ, µ, γ) such that
for the (φ, µ)-variant game (G∞φ,µ), γ(h) gives the player 1 payoffs in some equilibrium of
G∞φ,µ when the (fictitious) initial history h is realized. These HBPs are of interest because
they describe equilibrium payoffs for the full game G∞ starting at period K (when the
public history gets “full”), conditional on the existence of a hypothetical equilibrium whose
distribution over histories at period K matches the distribution specified by φ.
To summarize, the following proposition characterizes D, which specifies the full
game equilibrium payoffs at period K for all hypothetical equilibrium behavior in the initial
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periods 0, ...,K − 1. Further below I will show how to calculate what we are ultimately
interested in, the set E of equilibrium payoffs (at period 0), from D.
Proposition 2.3.3. The following hold:
1. Self-generation: Suppose that a bounded set W ⊂W is self-generating. Then W ⊂
D.
2. Factorization: D = B(D).
Before presenting the algorithm, I define its initial starting point, the feasible set
of HBPs. Let F † ⊂ R be the set of feasible payoffs for player 1, and let F† ≡ {(φ, µ, γ) ∈
W : ∀h ∈ Y K , γ(h) ∈ F †} denote the set of feasible HBPs (the set of all HBs paired with
all payoff functions with feasible values). Repeatedly applying the B(·) operator to this set
converges to D.




I carry this algorithm out by hand when applying it to the product choice game
in Section 2.5.1. Developing a numerical implementation like that of Judd, Yeltekin, and
Conklin (2003) is a particularly interesting avenue for future research, given the complexity
of these games.
The difficult part of the analysis is behind us, having characterized the possible
equilibrium payoffs at period K, and can now turn to the ultimate objective of calculating
the set E of wPBE payoffs of the full game for player 1. Once the possible equilibrium
payoffs at period K are known, finding E boils down to solving the equilibrium payoffs of
a full-memory, finitely repeated game with periods 0, ...,K − 1, with payoffs augmented
at the end of period K − 1 by the discounted continuation payoffs in γ for some HBP
(φ, µ, γ) ∈ D, with the additional requirement that equilibrium behavior match φ so that
beliefs are consistent.
For each payoff function, construct such a finitely repeated game, calling it an “an-
tegame” since it represents the first K periods of play in the full game.
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Definition 2.3.17. Let any payoff function γ be given. The γ-antegame is defined as
follows. Player 1’s type θ is drawn with probability µ0(θ), and the stage game G is
repeated K times (with first period 0), with all players observing the full history. Let
h ≡ (h0, ..., hK−1) ∈ Y K denote the public history at the end of this game. Each short-run
player 2 in period t receives their (ex-post) stage payoff u∗2(a
t, y) where at, yt are the action





t, yt) + δKγ(h).
Let Σ∗γ denote that set of wPBE strategy profiles for the γ-antegame.
As above, let V (σ̃) denote the value of σ̃ ∈ Σ∗γ to player 1. Let Pσ̃(h|θ) be the
probability of “final history” h ∈ Y K given σ̃ ∈ Σ∗γ and type θ ∈ Θ. For each w ≡ (φ, µ, γ),
define
E(φ,µ,γ) ≡ {V (σ̃) : σ̃ ∈ Σ∗γ ;∀h ∈ Y K , Pσ̃(h|θ) = φ(h|θ)} (2.3.6)
as the set of payoffs of equilibria of the γ-antegame whose conditional probability distribu-
tion of final histories matches φ. The following operator summarizes this process.
Definition 2.3.18. Let a set of HBPs W ∈ W be given. Define V(W ) ≡ {v ∈ Ew : w ∈
W} ⊂ R.
Again, applying the V operator to a set of HBPs means solving the relatively simple
task of finding the wPBE payoffs of finitely K-repeated games with full memory. Finally,
applying the V operator to D yields the equilibrium payoffs of the full game.
Proposition 2.3.5. For any set of HBPs W ⊂ D, V(W ) ⊂ E. Furthermore, V(D) = E.
I conclude by summarizing the full procedure of solving for the equilibrium payoffs.
First, repeatedly apply the B(·) operator to the set F† of feasible HBPs, yielding the set
D (as in Proposition 2.3.4). Second, apply the V(·) operator to D, yielding the set E of
equilibrium payoffs (as in Proposition 2.3.5).
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2.3.5 Stationary Equilibria
Previous analysis of bounded memory reputation environments (e.g. Liu (2011b)
and Liu and Skrzypacz (2014b)) has generally restricted attention to equilibria with sta-
tionary strategies, that is, strategies that do not depend on the calendar date (for periods
t ≥ K). If short-run players observe the calendar date, there may not be a wPBE with such
strategies since beliefs, and therefore incentives, may depend on the calendar date. Let two
public histories ht ∈ Ht, h̃t′ ∈ Ht′ for t, t′ ≥ K which are identical except for the period
(t 6= t′), i.e. for every k ∈ {K, ..., 1}, ht−k = h̃t
′




no guarantee that short-run player best response in period t at public history ht is a best
response in a different period t′ with h̃t
′
w ht since beliefs and thus expected payoffs may
differ. This is not a problem if the equilibrium distribution of histories at each period is
identical for all periods t ≥ K, but such an assumption may be quite restrictive.
Definition 2.3.19. Let σ ∈ Σ be a strategy profile of the full game. σ is stationary if it
depends only on the public history and is independent of the calendar date; that is, for two
histories ht, h̃t
′







Instead, assume short-run players do not observe the calendar date, except for peri-
ods 0, ...,K − 1 where the length of the history gives the date away. Thus, the set of public
histories in this specification is H ≡
⋃K
t=0 Y
K . Instead, they have the improper uniform























where P tσ(h|θ) is the probability of history h at period t given strategy profile σ and long-run
player type θ.
It turns out that combining the “time-average” history distribution φ (given by the
limit terms in (2.3.7)) with the corresponding belief mapping µ and payoff function γ, with
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values are given by the continuation payoffs of σ, yields a self-generating singleton HBP
(φ, µ, γ).
Proposition 2.3.6. For any stationary wPBE (σ∗, µ∗), there exists an HBP w ≡ (φ, µ, γ)
such that w ∈ B({w}), i.e. w is decomposed by some HBA x ≡ (φ, µ, α) ∈ X and itself,
where the following are satisfied: α2(h) = σ
∗




and V (h) = γ(h), for all h ∈ Y K , a2 ∈ A2 and θ ∈ Θ.
This gives stationary equilibria in the game with unobserved calendar date a very
simple interpretation within the framework outlined in Section 2.3.4. Characterizing the
set of non-stationary equilibrium payoffs requires characterizing the largest self-generating
set of HBPs, while characterizing the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs only requires
searching the HBP space for self-generating points.
2.4 Purifiability and Quasi-Markov Equilibria
The previous section provides an algorithm (Propositions 2.3.4 and 2.3.5) to cal-
culate the set of wPBE payoffs. Even when the HBP space has few dimensions, carrying
out the algorithm remains a daunting task. To get a sense of this, let an HB (φ, µ) and
an HBP w̃ ≡ (φ̃, µ̃, γ̃) be given. Finding the set of action profile mappings α that make
(φ, µ, α) enforceable by w̃ essentially amounts to finding the set of Bayes Nash equilibria
of a one-shot sequential move game whose outcome probability distributions match φ̃.17
Given even a singleton set of HBPs W̃ ≡ {w̃}, finding the set of decomposed HBPs B(W̃ )
17To clarify, this one-shot game consists of the following four steps:
1. Nature chooses randomly chooses a history h ∈ Y K with probability φ(h|θ), which is not payoff
relevant except that it affects beliefs as it is correlated with player 1’s type.
2. Player 2 chooses an action a2 ∈ A2.
3. Player 1 chooses an action a1 ∈ A1.
4. Nature chooses y ∈ Y according with probability ρ(y|a2, a1).
Then player 2 receives payoff u∗2(a2, a1, y) and player 1 receives (1− δ)u∗1(a2, a1, y) + δγ̃(hy). The task is to
find equilibria of this game such that history h and signal y occur with probability φ̃(hy|θ).
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means solving the above problem for every possible HB (φ, µ) (of which there are infinitely
many).18
This section introduces an equilibrium refinement, which I call “quasi-Markov per-
fection,” which greatly simplifies the set of strategies (i.e. HBAs) that must be considered
in cases where the long-run player’s actions are perfectly monitored and there is exactly
one commitment type, as is the case with the applications in Section 2.5. In complete
information dynamic games with a stochastic payoff-relevant state variable, applied work
has often restricted attention to Markov perfect equilibria, defined as having strategies that
condition only on the current state. Here, the stage game payoffs are static — there is only
one Markov state in this sense — but the short-run player’s expected payoffs are “dynamic”
because beliefs change depending on the public history (and possibly time). Quasi-Markov
perfection is the natural extension of Markov perfection to this incomplete information
environment.
Besides enhancing tractability, quasi-Markov perfection has another virtue: the equi-
libria that it rules out are all“fragile”because they are not purifiable in the sense of Harsanyi
(1973). Non-purifiable equilibria are not robust to arbitrarily small private, independent
payoff shocks. I show this by extending the results of BMM, who prove that for complete
information dynamic sequential move games with bounded memory, all purifiable equilibria
are Markov perfect. As BMM point out, models cannot hope to describe reality perfectly
and so at least some private payoff information is always present, so it is argued that this
refinement does not come at the expense of realism.
At first glance, it may seem that beliefs are the appropriate extension of Markov
states, as they determine the expected short-run player payoffs. However, such an equiva-
lence class is too coarse for our purposes because two histories with the same beliefs today
may lead to different beliefs tomorrow even if today’s public signal is the same. For ex-
ample, suppose (as will be done in Section 2.5) that the long-run player has two actions
18It means finding the set of Bayes Nash equilibria for every possible probability distribution for nature’s
move in step 1 of Footnote 17.
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A1 ≡ {C,D}, with a single commitment type θ̂ who always plays C, and suppose that the
long-run player’s action (and only her action) is perfectly monitored (formally, Y ≡ {C,D}
and ρ(a1|a2, a1) = 1 for all a2 ∈ A2). Let the memory length be K = 2, and assume the
belief µ(θ̂|h) = 0 for any history h containing the non-commitment action D. Consider the
situation of having history h ≡ DD versus history h′ ≡ DC today. Both histories have
belief 0, yet if C is played today, the belief tomorrow is µ(hC) = µ(DC) = 0 in the former
case versus µ(h′C) = µ(CC) ≥ µ0(θ̂) > 0 in the latter.
Quasi-Markov perfection allows different behavior at histories with the same beliefs
today as long as they lead to different beliefs sometime in the future. A quasi-Markov
state is defined as including all histories h, h′ which have the same beliefs today’s period
t (µt(h) = µt(h′)), will lead to the same beliefs tomorrow following any signal yt+1 today
(µt+1(hyt+1) = µt(h′yt+1)), and the same beliefs the next day following tomorrow’s signal
yt+2 (µt+1(hyt+1yt+2) = µt(h′yt+1yt+2)), and so on forever.
Definition 2.4.1. Let any public wPBE (σ, µ) be given. For any period t, two date-histories
(t, h), (t, h′) ∈ Ht are in the same quasi-Markov state for player 2, denoted (t, h) ∼ (t, h′), if
they have the same beliefs at the current period t and for any given continuation history yk ∈
Y k for any k ≥ 1; that is, µ(θ|(t, hyk)) = µ(θ|(t+k, h′yk)) for all θ ∈ Θ, k ∈ {1, ...}, yk ∈ Y k.
Two player 2 actions a2, a
′
2 ∈ A2 are incentive-equivalent if ρ(y|a2, a1) = ρ(y|a′2, a1) for all
a1 ∈ A1, and
u1(a2, a1)− u1(a2, a′1) = u1(a′2, a1)− u1(a′2, a′1) ∀a1, a′1 ∈ A1.
Two player 1 date-histories (t, ha2), (t, h
′a′2) are in the same quasi-Markov state for player
1 if a2 and a
′
2 are incentive equivalent (a2 ∼ a′2) and (t, h), (t, h′) have the same beliefs for
any continuation history yk ∈ Y k for all k ≥ 1 (but not necessarily at the current history,
i.e. k = 0).
The equilibrium (σ, µ) is quasi-Markov perfect if strategies are the same within a
quasi-Markov state for each player: σ2(t, h) = σ2(t, h
′) and σ1(t, ha2) = σ1(t, h
′a′2) for all
(t, h), (t, h′) ∈ Ht and a2, a′2 ∈ A2 such that (t, h) ∼ (t, h′) and (t, ha2) ∼ (t, h′a′2).
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To see how quasi-Markov perfection simplifies the strategy space, consider the ex-
ample mentioned earlier. The histories CD and DD are in the same quasi-Markov state
because both give belief 0 today, and no matter what today’s signal yt is (either C or
D), the belief tomorrow (and in fact the whole history) will also be the same (formally,
CDyt = DDyt for both yt ∈ {C,D}). The other two histories DC,CC are each in distinct
quasi-Markov states, so there are three total states for K = 2.
For K = 3, there are four states. The histories DDD,CDD,DCD,CCD are all
in the same state because all have belief 0 in the present period t, belief 0 the next period
t + 1 following signal C, belief 0 in period t + 2 following another signal C, and after a
third signal C all the histories become CCC (after signal D they have belief 0, of course).
The other three states are {DDC,CDC}, {DCC} and {CCC}. Note that in this example,
quasi-Markov perfection means conditioning on when the most recent D event occurred, a
point fleshed out in the application in Section 2.5.
I now construct the (ψ, ε)-perturbed game, largely following the construction given
by BMM. Let Zi be a full-dimensional, closed subset of [0, 1]
|Ai| for each player i, and let
Z ≡ Z2×Z1. Let ∆∗(Z) be the set of measures which have support Z generated by strictly
positive densities. At each full history h ∈ H a payoff shock z ≡ (z2, z1) ∈ Z is drawn
according to ψ ∈ ∆∗(Z). The payoff shocks are independent across the two players and the
histories. The complete history with shocks at period t is h̃ ∈ H̃t ≡ (A × Y × Z)t; also
denote the set of player 1 full histories with shocks at period t as H̃t1 ≡ (A×Y ×Z1)t×A2,




1. If player i chooses action ai, then εz
ai
i is added to her stage payoff,
where ε > 0 and zai . Player i’s (ex-post) payoff for action profile a, signal y and shock zi is
ũi(a, y, zi) = u
∗
i (a, y) + εz
ai
i .
Players privately observe only their own shocks. A strategy for player 2 at period t is
σ̃t2 : H
t × Z2 → ∆A2. A strategy for player 1 is a mapping σ̃1 : Θ× H̃1 → ∆A1.
In any equilibrium of the perturbed game, players have a strict preference for their
strategies for almost all shocks. Strategies with this property are called “essentially sequen-
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tially strict.” The following definition also extends quasi-Markov perfection to the perturbed
game for strategies that behave according to Definition 2.4.1 for almost all shocks.
Definition 2.4.2. A wPBE (σ, µ) is an essentially sequentially strict equilibrium if for all
(t, h) ∈ H and almost all payoff shocks z2 ∈ Z2, the action σ2(t, h, z2) is pure and the unique
maximizer, and similarly for all a2 ∈ A2 and almost all z1 ∈ Z1, σ1(t, ha2, z1) is also pure
and the unique maximizer.
An equilibrium (σ, µ) of the perturbed game is quasi-Markov perfect if for almost all
z2 ∈ Z2 and almost all z1 ∈ Z1, σ2(t, h, z2) = σ2(t, h′, z2) and σ1(t, ha2, z1) = σ1(t, h′a′2, z1)
for all (t, h), (t, h′) ∈ H, a2, a′2 ∈ A2 such that h ∼ h′ and a2 ∼ a′2.
The following result (my version of Proposition 1 from BMM) shows that all equi-
libria of the perturbed game are essentially sequentially strict, and every essentially se-
quentially strict equilibrium is quasi-Markov (see Lemma 2.2.2). The intuition is that the
continuity of ψ ensures that a player being indifferent occurs with probability zero.
Proposition 2.4.1. Every wPBE of the perturbed game is quasi-Markov perfect.
The main purifiability result can now be stated. The following condition is what
BMM call “weak purifiability,” which is weaker than the purifiability notion of Harsanyi
(1973).19 A sequence of current shock strategies (σ̃k)k converges in outcomes to a strategy




σ̃k2 (a2|h, z2) dψk(z2) = σ2(a2|h) and lim
k→∞
ˆ
σ̃k1 (a1|ha′2, z1) dψk(z1) = σ1(a1|ha′2)
(2.4.1)
for each public history h and a′2 ∈ A2.
19In the language of BMM, an equilibrium is “weakly purifiable” if there exists a sequence of perturbed
games converging to the unperturbed game such that a sequence of corresponding wPBEs converge to the
equilibrium. “Harsanyi purifiability” (as BMM call it) requires that for every sequence of perturbed games,
there exists a sequence of corresponding wPBEs converging to the equilibrium. Harsanyi purifiability implies
weak purifiability; see Definitions 6 and 7 of BMM.
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Definition 2.4.3. A wPBE (σ∗, µ∗) of the full game G∞ is purifiable if there exists a
sequence (ψk, εk)k → 0 with ψk ∈ ∆∗(Z) and εk → 0 such that there is a sequence of
strategy profiles (σ̃k)k converging in outcomes to σ
∗, with σ̃k a wPBE of the (ψk, εk)-
perturbed game.
The following is the incomplete information version of Proposition 2 from BMM,
showing that quasi-Markov perfection is implied by purifiability.
Proposition 2.4.2. Every purifiable wPBE is quasi-Markov perfect.
One may wonder to what extent the converse holds: are quasi-Markov equilibria
purifiable? Though I do not attempt a general answer, I show that in the application of
Section 2.5, the minimum and maximum quasi-Markov equilibrium payoffs are given by
purifiable equilibria for almost all priors.20
2.5 Applications
With the theoretical machinery of Sections 2.3 and 2.4 in hand, I apply it to the
product choice game depicted in Figure 2.5.1. I assume short-run players have perfect
monitoring of the K most recent long-run player actions but no monitoring of past short-
run player actions. Liu and Skrzypacz (2014b) call this property “limited records.” The
long-run player is either normal type θ0 with payoffs in Figure 2.5.1 or a commitment
type θ̂ who always plays C. Short-run players have prior belief µ0(θ̂) that player 1 is the
commitment type, which are abbreviated as simply µ0 in this section. For concreteness, I
refer to player 1 as the “firm” and player 2 as the “consumer.”
Based on the reasoning of Section 2.4, I restrict attention to quasi-Markov perfect
equilibria, a restriction that omits only non-purifiable equilibria. For any off-equilibrium
20Under complete information, BMM show a partial converse of their proposition for complete information:
for a class of games with generic payoffs, all stationary Markov equilibria are purifiable, relying on a result
from Doraszelski and Escobar (2010). I conjecture this result carries over to this incomplete information
environment, but even if it does, it leaves open the question for non-stationary equilibria and non-generic
payoffs, both of which must be considered in this application.
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Figure 2.5.1: The product choice game, with player 1 (firm) payoffs on top and player 2
(consumer) payoffs on bottom.
date-history (t, h) where D is played at least once, assume that player 2 has belief 0 on the
commitment type; Bayes’ rule obviously implies this holds for all histories on the equilibrium
path.
Assumption 2. For any public history h containing D at any period, player 2 believes that
player 1 is the normal type θ0 with probability one.
This assumption means that quasi-Markov perfection implies that players condition
only on the period of the most recent D in the public history (and the calendar date). For
any public history h ∈ Y K , let
ι(h) ≡ K + min{k : h1−k = D} (2.5.1)
be the number of Cs since the most recent D, called the “index of h.” For each k ∈
{0, ...,K − 1}, define Ik ≡ {h ∈ Y K : ι(h) = k} as the set of histories with index k, and
define singleton set IK ≡ {CK}, where CK is the K-length history containing only “C”.
For convenience, I use notation of the form ak11 ã
k2
1 · · · ā
kn
1 to denote the history containing
k1 instances of (player 1) action a1, followed by k2 instances of ã1, and so on, followed by
ā1 for the kn most recent periods; for example, DC
K−3D2 is the history consisting of one
D, followed by K − 3 periods of C, followed by two periods of D.
In their environment, Liu and Skrzypacz (2014b) show that strategies in all sta-
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tionary PBEs, including (possibly) non-purifiable ones, depend on only on the index of a
history, i.e. the time since the last non-commitment action. Proposition 2.4.2 shows that
requiring purifiability also allows such a simplification for all finite stage games with limited
records and a single long-run player commitment type, as well as to non-stationary equi-
libria. For each k, all the histories in Ik are in the same quasi-Markov state by Definition
2.4.1. Furthermore, the fact that the cost of effort is constant across the short-run player’s
actions (formally, u1(c, C)−u1(c,D) = u1(d,C)−u1(d,D) = 1) implies that both short-run
player actions are incentive equivalent; hence, the long-run player does not condition on the
short-run player’s action. I relax this assumption in my analysis of stationary, long-memory
equilibria in Section 2.5.2. I formally add quasi-Markov perfection to Definition 2.3.13 in
the following definition.
Definition 2.5.1. Let an HBA x ≡ (φ, µ, α) enforced by some HBP w ≡ (φ̃, µ̃, γ̃) be given.
x is quasi-Markov enforced by w if α2(h) = α2(h
′) and α1(hc) = α1(hd) for any two histories
h, h′ ∈ Ik for any k.
The analogous definitions of quasi-Markov decompose and quasi-Markov self-generat-
ing, as well as the analogues of Propositions 2.3.3 and 2.3.4, are given by inserting “quasi-
Markov” into the appropriate places; the respective proofs are straightforward modifications
and so are omitted.
This partitioning greatly simplifies the analysis of the HBP space. Consider some
HBP (φ, µ, γ) ∈ W. Since play at periods K,K + 1, ... conditions only on the index of
the history, the collapsed payoff function space Γ is (K + 1)-dimensional, one dimension
for each index 0, ...,K. (Indeed, Γ is isomorphic to RK+1.) Similarly partition the history
distribution space Φ by index; for a given history distribution φ, abuse notation by denoting
φ(Ik|θ) ≡
∑
h∈Ik φ(h|θ). Note that φ(IK |θ̂) ≡ φ(C
K |θ̂) = 1, so only the history distributions
for the normal type θ0 are non-trivial; abbreviate φ(Ik) ≡ φ(Ik|θ0). All of this means that
Φ is now K dimensional (the requirement that
∑K
k=0 φ(Ik|θ0) = 1 removes the (K + 1)-th
degree of freedom). Since beliefs are pinned down at every history, the belief mapping
µ is redundant. Thus, I omit the belief mapping (“(φ, γ)” instead of “(φ, µ, γ)”) except
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when it is notationally convenient, in which case I abbreviate µ(IK) ≡ µ(θ̂|IK) (since
beliefs at all other histories are simply zero). Summarizing, purifiability (and hence quasi-
Markov perfection) allows us to collapse the 2|Y |K − 1 dimensions of HBP space (|Y |K − 1
dimensions of history distributions and |Y |K dimensions of payoff function space, ignoring
any non-redundant belief mappings) to 2K + 1 dimensions (K for history distributions and
K + 1 for payoff functions).
2.5.1 Product Choice Game with 1-Period Records
Consider the case where K = 1, which is sufficiently tractable to analytically char-
acterize the exact minimum and maximum quasi-Markov equilibrium payoffs for all priors
µ0 ∈ [0, 1] and almost all discount factors δ ∈ [0, 1). There are just two possible histories at
any period t ≥ 1: Y K = {C,D}.
As discussed above, the HBP space W ≡M×Γ has three dimensions: one for history
distributions and belief mappings (M), and two for payoff functions (Γ). The space Φ of
history distributions φ (and HB space M, since beliefs are redundant) is isomorphic to the 1-
simplex, so I further abbreviate φ ≡ φ(C|θ0) (since φ(C|θ0) = 1−φ(D|θ0)). For convenience,
I use the real numbers in [0, 1] interchangeably with history distributions φ ∈ Φ.
Since there are only two player 2 actions A2 ≡ {c, d}, I abbreviate σ2(t, h) ≡
σ2(c|t, h) = 1 − σ2(d|t, h). I do the same when discussing action profile mappings α ∈ A:
α2(h) ≡ α2(c|h). Similar abbreviation is possible for player 1, but it is possible to go fur-
ther because purifiability requires that player 1 condition only on the calendar date, since
either history C or D is immediately erased by the current period’s signal (and so leads to
the same beliefs for any continuation history) and player 2’s actions c and d are incentive-
equivalent. In other words, for a given period t, all player 1 date-histories (t, ha2) are in the
same quasi-Markov state. Hence, abbreviate σ1(t) ≡ σ1(C|t, ha2) for all h ∈ Y ≡ {C,D}
and a2 ∈ A2, and do the same for an action profile mapping: α1 ≡ α1(C|ha2). As with
history distributions, I use real numbers in [0, 1] interchangeably with these mixed actions.
The results are presented first, followed by discussion of the algorithm.
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Figure 2.5.2: On the left, the minimum (black) and maximum (gray) quasi-Markov equi-
librium long-run player payoffs are plotted for δ = 0.9. On the right, the minimum and
maximum payoffs for only stationary equilibria are plotted.
2.5.1.1 Results
The following proposition gives the exact minimum and maximum quasi-Markov
equilibrium payoffs for player 1 for all priors µ0 and all discount factors δ ∈ [0, 12) ∪ (
1
2 , 1).
The results are more easily understood with the plot in Figure 2.5.2.
Proposition 2.5.1. Let E(δ, µ0) be the set of quasi-Markov equilibrium player 1 payoffs
of the 1-period records product choice game, and let e(δ, µ0) ≡ minE(δ, µ0), ē(δ, µ0) ≡
maxE(δ, µ0) be the minimum and maximum quasi-Markov equilibrium payoffs, respectively.
For δ < 12 ,
e(δ, µ0) =
1 µ0 ≤ 123(1− δ) + δ µ0 > 12 ē(δ, µ0) =
1 µ0 < 123(1− δ) + δ µ0 ≥ 12 . (2.5.2)
For all δ > 12 ,
e(δ, µ0) =

1 0 ≤ µ0 ≤ 19
λ∗(µ0) 19 < µ
0 ≤ 12




1 µ0 = 0
2 0 < µ0 < 12
1−δ






where λ∗(µ0) is defined as follows. Let L(µ0) = mink q
k(0, µ0) such that qk(0, µ0) ≥ 12 ,










[(1− δk) + 3δk(1− δ)− δk−1(1− δ)] (2.5.5)
for k ∈ {L− 1, L}. Finally,
λ∗(µ0) =
(1− δ) + δλ
L(µ0)−1
1 q




A natural concern about this characterization is that Proposition 2.4.2 proves that
quasi-Markov perfection is only a necessary, not necessarily sufficient, condition of purifi-
ability – are the equilibria giving these payoffs actually purifiable? I assuage this concern
in Appendix 2.3.2, proving that there is a purifiable equilibrium with the minimum and
maximum payoffs given in Proposition 2.5.1 for almost all priors.22
In the complete information case (µ0 = 0), all histories are in the same quasi-Markov
state. The BMM result applies here and shows that the only purifiable equilibrium outcome
is the repeated static Nash equilibrium with payoff 1.
Going from zero to a slightly positive prior, there is no discontinuity for the min-
imum equilibrium payoff, but there is for the maximum, which immediately jumps to the
Stackelberg payoff of 2. For 0 < µ0 ≤ 19 , the minimum payoff is given by stationary equi-
libria where the long-run player plays C with some probability α1 ∈ [0, 12).
23 The lower α1
is, the more the short-run player prefers d conditional on the normal type θ0; however, a
21Recall that real numbers (in [0, 1]) and history distributions (in Φ) are used interchangeably. I use
q(φ, µ0) only when φ ∈ [0, 1] and q(φ, µ0) ∈ [0, 1], except to show contradictions in the proof where useful.
22The Lebesgue measure zero set of priors ignored in Appendix 2.3.2 correspond to the priors with dis-
continuities in Figure 2.5.2.
23Recall that quasi-Markov perfection means player 1 cannot condition on anything except the calendar
date.
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smaller α1 also implies a higher belief at history C the next period. The minimum payoff
stationary equilibrium has the long-run player mixing such that these countervailing effects
balance and the short-run player is indifferent upon observing history C. Since the short-run
player is indifferent at history C (where she has positive belief on the commitment type),
she strictly prefers d at history D (when the belief is zero and the long-run player still plays
the same mixed action). Since the long-run player is always indifferent, the long-run player’s
payoff can be calculated with the payoff of always playing D (a best response), which yields
flow payoff 1 every period. To keep the long-run player indifferent, the short-run player
plays α2(D) = 0 and mixes with positive probability α2(C) at history C.
The maximum payoff stationary equilibrium is qualitatively similar, with the long-
run player mixing with probability α1 =
1
2 so that the short-run player is indifferent at
history D, while strictly preferring c at history C. At history D, the short-run player mixes
so that the long-run player is indifferent. The best response strategy of always playing C
yields a flow payoff of 2 every period.
For prior µ0 > 19 , the payoff 1 stationary equilibria are no longer sustainable. If
player 1 mixes today (period t) with probability α1(t) such that player 2 is indifferent at
history C with belief µ(t, C), the prior is high enough that the belief tomorrow µ(t+1, C) >
µ(t, C) must be higher. Keeping tomorrow’s player 2 indifferent at history C requires player
1 mix at a lower probability α1(t + 1) < α1(t), so the equilibrium cannot be stationary.
Instead, the minimum quasi-Markov equilibrium payoff for 19 < µ
0 ≤ 12 is given by a non-
stationary equilibrium where player 1 mixes in periodic cycles, starting with some high
probability and gradually playing C more rarely. At the end of the cycle, the belief exceeds
1
2 and player 2 strictly prefers c, at which point player 1 plays C with high probability,
yielding a low belief next period and restarting the cycle. As the prior increases, the belief
cycle must become shorter, reaching a high belief more quickly and thus yielding a higher
equilibrium payoff. The discontinuities in the graph are a result of the steps in the cycle
being eliminated by a higher prior. By contrast, the high payoff stationary equilibrium
survives because the short-run player is indifferent at history D, where the belief (zero) is
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unaffected by the prior.
At µ0 > 12 , the minimum payoff is the same (in terms of strategies) stationary
equilibrium that gave the maximum payoff for µ0 < 12 . There also exists a non-stationary
equilibrium where the short-run player is exploited every other period upon observing his-
tory C. The long-run player always plays D in even periods and C in odd periods. The
odd-period short-run players clearly have c as a strict best response. The even-period
short-run players also have c as a strict best response, because the prior is so high that
c gives a higher payoff despite the long-run player playing D with certainty and the fact
that the history is uninformative (µ(C) = µ0). This equilibrium gives the maximum payoff
(approaching 2.5 for δ close to one) for these high priors.
2.5.1.2 Algorithm
To carry out the algorithm of Proposition 2.3.4, the starting point is the set of
feasible HBPs F†, which is the subset of W where the payoff functions have values in the
set of feasible payoffs F † ≡ [0, 3]. This set is drawn in Figure 2.5.3 as a “cube.”24 The
algorithm involves applying the B(·) operator to all the points in this 3-dimensional set,
and then each subsequent set B(F†),B2(F†), ....
Fortunately, it is possible to ignore almost all of the points in F† because they
generate the empty set. In fact, only the gray points in Figure 2.5.3 generate non-empty
sets. Note the “vertical” (coming out of the page) plane I ≡ {(φ, µ, γ) : γ(C) = γ(D)+ 1−δδ },
which I call the indifference plane, consisting of all points where the long-run player is
indifferent between C and D.
To the“northwest”of the indifference plane, player 1 strictly prefers D. This includes
the 45◦ plane (a line in payoff function space) outlined by the diagonal dashed lines in Figure
2.5.3, where there is no intertemporal incentive because the continuation payoffs for both
24Though it is drawn as a cube to make the diagrams easier to read, the φ dimension is not comparable
in any direct way to the payoff function dimensions, so there is no sense in which the cube has the same
“length” in this direction as in the other two.
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Figure 2.5.3: The “cube” is the set F† of feasible HBPs, with the history distribution dimen-
sion pointing out of the page. The gray set is the set of “useful” points F̄, which generate
non-empty sets.
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actions are equal. Consider some HBP w̃ ≡ (φ̃, γ̃) in this northwest set. Since she strictly
prefers D under w̃, any enforceable HBA (φ, α) clearly must have player 1 always playing
D: α1 = 0. Since player 1’s action is the same as the public signal, inducibility requires that
φ̃ = α1 = 0. Hence, if w̃ is not on the “floor” of the northwest (i.e. φ̃ > 0), there does not
exist an HBA enforced by w̃, and so there are no HBPs decomposed by w̃: B({w̃}) = ∅.
This is why I only keep track HBPs in the northwest above the floor as the algorithm is
carried out.
Exactly the opposite occurs in the “southeast” of the indifference plane, where the
long-run player strictly prefers C. Letting w̃ ≡ (φ̃, γ̃) in the southeast be given, any en-
forceable HBA (φ, α) must have player 1 always playing C: α1 = 1. Inducibility requires
φ̃ = α1 = 1, and so unless w̃ is on the “ceiling” of the southeast, there is no HBA enforced
by w̃ and B({w̃}) = ∅. Thus, I only keep track of the ceiling in the southeast.
The indifference plane itself is special because every point (φ̃, γ̃) in it generates non-
empty sets. Inducibility requires φ̃ = α1 for an enforceable HBA (φ, α), but since player 1 is
indifferent, I can always choose α1 to satisfy this without violating incentive compatibility.
To summarize, the set of“useless points”F∅ ≡ {w ∈ F† : B({w}) = ∅}— consisting
of everything above the floor of the northwest and below the ceiling of the southeast — can
be safely ignored. Denote the remainder of the feasible space F̄ ≡ F†\F∅, the gray space in
Figure 2.5.3, called the “useful points.”
I construct analogues of the tools of Section 2.3 that deal only with the useful points.
Define the set D̄ ≡ D∩ F̄, it is easy to show that V(D̄) = V(D) = E because any equilibrium
σ̃ of the γ-antegame for some useless HBP (φ, µ, γ) ∈ F∅ would clearly fail the requirement
that Pσ̃(h|θ) = φ(h|θ) in (2.3.6), so V({(φ, µ, γ)}) = ∅. Define the analogous operator




m(F̄) = D̄, which simplifies executing Proposition 2.3.4’s algorithm.
What can the useful points actually generate? Figure 2.5.4 shows the set of generated
points for a number of example HBPs w̃1, ..., w̃10 all located on the indifference plane (and
therefore useful). In the following discussion, I call these the “enforcing points” w̃j ≡
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Figure 2.5.4: Ten example points w̃1, ..., w̃10 on the indifference plane and the sets of points
B({w̃1}), ...,B({w̃10}) they each generate. The useful points B̄({w̃1}), ...,B({w̃10}) gener-
ated by each respectively is bolded. All points at the same elevation generate qualitatively
similar sets, so the examples are purposely selected at distinct elevations.
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(φ̃j , µ̃j , γ̃j), referring to φ̃j as the “enforcing history distribution,” and so on. For an HBA
(φj , µj , αj) enforced by w̃j , I refer to φj as the “current history distribution,” and so on.
First, consider w̃1 ≡ (φ̃, γ̃) on the floor.25 I start by finding all HBAs x ≡ (φ1, µ1, α1)
enforced by w̃. Inducibility requires that player 1 always play D (i.e., α11 = 0), so if player
2 knows she faces the normal type, she will strictly prefer d. This is the case at the history
D, so α12(D) = 0. She also strictly prefers d at history C so long as the belief µ
1(C) is low
enough, which is true so long as the probability φ1 of C for the normal type is high enough.
The proof shows this threshold is µ
0
1−µ0 . Below the threshold (φ
1 < µ
0
1−µ0 ), the belief on
the commitment type is so high that she strictly prefers c. When φ1 = µ
0
1−µ0 , player 2 is
indifferent and may choose any action α12(C) ∈ [0, 1].
Having found the HBAs x enforced by w̃, I can find the set of HBPs w ≡ (φ1, µ1, γ1)
decomposed by x and w̃. Since α2(D) = 0, it is known that γ
1(D) = (1 − δ)u1(d,D) +
δγ̃1(D) = (1− δ) + δγ̃1(D). For φ > µ
0
1−µ0 , I have γ
1(C) = γ1(D) because player 2 strictly
prefers d at history C, which means w is on the 45◦ plane in the northwest (above the
floor). For φ1 < µ
0
1−µ0 , I have γ
1(C) = (1− δ)u1(d,C) + δγ̃1(D) = 3(1− δ) + δγ̃1(D), so w





can be anywhere in between — including the indifference plane. This is crucial because the
point generated on the indifference plane is the only useful point of B({w̃1}), so it is only
necessary to keep track of this one for the next iteration of the algorithm.
The HBPs w̃2, w̃3, w̃4 have positive but still low enforcing history distributions:
0 < φ̃2 < φ̃3 < φ̃4. Let (φj , µj , αj) be an HBA enforced by one of these enforcing points w̃j
such that the (current) player 2 is indifferent. The set of generated points for each w̃j is
qualitatively similar but “shifted up” because player 1 is playing C with increasing (current)
probability αj , so belief µj at which player 2 is indifferent is lower and hence the current
history distribution φj is higher. Given enforcing distribution φ̃, the proof shows that this
25Figure 2.5.4 shows it on the indifference plane instead of the northwest, but the set of generated points
is the same at points directly to the west, i.e. points with the same γ̃1(D) coordinate. The reason is that
only the continuation payoff for D is all that matters since φ̃ = 0 implies player 1 always plays D.
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shifting up is described by the function φj = q(φ̃j) = µ
0/(1−µ0)
1−2φ̃j (this is described in greater
detail in the discussion of Figure 2.5.5).
Consider w̃5 in Figure 2.5.4. At a high enough enforcing distribution φ̃5 = q−1(1),
player 2 is indifferent at current distribution φ = 1, which is the lowest possible posterior
µ(C) = µ0. Note that because the “lap” of the “wall-sit” figure intersects with the ceiling
of the southeast, there is a line segment of multiple useful points in the decomposed set,
bolded in the figure. For all enforcing distributions strictly between φ̃5 and 12 , the set of
generated points is simply a vertical line in the southeast, for example w̃6 and B({w̃6}).
Since the generated points all lie in the southeast, the only useful one is on the ceiling.
The w̃7 = (φ̃7, γ̃7) enforcing HBP has φ̃7 = 12 , which means that player 2 is indif-
ferent at history D when she knows she is facing the normal type and strictly prefers c
when she has positive belief on the commitment type (at history C). Thus, α72(C) = 1 so
γ7(C) = 3(1 − δ) + δγ̃7(D). On the other hand, I can choose any action α72(D) ∈ [0, 1]
and so can decompose any γ7(D) ∈ [(1 − δ) + δγ̃7(D), γ7(D)]. This yields the rectangle
depicted in Figure 2.5.4, whose intersection with F̄ is bolded. For enforcing distributions
strictly greater than 12 (e.g. w̃
8, w̃9, w̃10), player 2 strictly prefers c at both histories, so for
example γ8(C) = γ8(D) = 3(1− δ) + δγ̃8(D), generating a vertical line on the 45◦plane in
the northwest.26
I summarize the set of useful points generated by different HBPs with Figure 2.5.5.
Roughly speaking, Figure 2.5.5 “collapses” the 3-dimensional Figure 2.5.4 into two dimen-
sions to convey the mapping from the elevation of an enforcing point to that of the useful
generated points. Given an enforcing HBP (φ̃, µ̃, γ̃), the correspondence R(φ̃, µ̃, γ̃) ≡ {φ :
(φ, µ, γ) ∈ B̄({(φ̃, µ̃, γ̃)})} gives the set of history distributions φ for which a useful point
generated. In other words, the horizontal axis is the “elevation” of the enforcing point in
Figure 2.5.4, and the vertical axis is the elevation of the generated useful point. The cor-
respondence is labeled by line style to indicate the payoffs that are decomposed at each
26For w̃10, the analogue of Footnote 25 holds. Though w̃10 is on the indifference plane, any points directly
south (with the same γ̃10(C) coordinate) generate exactly the same set.
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Figure 2.5.5: Given an enforcing HBP (φ̃, γ̃) with history distribution φ̃ (horizontal axis),
I plot the set of history distributions φ (vertical axis) for which a point (φ, γ) is generated
by w̃. The black line is the 45◦ line. The different line styles describe the generated payoff
function γ.
elevation. Note that R crosses the 45◦ line at three points: φ̂1, φ̂2 and 12 . These indicate the
three stationary equilibria, since stationary equilibria correspond to self-generating HBPs
(recall Proposition 2.3.6). There are two “low” payoff and one “high” payoff stationary
equilibria.
Figure 2.5.6 shows the effect of the prior increasing to 19 and just above. Note
that when the prior is 19 , the two stationary low payoff equilibria seen in Figure 2.5.5 have
“merged” into one. When the prior increases above 19 , the stationary equilibrium disappears.
Instead, the lowest payoff equilibrium is non-stationary, given by a “cycle” of self-generating
HBPs depicted by the arrows. Note that generation “goes backwards in time,” so the belief
at history C follows a 5 period cycle, starting from a low value, gradually increasing until
the belief is 1, and then starting over again at the low value.
As the prior increases, the number of low payoff steps in the cycle necessarily de-
creases as the solid gray curve rises, as depicted in 2.5.7. When µ0 = 12 , the solid gray curve
has been reduced to a single point at the upper right corner, because q(0) = 1. This allows
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Figure 2.5.6: Left, R(φ̃, µ̃, γ̃) is plotted for µ0 = 19 , where there is just a single low payoff
stationary equilibrium. Right, R(φ̃, µ̃, γ̃) is plotted for µ0 = 0.15, where the minimum
equilibrium payoff is given by a non-stationary equilibrium traced out.
Figure 2.5.7: Left, the graph of R for µ0 = 0.45, with the minimum payoff non-stationary
equilibrium traced out. Right, the graph of R for µ0 = 0.55, with the maximum payoff non-
stationary equilibrium traced out. In both cases, the stationary equilibrium with payoff
2 is depicted, which corresponds to the maximum equilibrium payoff on the left and the
minimum on the right.
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just a two period cycle, alternating between the low payoff and the very high payoff. For
µ0 > 12 , the solid gray curve disappears completely. This allows a higher equilibrium payoff
than 2: a cycle alternating between a high payoff of 2 (playing C after player 2 plays c)
and very high payoff of 3 (playing D after player 2 plays c). In this case, the lowest payoff
equilibrium is the “high” payoff stationary one.
2.5.1.3 Non-Quasi-Markov Equilibria
How restrictive is the assumption of quasi-Markov perfection, and what are equi-
libria failing this refinement like? Though I do not attempt a general answer because (as
discussed at the beginning of Section 2.4) solving for the full set of equilibrium payoffs is
very complicated, I construct a class of non-quasi-Markov equilibria that expand the set of
equilibrium payoffs for low priors. For all µ0 ∈ [0, 13 ], there exist stationary equilibria that
give every payoff in the interval [1, 2]. In the complete information case (µ0 = 0), there are
such equilibria giving player 1 the “high” payoff of 2 where BMM show the only purifiable
payoff is 1. For priors µ0 ∈ (19 ,
1
3 ], there are equilibria with payoff 1 that survive at higher
priors.
I now construct these equilibria. For brevity, define φ∗ ≡ µ
0
1−µ0 . Define player 1’s







for both a2 ∈ {c, d}. It can be checked that this strategy makes player 2 indifferent












. I am free to choose any
σ02(∅) without affecting player 1’s incentives. The equilibrium payoff can be calculated by
evaluating the strategy of playing D every period (a best response):
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= 2(1− δ)σ2(∅) + 2δσ2(C).





to get an equilibrium with a payoff
between 1 and 2.
These equilibria feature relatively complicated and arbitrary mixing by both players
in order to keep each other indifferent. At µ0 = 0, BMM show that the intuition that
such behavior is unrealistic is confirmed by the fact that these equilibria are not purifiable,
and that the only purifiable equilibrium is the repeated one-shot equilibrium. Requiring
quasi-Markov perfection rules out similarly unrealistic equilibria at positive priors.
2.5.2 Product Choice Game with Long Records (Stationary)
The analysis of the Section 2.5.1 shows that with 1-period memory, a focus on sta-
tionary equilibria is restrictive. Nevertheless, as K increases, so do the dimensions of the
HBP space. Given the complexity of just 1-period memory, studying non-stationary equi-
libria for long memory may require numerical methods similar to the techniques developed
by Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin (2003) for the APS environment.
With that in mind, this section studies stationary, purifiable equilibrium payoffs
for long records in the product choice game. Taking advantage of the simplicity of the
stationary environment, I also relax the assumption of constant cost of effort by player 1
with respect to player 2’s action, using the more general stage game in Figure 2.5.8.
I first start with a relatively straightforward result that the continuation payoff
at the clean history is the Stackelberg payoff (2) for long memory, similar to the bound
of Theorem 2 in Liu and Skrzypacz (2014b).27 Recall that Proposition 2.3.6 shows any
27Liu and Skrzypacz’s result for their continuous product choice game also applies to arbitrary priors on
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Figure 2.5.8: The product choice game, with player 1 payoffs on top and player 2 payoffs
on bottom, where λ > 0.
stationary equilibrium corresponds to a self-generating HBP (φ, µ, γ). The intuition is as
follows. A continuation payoff γ(IK) < 2 requires that player 2 sometimes plays d at the
clean history. This requires both that the belief µ(CK) at the clean history be low (so φ(IK)
must be sufficiently high), and that player 1’s strategy at the clean history CK must play
D sufficiently frequently (so φ(I0) must be also be sufficiently large). Playing D frequently
at the clean history IK means the “yesterday-dirty” histories I0 must be reached sufficiently
frequently. Thus, the probability mass at φ(IK) must be high at the same time that enough
mass is“flowing out to I0”to make player 2 willing to play d at IK . To keep the clean history
probability φ(IK) sufficiently high requires that enough mass is flowing in from IK−1 (the
history one period away from being clean), which also requires enough from IK−2, and so on.
When K is large, this “stretches” the probability distribution φ(·|θ0) over all the histories
I0, I1, ..., IK−1, until there is a contradiction because the sum of the probabilities must be
greater than 1.
Proposition 2.5.2. Suppose µ0 > 0. There exists K∗(µ0) such that for all K > K∗,
V (CK) ≥ 2.
Let e denote the minimum equilibrium payoff. This result shows that for large K,
player 1 gets close to the Stackelberg payoff when sufficiently patient, i.e. e is bounded by
the calendar date in their model, while I assume the improper uniform prior.
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(1 − δ) · 0 + δKV (CK), following the standard Fudenberg and Levine (1989) argument of
bounding the payoff of deviating to the commitment action C. Thus, limδ→1 limK→∞ e ≥ 2.
However, the order of limits is critical; reversing them gives this lower bound no bite:
limK→∞ limδ→1 e ≥ 0. This makes the welfare impact (on player 1) of increasing memory
unclear. Longer memory ensures that the payoff of the clean history is high, but it also
makes it harder to clean the history.
The following result shows that under purifiability, there is no tradeoff: as long as
the discount factor is above a threshold dependent only on the stage game payoffs (not the
prior), player 1 gets exactly the Stackelberg payoff when memory is sufficiently long.
Proposition 2.5.3. Suppose µ0 > 0 and δ > max{λ,1}1+max{λ,1} . There exists K
∗(µ0) such that
for all K > K∗, the player 1 payoff is exactly 2 for any stationary, purifiable PBE.
Note that if δ < max{λ,1}1+max{λ,1} , then after player 2 plays c, player 1’s impatience makes
it infeasible for future incentives to outweigh the myopic incentive of playing D. For such
low δ, for all priors below a threshold (dependent only on stage payoffs) the only equilibrium
outcome is the repeated static Nash (even without purifiability), as was the case in (2.5.2).
I discuss the intuition of the proof for λ = 1, referring the interested reader to the
proof for the more complicated general case.28 This is simpler because λ = 1 means c and
d are incentive-equivalent for player 1, so player 1 does not condition on player 2’s action.
First, it must be that C is a best response at every history or the continuation payoff of I0
(where D has just been played) is 1. To see why, if D is a strict best response at some Ik,
then player 2 will always play d at history Ik, which will be followed by the continuation
payoff V (I0) because player 1 plays D. This continuation payoff V (Ik) = (1− δ) + δV (I0)
cannot be better than V (I0), so there is no intertemporal incentive to play C at history
Ik−1. By backward induction, D is a best response at I0 and so V (I0) = 1 (the minmax).
28λ > 1 means the short-run incentive to exploit is greater when the short-run player is more trusting. Liu
and Skrzypacz (2014b) make the analogous assumption in their continuous stage game to find reputation
bubble behavior, but the proof of Proposition 2.5.3 indicates this behavior does not exist in the game studied
here; specifically, the strict preference to “prick” the bubble at the clean history is ruled out — contrast Case
2 on page 177 with Lemma 6 and Corollary 1 of Liu and Skrzypacz.
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The next result is that for high enough K, the continuation payoff for the clean
history is exactly V (IK) = 2. If V (IK) < 2, then player 2 would have to play d with positive
probability at the clean history (α2(IK) < 1), which means player 1 would sometimes have
to play D with at least probability 12 . Recall from Proposition 2.3.6 there exists a self-
generating HBP w ≡ (φ, µ, γ). The fact that d is a best response at IK implies that
µ(IK) ≤ 12 , which requires the normal player spend sufficient time at IK , i.e. φ(IK |θ0) ≥
1−µ0
µ0
. However, playing D with at least probability 12 means player 1 is also spending
time at the freshly dirty history I0. The long-run player must also spend time at history
classes I1, ..., IK−1 “cleaning” the history to arrive at IK frequently enough. When memory
is long, satisfying all these requirements becomes impossible as the history distribution gets
“stretched out,” giving a contradiction.
If player 1 strictly prefers C at the clean history CK , then she also prefers it at
initial history CK−1, so player 2 plays c at CK−1 and by backward induction the equilibrium
payoff is 2. If player 1 strictly preferred D at the clean history, she would also prefer it at
IK−1, and so by the backward induction argument given above, the freshly dirty history
continuation payoff is V (I0) = 1, which would make the long-run player strictly prefer d at
CK , a contradiction.
Supposing that player 1 is indifferent at CK , it must be that for each k ∈ {1, ...,K−
1}, the continuation payoffs satisfy V (Ik) ≥ V (I0) + 1−δδ = V (IK) = 2 because C must be a
best response. This similarly implies that V (Ck) ≥ 2 for each k ∈ {1, ...,K−1}. Because the
incentive to play C cannot be less, purifiability requires that the long-run player play C at
least as much in the initial histories ∅, C1, ..., CK−1 as in the dirty histories I0, I1, ..., IK−1.
The short-run player must therefore play c at least as much as well. However, because the
belief at a clean initial history is strictly positive (at least µ0), the incentive to play c is
actually strictly greater. Then if player 2 is indifferent at dirty history Ik, they must always
play c at clean history Ck. It must be that player 2 mixes at the freshly dirty history I0;
always playing c at I0 would make player 1 strictly prefer D at the clean history C
K , and
always playing d would make player 1 strictly prefer C at the clean history — either is a
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contradiction. Since player 2 mixes at I0, she must strictly prefer c at the initial history
∅. Thus, the equilibrium payoff is V (∅) = (1− δ)u1(c, C) + δV (I1) ≥ 2, which holds with
equality since a stationary equilibrium with payoff greater than 2 is impossible.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter lays out two theoretical tools for the study of bounded memory rep-
utation games with sequential-move stage games where the short-run player moves first.
Extending the self-generation methods of APS to bounded memory reputation, I derive
a recursive characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs, which allows study of non-
stationary equilibria and gives a simple interpretation for stationary equilibria as self-
generating “points.” I also define a simplifying equilibrium refinement, quasi-Markov perfec-
tion, and extend the results of BMM to show that this is a necessary condition of purifiable
equilibria.
These tools are applied to a product choice game example with a “honest” Stackel-
berg commitment type, where only the most recent long-run player actions are observed.
In the 1-memory case, I obtain a complete characterization of the minimum and maximum
quasi-Markov equilibrium payoffs for all priors and almost all discount factors, giving insight
into how restrictive the assumption of stationarity is. I also show that for long memory,
even when not especially patient, the long-run player obtains exactly the Stackelberg payoff
in all purifiable stationary equilibria even for very low priors. Thus, for bounded memory in
this environment, long memory is important for guaranteeing payoffs, rather than patience.
Although the recursive framework is specified for the applications examined in this
chapter, it is worth noting that it is straightforward to extend it to simultaneous move stage
games, imperfect monitoring of player 2’s action by player 1, and even multiple long-run
players who have bounded memory (with beliefs on each other’s types). An application of
the latter case might be firms whose employees and managers turn over at regular intervals,
giving them bounded institutional memory. An interesting direction for future research is
the development of a computational implementation of the algorithm presented here — as
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was done by Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin (2003) for the original complete information, full




Drug Wars and Government Policy
3.1 Introduction
On December 1, 2006, Felipe Calderon took office as president of Mexico. Within
two weeks, he deployed 6500 federal troops to combat drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)
in his home state of Michoacán, which had experienced a wave of execution style killings
(Grillo, 2006). This marked the beginning of the massive crackdown on DTOs that would
become a hallmark of his administration, involving 45,000 troops by the time he left office
in 2012 (Dell, 2011). Before Calderon’s presidency, the Mexican National Human Rights
Commission (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos) reports a total of 8901 drug-
related homicides from 2001 to 2006, an average of 1484 per year . As the government
ramped up its war on the cartels over subsequent years, drug war violence exploded, reaching
over 10,000 per year by 2010. By the end of Calderon’s presidency in 2012, at least 60,000
people were killed, though some reports suggest the number is much higher (Molzahn,
Rodriguez, and Shirk, 2013).
Although it is fairly straightforward to see why government-vs-cartel violence would
increase following a crackdown — a crackdown by definition increases government interac-
tion with DTOs — it is less obvious why government intervention would increase violence
between the cartels. In fact, the vast majority of drug-related homicides are due to violence
between the cartels. The most reliable data on drug-related homicides come from Mexico’s
National Security Council (Consejo de Seguridad Nacional, CSN), who publicly reported
drug-related homicides in Mexico from December 2006 (when the crackdown began) un-
til September 2011. In CSN’s data, 89.3% of casualties are “targeted executions linked to
drug-trafficking operations” (Rios, 2013).
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This chapter develops a model that offers a theoretical explanation for why DTOs
engage in violence with each other, and why violence increased during the Calderon’s crack-
down between 2006 to 2012 but not during previous law enforcement operations against
DTOs. In the model, the threat of violence is used to enforce collusion between the drug
cartels in order to increase profits. Since cartels are not able to observe defection, but
instead only observe a noisy signal of actions, punishments and therefore violence occur in
equilibrium. The government has the power to arrest traffickers, which makes drug traffick-
ing more expensive. If the government arrests traffickers only when cartels are punishing
each other, punishments become harsher and therefore allow more collusive behavior with
less frequent violence. One can think of this policy as “corrupt” because it effectively helps
traffickers cooperate and maximizes profits, which could be desirable if the government takes
some fixed percentage of profits as a bribe. This policy also minimizes violence. If instead
the government cracks down indiscriminately, always arresting traffickers, this cooperative
incentive goes away, and so long as the government’s crackdown is sufficiently bounded
(by its capacity to arrest), violence increases even though drug trafficking has become less
profitable.
The model is based on the Green and Porter (1984) model of collusion under imper-
fect monitoring. Two firms play a repeated modified Cournot duopoly game, where they
choose both a quantity of drug traffickers to hire and whether or not to attack each other,
thereby killing some of the other firm’s traffickers. Cartels find it profitable to attack in
the short-run because killing opposing traffickers reduces the quantity of competing drugs
delivered to market, thereby raising the price and the firm’s profits. It is possible to achieve
higher payoffs by enforcing collusive behavior through the threat of punishments, which
include violence. However, since quantities are only imperfectly monitored, punishments
and violence occur on the equilibrium path. The firms play the optimal equilibrium among
a class of equilibria similar to those constructed by Green and Porter. If the government
arrests traffickers (which is modeled as having the same effect on profits as killing them,
except that cartels do not have to hire assassins) during punishments, then punishments
become harsher and are able to enforce smaller quantities and higher profits. This allows
89
punishments to be triggered less frequently, resulting in less violence. By contrast, if the
government arrests every period no matter the state, the incentive to cooperate is reduced
and so punishments are triggered more frequently.
The most technically difficult task here is characterizing the optimal equilibrium. I
restrict attention to a class of equilibria I call “Green-Porter equilibria” (GPE) because of
their similarity to the equilibria constructed in Green and Porter (1984). A GPE is in one of
two states: the reward state or the punishment state. The reward state has firms producing
smaller quantities than the static equilibrium, and transitions to the punishment state upon
observation of either killing (which is perfectly monitored) or low prices. In the punishment
state, firms play the static Nash equilibrium, which involves killing and Cournot quantities.1
The firms observe a public correlation device and randomly choose to return to the reward
state after some given realizations of the device, rather than the price, such that there are
no intertemporal incentives and the static Nash equilibrium is incentive compatible. I use a
simplified version of Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin’s (2003) implementation of the recursive
Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) method to numerically characterize these optimal
equilibria.
The fact that an explosion in violence occurred just after Calderon’s announcement
and grew worse as he pursued this policy raises the question of whether the crackdown
caused the increase in violence, or if the crackdown simply pre-empted an inflammation
of an existing conflict between cartels. Indeed, the latter case suggests that the violence
might have been even worse in the absence of this policy. However, empirical evidence
indicates that the Calderon crackdown did actually cause increases in violence. Looking at
municipalities holding mayoral elections in 2007 and 2008 where the margin of victory was
within 5%, Dell (2011) finds that municipalities which elected a candidate from Calderon’s
conservative PAN party were more likely to subsequently experience drug violence than
those electing non-PAN candidates. Since the margin of victory is so close, Dell argues the
1To clarify, these are Cournot quantities of drugs delivered to market, equal to the number of traffickers
who survive both attacks from the other cartel and arrests from the government. This requires firms to hire
a larger number of traffickers than in the Cournot game without attacks or arrests.
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outcomes of these elections provide exogenous variation in law enforcement activity, since
PAN mayors were politically aligned with PAN President Calderon.
One may be tempted to think that crackdowns would always spark conflict through
the “hydra effect” — that removing the head of a cartel opens up competition between his
lieutenants — yet this does not always appear to be the case. Rios (2014) points to law
enforcement operations against DTOs before 2000, when Mexico was a one-party state ruled
by the liberal PRI party, “which resulted not in violent confrontations, but in the main-
tenance of a highly disciplined group of oligopolistic criminal organizations that operated
without fighting each other.” When the leader of the then most-powerful Guadalajara car-
tel, Felix Gallardo, was arrested in 1989 following the capture, torture, and murder of DEA
agent Enrique Camarena, his cartel split peacefully into some of the forerunners of today’s
major cartels, dividing territories as reportedly agreed upon at a conference in Acapulco
(Rios, 2014). Rios particularly points to the end of one-party-rule in 2000 as preventing
the government from coordinating in a way that could enforce cooperation between car-
tels, as PAN and PRI controlled different parts of the Mexican government. By contrast,
PRI-controlled Mexico featured explicit corruption agreements between the government and
cartels, requiring that cartels only traffic within their territories, not kill each other on the
streets, and that they not sell drugs to Mexicans (instead only transporting them to the
US). Rios shows that as PRI lost its grip on the Mexican government, markets for con-
sumer cocaine within Mexico began to open up, suggesting a collapse of these agreements.
Although the model presented here cannot, at least in its present simple form, capture all
of these rich dynamics, it provides a starting point for analyzing how some government
enforcement operations can make violence less prevalent, while others can lead to more war.
3.2 Model
My model of the drug market is based on the repeated Cournot game with imperfect
monitoring of Green and Porter (1984). The stage game is modified by giving firms the
option to attack each other at a cost, thereby removing competing drugs from the market.
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These attacks are what I refer to as “violence.”2 This is individually profitable for the firm
because it raises the price and therefore the firm’s own revenue. I also allow an exogenous
government to arrest traffickers, which similarly removes drugs from the market.
3.2.1 Stage Game
There are two firms, 1 and 2. The stage game is as follows. Each firm i simulta-
neously chooses to hire some quantity qi ∈ Q of traffickers, where Q is a fine grid on an
interval [0, Q], and whether to attack si ∈ {0, 1}, where si = 1 indicates attacking and
si = 0 indicates not. I assume that Q >
1
3(r− c) so that this upper bound is never binding.
Let Ai ≡ Q×{0, 1} denote the action space of firm i, A ≡ A1×A2 the set of action profiles,
and ∆X the set of probability distributions over X. The exogenous government chooses to
arrest some number g ∈ G traffickers of each cartel, where G is a fine grid on an interval
[0, G].
Firm i pays some constant marginal cost c to hire each unit of traffickers, who each
carry 1 unit of drugs. If firm i attacks (i.e., si = 1), then κ traffickers from firm −i are killed
and do not deliver their drugs to market, and firm i pays some cost η to hire the assassins.
If the government arrests g traffickers, those traffickers also do not deliver their drugs. Let
q̂i = max{qi − κs−i − g, 0} be the quantity of drugs firm i delivers to market. The firms
face a demand curve
p(a) = r − (q̂1(a) + q̂2(a))
where a ≡ ((qi, q−i), (si, s−i)) is a strategy profile and r > 0 is some constant. Firms receive
expected profit3
ui(a) = p(a)q̂i(a)− cqi − ηsi.
The stage game profits are the revenues from drugs delivered minus the cost of hiring all
2Violence is defined formally in (3.4.2).
3I use the term expected profit because I later introduce imperfect monitoring of the choice of quantities
qi, q−i by making the publicly observable price p subject to some mean-preserving shocks. Since firms are
risk neutral, this has no effect on the one-shot game.
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traffickers (including those arrested or killed) and the cost of assassinations:
ui(a) = p(a)q̂i(a)− cqi − ηsi
It is straightforward to show that the maximum feasible payoff is obtained by the firms not
attacking (si = 0) and each choosing quantity qi ≡ qm = 14(r − c), which I refer to the
“monopoly quantity.”4 For simplicity, I assume that the cost η of attacking is sufficiently
small such that attacking is a best response so long as firm i delivers at least the monopoly
quantity:
η < κqm. (3.2.1)
I also assume that feasible killings are bounded by
κ < 12(r − c), (3.2.2)
since otherwise a profitable one-shot equilibrium with violence is impossible.
3.2.2 Repeated Game
I assume that the firms play the infinitely repeated stage game, maximizing their
discounted average payoffs given discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Attacks (s1, s2) are publicly
observed, but the quantities (q1, q2) are not. Instead they observe the price p(θ, a) = θp(a)
subject to some shock θ distributed log-normally, with mean one and variance exp(ζ2)− 1,
according to cdf
F (θ) = Φ
(



























4This is, of course, obtainable by any action profile yielding total output 1
2
(r − c), but it will be more
natural to use per-firm values since I focus on symmetric equilibria.
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where Φ, φ are the cdf and pdf, respectively, of the standard normal distribution. Since
E[θ] = 1, it does not affect expected stage game payoffs. Players also observe a public
correlation device ω, which is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
I restrict attention to a class of equilibria that I call Green-Porter equilibria (GPE),
based on the equilibria described in Green and Porter (1984). These are equilibria which
are either in a “reward” state or a “punishment” state. The government chooses a policy
(ḡ, g̃) ∈ G2, where ḡ is the number of arrests in the reward state and g̃ is the number of
arrests in the punishment state. A GPE begins in the reward state and remains there until
either a price below some threshold p̄ or an attack are observed. In the reward state, the
firms play an action profile ā, and the government plays ḡ. In the punishment state, the
firms play the static Nash equilibrium ã given the government’s policy g̃. The punishment
state ends when the public correlation device is realized below some threshold ω̃.
A GPE where punishment state has mean duration T = 1ω̃ will be referred to as a T -
GPE. The arguments in Porter (1983) show that choosing T =∞ (permanent punishment)
yields the maximum possible payoff. Since never-ending war between drug traffickers may
not be realistic, perhaps due to renegotiation, I let T ∈ [1,∞] be exogenous and pick
T = 20 for the example presented in Section 3.4.5 I assume the firms play the optimal such
equilibrium.
Assumption 3. Given T ∈ [1,∞] and policy (ḡ, g̃), the firms play the T -GPE yielding the
maximum payoff.
3.3 Numerical Solution
This section presents a numerical method for characterizing the optimal T -GPE
when the grid of quantities Q is “sufficiently fine,” meaning that the results are not changed
by adding points to the grid. I define this formally as follows: a statement X is true when
5Choosing T =∞ does not qualitatively change the results presented in Section 3.4.
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Q is a sufficiently fine grid on [0, Q] if and only if there exists a finite subset F ⊂ [0, Q] such
that F ⊂ Q implies that X is true.
I first characterize the symmetric static Nash equilibria for all government policies
g ∈ G.
Lemma 3.3.1. Define q(λ) ≡ 12(r − c− λ), and implicitly define function Ľ(g, š) by








Ľ(g, š) is strictly decreasing in š.
Proposition 3.3.1. For a policy g ∈ G, let a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the one-shot
game be given. Let E[q∗i ], E[s
∗
i ] denote the expected actions in the equilibrium. When Q is
a sufficiently fine grid on [0, Q],
E[q∗i ] =




2 + η − cκ
]
r − c− 2
√
(cκ+ η)E[s∗i ] + cg + ηE[s
∗














2 + η − cκ
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(r − c)− ηκ






(r − c)− ηκ
]2 − (cκ+ η)) < g < 14c [(r − c)− ηκ]2
0 otherwise,
(3.3.3)
where ξ(g) is the (unique) nonnegative solution to the cubic equation




ξ(g) Ľ(g, 1) > B0









(r − c)2 − 8η
]
and š∗ solves Ľ(g, š∗) = B0.
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Note that the symmetric equilibrium outcomes are unique (when Q is sufficiently
fine).




2 + η − cκ
]
, the one-shot equilibrium is pure (when Q
is sufficiently fine). For g above this threshold, the one-shot equilibrium involves mixing
between“shutting down”(qi = 0, si = 0) and an action with generally positive values (q̆i, s̆i).
These mixing equilibria have value zero, since shutting down is a best response, even though
drugs and violence happen in equilibrium (in expectation).
Remark 3.3.2. Proposition 3.3.1 gives simple closed form solutions for the equilibrium out-











(r − c)− ηκ
]2)
, which
are defined implicitly. For these policies, I calculate E[s∗i ] numerically. Note that, although
ξ(g) has a closed form solution, I use the faster and simpler approach of using Newton’s
method. For χ(g), it is possible solve Ľ(g, š∗) = B0 through bisection, evaluating Ľ(g, š) at
each iteration by solving (3.3.1) via Newton’s method.
For the purposes of solving the optimal T -GPE and make use of existing results, it
will be useful to introduce a slightly more general equilibrium definition, the non-stationary
Green-Porter equilibrium (NGPE) (a T -NGPE is analogously defined). An T -NGPE is the
same as a T -GPE, except that the firms (but not the government) may condition on the
calendar date t during the reward state. Thus, the T -GPEs are a subset of the T -NGPEs.
I will show how to solve for the optimal T -NGPE payoff, which turns out to be a T -GPE
payoff as well (in Corollary 3.3.2).
Let E ⊂ R denote the set of T -NGPE equilibrium payoffs (NGPEs are symmetric
so the set of equilibrium payoffs is one dimensional), and let Ē ≡ max E be the payoff
of the optimal T -NGPE. I characterize Ē through a simplified version of the method of
Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986; 1990) (borrowing notation from Mailath and Samuel-
son (2006b)) and the numerical implementation developed by Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin
(2003).
Definition 3.3.1. Let some set W ⊂ R be given. A mixed action profile α is enforceable
96
on W if there exists p̄ and V ∈W such that
V(α, p̄, V )












((1− δT )uN + δTV )
]
(3.3.6)













((1− δT )uN + δTV )
]
(3.3.7)
for all αi ∈ ∆Ai. The price p̄ and reward payoff V enforce α (on W ).
Similarly I adapt the notion of decomposition and the “generating operator” B(·).
Definition 3.3.2. A payoff V ∈ R is decomposable on W ⊂ R if there exists action profile
α enforced by some price p̄ and V ′ ∈ W such that V = V(α, p̄, V ′). V is decomposed by
α, p̄, V ′ (on W ). Define
B(W ) ≡ {V ∈ R : V = V(α, p̄, V ′) for some α enforced by p̄ and V ′ ∈W}.
A straightforward, much simpler version of the arguments in Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti (1990) show the following. (Since the arguments are nearly identical to those in
Appendices 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, replacing terms with their NGPE analogues, I omit them.)
Proposition 3.3.2. The following hold:
1. If W ⊂ B(W ), i.e. W is a “self-generating set,” then W is the payoff of a T -NGPE.
2. B(E ) = E .
3. Let F † denote the set of feasible payoffs. Then limm→∞
⋂
m B
m(F †) = E .
I now characterize Q,U in order to compute B̄(·). The following proposition char-
acterizes the interior solution, if it exists.
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Proposition 3.3.3. Let some payoff V̄ be given. Let Ṽ = (1−δT )uN (g̃)+δT V̄ be the value




such that α is enforced by p̆ and V̄ .
Define θ̄ ≡ p̄/p(ᾱ) and
ψ(θ̄) ≡ C0 −
√
C1 + γ(θ̄)∆V (3.3.8)
where C0 ≡ 112(5r − 2c), C1 ≡
1
144(r + 2c)
2, γ(θ̄) ≡ 16
δ
1−δf(θ̄)θ̄. Define β̄ ≡ κs̄i + ḡ.
Suppose that the solution is interior, i.e., θ̄ ∈ (0,∞). Then when Q is sufficiently
fine,
q̄i = ψ(θ̄) + β̄, (3.3.9)
0 =
(
4ψ(θ̄)− (r − c)





which has a unique solution such that θ̄ ≤ exp(−12ζ
2). Also, s̄i = 0 if and only if 0 ≥
(1− δ)[κψ(θ̄)− η]− δ∆V .
Although the equation (3.3.10) does not appear analytically tractable, the fact that
the solution is unique and known to be within the interval (0, exp(−12ζ
2)] allows the use
of a root-finding algorithm like Newton’s method. The following corollary gives a test for
whether the interior solution above is in fact optimal, and if it is not, gives the corner
solution that is optimal.
Corollary 3.3.1. Let v̄N be the static Nash equilibrium payoff given government arrests ḡ.
If




0 V̄ ≥ Ṽ∞ V̄ < Ṽ .
and E[(q̄, s̄)] is characterized by the one-shot equilibrium in Proposition 3.3.1. Otherwise,
the globally optimum θ̄ is the interior solution characterized by Proposition 3.3.3.
The proof is straightforward. First, if Ṽ > V̄ , an interior solution can only enforce
quantities higher than the static equilibrium (see (3.3.8)), yielding a lower current period
payoff, when the static equilibrium always followed by continuation payoff Ṽ is enforceable
and decomposes a higher payoff. A corner solution θ̄ ∈ {0,∞} can only enforce the one-shot
equilibrium, so the decomposed payoff must be the right hand side of (3.3.11). If the best
interior θ̄ decomposes a higher payoff, the solution is interior. Otherwise, it is best to simply
always choose the highest continuation payoff.
Since we are interested only in the maximum payoff Ē , I show that further simplifi-
cation is possible by focusing on the maximum payoff at each iteration of the algorithm in
part (3) of Proposition 3.3.2.
Definition 3.3.3. Define
B̄(W ) ≡ max B(W ), (3.3.12)
and define the pair Q(V ) = α,U(V ) = p̄ as an action profile α and price p̄ which, with some
V ∈W , decompose B̄(W ).
Lemma 3.3.2. Let closed set W ⊂ R be given, and define W̄ = maxW . Then B̄(W ) is
decomposable on the singleton {W̄}, i.e. B̄(W ) ∈ B({W̄}), and Q(V̄ ) = ᾱ,U(V̄ ) = p̄ where
ᾱ and p̄ = θ̄p(ᾱ) are characterized by Proposition 3.3.3 and Corollary 3.3.1.
This immediately gives the following algorithm for computing a tight upper bound
on Ē , and also shows that Ē is the optimal T -GPE (not just T -NGPE) payoff.
Corollary 3.3.2. Let F̄ ≡ max F † denote the maximum feasible payoff. Then
lim
m→∞
B̄m(F̄ ) = Ē , (3.3.13)
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and Ē is the payoff of a T -GPE.
Thus, repeated application of B̄(·) to the payoff yielded by the monopoly quantity
converges to the optimal T -GPE payoff Ē . The sequence {B̄m(F̄ )}m yields a decreasing
sequence of upper bounds on Ē . To prove that B̄m(F̄ ) is within some precision ε > 0 of
Ē , I use the following result.
Lemma 3.3.3. Let some V ≥ uN be given. If B̄({V }) ≥ V , then V ≤ Ē .
Following the example of the inner-bound method of Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin
(2003), I use Lemma 3.3.3 to establish a lower bound for Ē . For any m, if (1− ε)B̄m(F̄ ) ≤
B̄((1− ε)B̄m(F̄ )), then (1− ε)B̄m(F̄ ) is a lower bound on Ē . Thus, this test establishes
that
(1− ε)B̄m(F̄ ) ≤ Ē ≤ B̄m(F̄ ).
Once Ē is established with sufficient precision, I can back out the strategy from Q(·),U(·).
I conclude this section by summarizing the algorithm. The upper-bound algorithm
is given by Steps 1 - 4, and Steps 5 - 6 establish the lower bound.
1. Set V̄ ← um, the maximum feasible payoff um (the monopoly payoff).
2. Use Proposition 3.3.3 and Corollary 3.3.1 to compute Q(V̄ ),U(V̄ ).
(a) Compute interior solution θ̄ for (3.3.10) using Newton’s method. Check for corner
solution using (3.3.11).
(b) If solution is interior, set Q(V̄ ) ← ᾱ,U(V̄ ) = θ̄p(q̄, s̄) according to Proposition
3.3.3. Otherwise, set Q(V̄ ) to the static Nash equilibrium according to Propo-
sition 3.3.1, computed numerically when necessary according to Remark 3.3.2,
and
U(V̄ )←
0 V̄ ≥ Ṽ∞ V̄ < Ṽ .
3. Set V̄ ′ ← B̄(V̄ ) = V(Q(V̄ ),U(V̄ ), V̄ ). Set ∆V̄ ← |V̄ ′ − V̄ |. Set V̄ ← V̄ ′.
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4. If |∆V̄ | ≥ ε, go to Step 2. Otherwise set V̄ U ← V̄ .
5. Set V̄ L ← (1− ε)V̄ U . Use the method in Step 2 to compute Q(V̄ L),U(V̄ L).
6. If B̄(V̄ L) = V(Q(V̄ L),U(V̄ L), V̄ L) < V̄ L, go to Step 2. Otherwise, stop.
Upon a successful conclusion at the end of Step 6, Ē is guaranteed to satisfy V̄ U ≥ Ē ≥
V̄ L = (1 − ε)V̄ U , thereby establishing the optimal T -GPE equilibrium payoff within a
precision specified by ε.
3.4 Results
I use the computational method described in Section 3.3 to find the outcomes under
different government policies. Of particular interest are violence, drug consumption, and
profit of the firms. Define the discounted average drug consumption as the following sum






















The parameters used in the example are as follows: r = 10, c = 1, κ = 0.3, η = 0.02,
ζ = 0.1, δ = 0.95, and ω̃ = 0.05 (so T = 20). I apply the method on a grid G over [0, 22]2
for different parameters of (ḡ, g̃).
The per-firm profit Ē (ḡ, g̃) is plotted in Figure 3.4.1. The plot shows that equilibrium
payoffs are always decreasing in ḡ: arresting during the reward phase always reduces profits.
There are also clearly regions where increasing Ē is decreasing in g̃. For example, at
ḡ = 10, g̃ = 0, the government arrests so much during the reward phase that the optimal
equilibrium immediately switches to the punishment phase (p̄ = ∞), which actually has a
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Figure 3.4.1: Discounted average payoffs Ē over different policies (ḡ, g̃).
higher value. Increasing g̃ simply reduces the value of the punishment phase and thus the
entire equilibrium.
What is more subtle (and not very visible in Figure 3.4.1) is that profits are actually
increasing in g̃ for the region g̃ ≥ ḡ, ḡ < 8.71. For example, at ḡ = g̃ = 0, profit is
Ē ≈ 9.68, while at ḡ = 0, g̃ = 22, profit is Ē ≈ 9.78. Making punishments harsher
allows the enforcement of more collusive behavior without needing to trigger punishments
as frequently, yielding higher profits.
Suppose that the government is “corrupt” and receives some fraction of the firm
profits as a bribe. If the government seeks to maximize the bribe and therefore profit, the
optimal policy is ḡ = 0, g̃ = G. By increasing g̃ and making punishments harsher, more
collusive behavior is enforceable during the reward phase and punishments need are not
triggered as frequently, so profits actually increase. Thus, a corrupt government will always
choose the “leftmost” point in Figure 3.4.1 (this point will be the “frontmost” point, pointing
out of the page, in Figures 3.4.1 and 3.4.3).
Note that for region ḡ > 8.72, g̃ > 8.72, profits are reduced to zero. For these
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Figure 3.4.2: Discounted average violence M over different policies (ḡ, g̃).
policies, the government arrests so frequently that only mixing equilibria exist, where firms
mix between delivering a positive quantity and zero drugs to market. Since shutting down
and delivering zero drugs is always a best response, the equilibrium payoff is zero. Note,
however, that firms still generally deliver positive quantities of drugs in expectation (as seen
in Figure 3.4.3).
Violence M is plotted in Figure 3.4.2 (note that the policy grid is rotated approx-
imately 90◦ counter-clockwise relative to Figure 3.4.1). When g̃ < 19.76, starting from
ḡ = 0, violence is strictly increasing in ḡ until collusion completely breaks down. Arresting
during the reward state reduces the difference between the values of the reward and punish-
ment states, so punishments are less harsh relative to the reward state. Enforcing collusive
behavior requires that the punishment state be triggered more frequently, and so violence is
higher. Eventually collusion is no longer possible, resulting in static Nash behavior in both
states and so the firms continuously attack. When arrests in the reward state are sufficiently
severe (ḡ > 8.72), the cartels play the mixed static Nash equilibrium, and increases in ḡ
lead to producing drugs and violence with lower probability, leading to the slight downward
slope seen.
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Figure 3.4.3: Discounted average drugs delivered D over different policies (ḡ, g̃).
By contrast, M is always weakly decreasing in g̃, and strictly so for the region
g̃ ∈ [ḡ, 19.76), ḡ < 8.71. In this region, increasing g̃ reduces the necessary frequency of
punishments to sustain collusion, so violence happens less frequently as punishments become
harsher. Eventually, as in the case of ḡ discussed above, arrests become so great that attacks
are not part of the static Nash equilibrium, resulting in zero violence altogether.
Figure 3.4.3 plots the average discounted quantity of drugs D delivered to consumers
(the policy grid is oriented identically to Figure 3.4.2 and rotated approximately 90◦ counter-
clockwise relative to Figure 3.4.1). D is always weakly (and usually strictly) decreasing in
g̃. This is because arrests during the punishment state either incentivize collusion in the
reward state, which reduces the quantity in the reward state, or reduce drugs delivered in
the punishment state — both of which affect D negatively.
The effect of ḡ is more complicated. For the region g̃ ∈ [ḡ, 8.71), ḡ < 8.71, drugs are
increasing in ḡ. In this region, arrests in the reward state inhibit collusion, increasing drugs
delivered in the reward state, while the punishment static equilibrium quantity is unchanged.
For the region g̃ > 8.72, ḡ < 8.71, collusion is also inhibited by reward state arrests, but this
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is dominated by the negative effect on drugs delivered during the punishment state, which
is also triggered more frequently in order to sustain collusion. For ḡ > 8.72, collusion is
unsustainable and reward state arrests reduce the equilibrium quantities. In the rightmost
corner (g̃ ≥ 20.5, ḡ ≥ 20.5), arrests are sufficiently high in both states that the market
effectively shuts down: firms repeatedly choose to hire zero traffickers and not attack.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Depending on the government’s objectives, the results above have differing policy
implications. If the government wishes to maximize cartel profits, perhaps because of cor-
ruption, the optimal policy is clear: never arrest during the reward state (ḡ = 0) and arrest
as much as possible in the punishment state (g̃ = G). Interestingly, Figure 3.4.2 shows that
this policy also minimizes violence, uniquely so if the government’s power is sufficiently
limited.
However, governments that outlaw drugs presumably also wish to reduce drug con-
sumption. Figure 3.4.3 shows that for a very powerful government (G ≥ 20.5), it is possible
to reduce both drugs and violence to zero through a total crackdown. This works because
the government arrests so many traffickers that shutting down is a dominant strategy.
This changes as the government becomes more constrained. A government with
capacity 8.72 < G < 19.76 faces a tradeoff between reducing violence and reducing drugs.
Arrests during the punishment state serve both goals because arrests are sufficiently harsh to
reduce quantities delivered. Arrests during the reward state reduce cooperative incentives,
resulting in punishments being triggered more frequently, which reduces drug quantities but
increases violence.
An even more constrained government (G < 8.71) faces no tradeoff: the corrupt
policy minimizes drugs, minimizes violence, and maximizes firm profits (because prices are
high). As above, arrests in the punishment state allow greater collusion, which reduces
both drugs and violence. However, punishment quantities are greater than the reward
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quantities. By triggering more frequent punishments, arresting during the reward state
actually increases equilibrium drug quantities.
The results show that switching from a corrupt policy to a crackdown policy of
always arresting as much as possible can trigger a spike in violence so long as the govern-
ment’s power is limited. Since it may be quite difficult to assess a government’s capacity
to arrest traffickers (at least ex-ante), a policymaker facing such uncertainty over G who
cracks down, aiming to reduce drug consumption but also wanting to prevent violence, may
be unpleasantly surprised by the outcome. This is one way of thinking about Calderon’s
crackdown, which often involved replacing entire local police forces accused of corruption.
By contrast, for a corrupt government or one that simply aims to minimize violence without
regard to drug consumption (some combination of which may be thought of as similar to the
PRI government before 2000), the decision problem is easy: never arrest during the reward
state and always arrest during punishments, no matter what G is. Thus, law enforcement
operations can actually prevent inter-cartel competition, so long as they are used to punish
signals of defection.
There are a number of interesting avenues for future research. A natural extension
is to more than two firms, resulting in a more competitive market. I currently restrict
the government to policies conditioning only on the reward/punishment state, which is
necessary given my current numerical method. If the government chooses arbitrary policies
based on the history, this effectively transforms the model into a dynamic game. Studying
policies like “never arrest until violence is observed, and always arrest thereafter” may be
possible through Yeltekin, Cai, and Judd’s (2015) numerical implementation of the Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) framework for dynamic games. Studying asymmetric policies
and strategies would also be of interest to evaluate the effects of favoring one cartel over
another. Also, a generalization to include multiple governments may shed greater light on
the effects of political decentralization, highlighted by Rios (2014) as being a key driver of





Proofs for Chapter 1
1.1 Proof of Theorem 1.2.2
Suppose by contradiction that for any δ∗ ∈ (0, 1), there always exists δ ∈ (δ∗, 1) such
that a sequential equilibrium exists with positive probability of hiring on the equilibrium
path. Let such an equilibrium be given. I begin by showing that if the mechanic performs
a tune-up, then she is known to be good by all future motorists (even those who do not
observe a tune-up).
Lemma 1.1.1. If the mechanic performs a tune-up at any history at period t′ on the equi-
librium path, then motorists at any future period t′′ > t′ will know that the mechanic is good
(regardless of the subsequent actions played by the mechanic) on the equilibrium path.
Proof. For convenience I use a subscript zero on any period t̃ to denote the earliest period
t̃0 ≡ max{0, t̃− T} observed by motorist t̃ (as given in Definition 1.2.1). Let any history ht̃




, ..., ht̃t−1) denote the partial
observable subhistory at t̃ up to t ∈ {t̃0, ..., t̃}, which contains the events of the periods
before (but not including) t that are observed by motorist t̃. Let C(ĥt̃) be an indicator
function equal to 1 if ĥt̃ has a tune-up or, for t̃ > T , has the mechanic hired every period,
and equal to 0 otherwise:
C(ĥt̃) ≡

1 ∃t ∈ {t̃0, ..., t̃− 1} such that ĥt̃t = c
1 t̃ > T and ∀t ∈ {t̃0, ..., t̃− 1}, ĥt̃t 6= ∅
0 otherwise.
I prove by induction the following claims to be true:
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Claim 1.1.1. The full history ht̃ contains a tune-up if and only if observable subhistory ĥt̃
contains a tune-up or, for t̃ > T , has the mechanic hired in every observed period t̃0, ..., t̃−1
(i.e. C(ĥt̃) = 1).
Claim 1.1.2. If ht̃ does not contain a tune-up, then the observable subhistory ĥt̃ has the
mechanic being hired at most L times.
Claim 1.1.3. Suppose that for observable subhistory ĥt̃, C(ĥt̃) = 0. For any t ∈ {t̃0, ..., t̃−1},





, ..., ht̃t−1) and C(ĥ
t̃) = 0 is independent of the mechanic’s type
s ∈ {b, g}; that is,
P (ηt 6= ∅|s = g, ĥt̃t̃0,t, C(ĥ
t̃) = 0) = P (ηt 6= ∅|s = b, ĥt̃t̃0,t, C(ĥ
t̃) = 0).
Remark 1.1.1. For any history ht̃ on the equilibrium path, if Claim 1.1.1 is true, then Claim
1.1.3 is true. By Claim 1.1.1, if motorist t̃ has an observable subhistory such that C(ĥt̃) = 0,
then he knows that the full history ht̃ has no tune-ups and therefore the mechanic has played
indistinguishably from the bad type thus far, so conditioning on the mechanic’s true state
cannot change the probability that motorist t ∈ {t̃0, ..., t̃− 1} hires, so Claim 1.1.3 is true.
First, suppose that t̃ ≤ T . Since motorist t̃ observes the full history ht̃, Claim 1.1.1
is clearly true. If the mechanic performed more than L engine replacements without any
tune-ups in ht̃, then the (L + 1)th hiring motorist would have a posterior greater than or
equal to ΥL(µ0) > p∗, so hiring could not be a best response. Thus, Claim 1.1.2 is true.
Claim 1.1.3 is implied by Claim 1.1.1 as stated in Remark 1.1.1.
Now suppose that for some t̃ ≥ T , Claims 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 are true for any
history ht at any t ≤ t̃ on the equilibrium path. I show that this implies they must also hold
at any following history ht̃+1 on the equilibrium path. First, suppose that ht̃ contains a
tune-up. By Claim 1.1.1, observable subhistory ĥt̃ satisfies C(ĥt̃) = 1, and motorist t̃ knows
the mechanic is good. If ĥt̃ has a tune-up at some period t ∈ {t̃0 +1, ..., t̃−1}, then the next
motorist will see the same tune-up in his observable subhistory ĥt̃+1 and thus C(ĥt̃+1) = 1.
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If the tune-up is at period t̃0, then by Assumption 1 motorists in all periods t̃0 + 1, ..., t̃− 1
hired, and motorist t̃ also hires, giving an observable subhistory ĥt̃+1 next period with the
mechanic hired every period, so C(ĥt̃+1) = 1.
The previous paragraph shows that if ht̃+1 contains a tune-up, then C(ĥt̃+1) = 1,
but proving Claim 1.1.1 still requires the converse to be true, whose contrapositive is proven
in this paragraph. Suppose ht̃+1 does not contain a tune-up. Since Claim 1.1.2 holds at
ht̃, then ĥt̃ has the mechanic hired at most L times. If ĥt̃ has the mechanic hired strictly
less than L times, then Claim 1.1.1 clearly holds because even if motorist t̃ hires, ĥt̃+1 will
have at most L < T hirings. Suppose ĥt̃ has exactly L hirings. Because P (ηt 6= ∅|s =
g, ĥt̃
t̃0,t
, C(ĥt̃) = 0) = P (ηt 6= ∅|s = b, ĥt̃t̃0,t, C(ĥ
t̃) = 0) for all t ∈ {t̃0, ..., t̃−1} (due to Claim
1.1.3 holds at ht̃), I can give a lower bound for the posterior belief at t̃. Suppose that an
observable period t has the mechanic not being hired (ĥt̃t = ∅); then the partial posterior
at t + 1 is unchanged from period t: µt̃t+1(ĥ
t̃) = µt̃t(ĥ
t̃). Suppose that it instead has the
mechanic doing an engine replacement (ĥt̃t = e); then Υ(·) bounds the partial posterior from
below: µt̃t+1(ĥ
t̃) ≥ Υ(µt̃t(ĥt̃)). Since ĥt̃ contains L engine replacements and T − L no-hire
events, motorist t̃ has a posterior µt̃(ĥt̃) ≥ ΥL(µ0) > p∗, so he does not hire, giving L < T
engine replacements in ĥt̃+1. Thus, if ht̃+1 does not have a tune-up, then the observable
subhistory ĥt̃+1 has the mechanic hired at most L < T times and C(ĥt̃+1) = 0, so both
Claims 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 are proven true. Finally, Remark 1.1.1 shows that Claim 1.1.1 implies
Claim 1.1.3.
Having proven Claims 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 for all histories on the equilibrium
path, Claim 1.1.1 implies Lemma 1.1.1 because the set of observable subhistories possible
at histories on the equilibrium path where a tune-up has ever occurred (which can only
happen if the mechanic is good) is disjoint from the set of observable subhistories possible
on the equilibrium path when a tune-up has not ever occurred.
The arguments in the proof of Lemma 1.1.1 show that more than L engine-replace-
ments cannot occur within the first T periods unless a tune-up is performed.
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Corollary 1.1.1. Let any sequential equilibrium be given, and let hT be a history at T on
the equilibrium path. If no tune-ups occurred in hT , then hT contains at most L engine
replacements.
Proof. Claim 1.1.2 is shown in the proof of Lemma 1.1.1 to be true at all histories on the
equilibrium path.
Without loss of generality, let period 0 be the first period at which the mechanic is
hired with positive probability. Lemma 1.1.1 implies that the continuation payoff of doing
a tune-up at any period is u (the mechanic is hired forever after) given Assumption 1. Let
l ≤ L be the maximum number of engine replacements without any tune-ups in any history
at period T on the equilibrium path, and let hT be such a history with l engine replacements.
Let tj denote the jth period in h
T containing an engine replacement.
I show that the last engine replacement (within the first T + 1 periods) at tl must
occur sufficiently late. If the mechanic does an engine replacement at period tl, then she is
certainly not hired for periods tl + 1, ..., T , so the continuation payoff of an engine replace-
ment is bounded from above by δT−tlu. Since the mechanic is hired she must be willing
to perform an engine replacement when needed with positive probability, so a necessary
condition is
(1− δ)u+ δT+1−tlu ≥ −(1− δ)w + δu
δT+1−tl ≥ −(1− δ)(1 + w/u) + δ
(T + 1− tl) ln δ ≥ ln(δ − (1− δ)(1 + w/u))












= 2 + w/u. (1.1.1)
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Let any ε > 0 be given. Then
tl ≥ T − 1− w/u− ε
for δ close enough to one. Define tl ≡ T − 1− w/u− ε as a lower bound for tl.
I define tj for all j ∈ {1, ..., l} by (backward) induction. Consider period tj for some
j < l, where tj′ is defined for all j
′ ∈ {j + 1, ..., l}. The continuation payoff of doing an
engine replacement is less than or equal to δtj+1−tj−1u (because tj+1 is a lower bound for the
(j + 1)th period with an engine replacement). Incentive compatibility gives the necessary
condition
(1− δ)u+ δtj+1−tju ≥ −(1− δ)w + δu
δtj+1−tj ≥ δ − (1− δ)(1 + w/u)
(tj+1 − tj) ln δ ≥ ln (δ − (1− δ)(1 + w/u))
tj ≥ tj+1 −
ln (δ − (1− δ)(1 + w/u))
ln δ
. (1.1.2)
The limit as δ → 1 of the second term on the right hand side of (1.1.2) is given by (1.1.1).
For δ close enough to one, substituting into (1.1.2) gives




























Since the choice of ε > 0 is arbitrary, suppose we pick some ε < (T+1)/L−(2+w/u). Then
t1 > 0 for δ close enough to one due to the lower bound (1.2.4) on T . Since the first period
in which the mechanic is hired with positive probability is period 0, this is a contradiction.
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1.2 Proofs of Fading History Results
1.2.1 Proof of Theorem 1.2.4
Let any sequential equilibrium and history ht be given at which player 1 faces a
decision node. Let Va1,a2(h
t) denote player 1’s continuation payoff from the action profile
(a1, a2). Player 1 plays ad with certainty if
Ea2 [(1− δ)u1(ad, a2) + δVad,a2(h
t)] > Ea2 [(1− δ)u1(a′1, a2) + δVa′1,a2(h
t)] (1.2.1)
for all a′1 ∈ A1\{ad}, where Ea2 [·] is the expectation over player 2’s actions a2 ∈ Ã2 given
player 1’s beliefs (in the mechanic game, of course, player 1 knows a2 (hiring) because Ã2






Ea2 [u1(ad, a2)− u1(a′1, a2)]. (1.2.2)
The left hand side of (1.2.2) is equal to the discounted sum of the expected differences
in stage payoffs at every future period. Denoting player 1’s stage payoff at some period t̂ > t
as v(t̂), let v̄a1,a2(h
t, t̂) ≡ E[v(t̂)|ht, a1, a2] be the expected stage payoff at t̂ conditional on
ht and action profile (a1, a2) at h
t. The maximum change in the expected stage payoff at t̂
due to choosing an action different from ad at period t is




t, t̂)} ≤ z.
The action at t can only affect player 1’s payoff at t̂ if period t̂ observes t directly, or observes
some period t′ ∈ {t+ 1, ..., t̂− 1} that observes t, etc.; otherwise, player 2’s action at period
t̂ is necessarily independent of the events of period t. This notion of an “observation chain”
is formalized as “t reaches t̂” in the following definition.
Definition 1.2.1. Let two periods t′ and t′′ > t′ be given. Inductively define the relation
“t′ k-reaches t′′” as follows. If period t′′ observes period t′, then t′ is said to 0-reach t′′. If
period t′′ observes some period t̃ ∈ {t′ + 1, ..., t′′ − 1} and t̃ k-reaches t′, then t′ is said to
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(k + 1)-reach t′′. More simply, if (and only if) period t′ k-reaches t′′ for some k ∈ {0, 1, ...},
then t′ is said to reach t′′.
Let φ(t, t̂) denote the probability that t reaches t̂, which gives the upper bound
∆v̄(ht, t̂) ≤ φ(t, t̂)z. The following lemma gives an upper bound for φ(t, t̂).
Lemma 1.2.1. For any two periods t and t̂ > t, φ(t, t̂) ≤ 2t̂−t−1λt̂−t.
Proof. The proof is by induction. For t̂ = t+1, φ(t, t̂) = λ is trivially true. Now suppose that
for some t̂ > t, φ(t, t′) ≤ 2t′−t−1λt′−t for all t′ ∈ {t+ 1, ..., t̂}. The probability that t reaches
t̂+1 is the probability that motorist t̂+1 observes either t or some period t′ ∈ {t+1, ..., t̂−1}
such that t reaches t′. Then Boole’s inequality gives


























I can now write an upper bound for the left hand side of (1.2.2):
Ea2 [Vad,a2(h
t)− Va′1,a2(h













Since δλ < 12 ,
Ea2 [Vad,a2(h
t)− Va′1,a2(h








The right hand side of (1.2.3) is a strictly increasing function of λ for λ ∈ (0, 1/(2δ)).




















Ea2 [u1(ad, a2)− u1(a′1, a2)]
for any a′1 ∈ A1, a2 ∈ Ã2, so (1.2.1) is true.
1.2.2 A Higher Upper Bound for λ for Myopic Equilibria in the Mechanic
Game
Theorem 1.2.4 assumes that the “worst case” when an “observation chain” reaches
a future period is the stage payoff decreasing by the maximum feasible amount z; in the
mechanic game, this difference is u+w. A tighter bound that seems natural is the difference
between the highest feasible payoff and the minmax payoff (u). The following corollary
uses that bound on the stage payoff difference to give a higher upper bound on λ, using
Assumption 1 and Criterion 1. For δ close to one, as w/u approaches 1 the bound (1.2.4)
approaches 25 (corresponding to motorists talking to an average of
2
3 future motorists) and as
w/u approaches∞, (1.2.4) approaches 12 (corresponding to an average of 1 future motorist).








Then the action outcome of any sequential equilibrium satisfying Assumption 1 and Crite-
rion 1 has the good mechanic doing the correct repair when hired.
Proof. Let σ∗g denote the equilibrium strategy of the good mechanic, and let σ̄g be the
strategy identical to σ∗g except that at any history containing a tune-up, the mechanic does
the right repair with certainty (it may be that σ∗g = σ̄g). The following result allows a
simplification of the continuation payoffs for a tune-up. Note that µt (with a subscript
instead of superscript t) denotes motorist t’s beliefs about the mechanic’s type and the
history (as opposed to µt, which is simply the belief on the type).
Lemma 1.2.2. Let a sequential equilibrium (σ∗g , (σ
∗
t )t, (µt)t) under fading history given λ
satisfying Assumption 1 and Criterion 1 be given. At any history ht on the equilibrium path
containing a tune-up, it is a best response for the mechanic to perform the correct repair.
Proof. Any motorist observing the entire history (which occurs with positive probability
at every history) must hire due to Assumption 1. This is only possible if the mechanic
performs the correct repair with at least positive probability β∗ no matter the car’s state,
so it must be a best response.
Thus, deviating to σ̄g must be a best response at any history containing a tune-up.
Calculation of the expected stage payoffs following a tune-up (simply the probability of
being hired times u) is simpler for σ̄g and allows them to be used as upper bounds on the
expected stage payoffs following an engine replacement because of Criterion 1.
For the remainder of the proof, suppose that the mechanic deviates to σ̄g, which
has the same continuation payoffs as σ∗g at every history, an implication of Lemma 1.2.2.
Let the notation and arguments in the proof of Theorem 1.2.4 (Appendix 1.2.1) up to and
including Lemma 1.2.1 be given, except that all notation is with respect to the strategy σ̄g
(not σ∗g) and a2 is omitted from subscripts (because in the mechanic game, at a mechanic’s
decision node, a2 is known to be “hire”). At any history h
t, let ρt̂a(h
t) be the probability
that the mechanic is hired at period t̂ > t conditional on repair a at ht.
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Criterion 1 implies that the continuation payoff for a tune-up is greater than or
equal to that of an engine replacement because v̄c(h
t, t̂) = ρt̂c(h
t)u ≥ ρt̂e(ht)u ≥ v̄e(ht, t̂).
Therefore, when the motorist at ht needs a tune-up, performing a tune-up strictly dominates
an engine replacement.
What remains to be shown is that performing a needed engine replacement strictly
dominates doing an incorrect tune-up. Let σ̆g be the strategy identical to σ̄g, except that any
history following (ht, e) (i.e. any history that begins with ht followed by e at period t) the
mechanic always does the right repair. Let V̆a, ρ̆
t̂
a, v̆a be the analogues of Va, ρ
t̂
a, v̄a (which are
defined for σ̄g) for a deviation to σ̆g. Note that v̆e(h







t) ≤ Ve(ht). The fact that v̆c(ht, t̂)− v̆e(ht, t̂) = (ρ̆t̂c(ht)− ρ̆t̂e(ht))u ≤ φ(t, t̂)u
yields
Vc(h









































Therefore, doing an incorrect tune-up is not a best response.
1.2.3 Proof of Theorem 1.2.5
Suppose by contradiction that for any λ∗ ∈ (0, 1), there always exists λ ∈ (λ∗, 1) such
that a sequential equilibrium exists with positive probability of hiring on the equilibrium
path. Let such an equilibrium be given. Without loss of generality, let period zero be the
first period at which the mechanic is hired with positive probability. The following lemma
establishes that if the mechanic is hired at some history in equilibrium, she must be hired
again sufficiently soon (or else the temptation to do a tune-up will be too great).
Lemma 1.2.3. Suppose the mechanic is hired at some history ht on the equilibrium path
at period t with positive probability, such that
• t = 0, or
• the mechanic is hired with probability greater than λt(t+1)/2.
Suppose the mechanic chooses e at ht, and let t′ > t be the earliest future period at which
the mechanic is again hired with probability greater than λt
′(t′+1)/2. Define
K(δ, u, w) ≡ ln(δ − (1− δ)(1 + w/u))
ln δ
.
Then t′ ≤ t+K(δ, u, w) for λ close enough to one.
Proof. For any period t, if the mechanic is hired at period 0 or at ht with probability greater
than λt(t+1)/2, then the mechanic must perform a needed engine replacement with positive
probability; otherwise, the motorist who sees the full history ht would not hire, since the
probability that the full history is observed is
∏t
k=1 λ
k = λt(t+1)/2. Incentive compatibility
gives
(1− δ)u+ δVe(ht) ≥ −(1− δ)w + δVc(ht) (1.2.5)
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where Va(h
t) is the continuation payoff of action a. By definition, t′ is the earliest period
such that the mechanic is hired with probability greater than λt
′(t′+1)/2 if she chooses e at
period t, so an upper bound on her continuation payoff for e is
Ve(h













Assumption 1 gives the following lower bound for the continuation payoff of c:
Vc(h








Substituting these bounds into (1.2.5) gives
(1− δ)u+ (1− δ)
t′−1∑
k=t+1
δk−t(1− λk(k+1)/2)u+ δt′−tu ≥ −(1− δ)w + δ (1− δ)λu
1− δλ
δt










Let any ε > 0 be given. Taking the limit of the right hand side of (1.2.6) as λ → 1, there
exists λ∗ such that for all λ ∈ (λ∗, 1),
δt
′−t ≥ δ − (1− δ)(1 + w/u)
exp (ε/(− ln δ))
since exp(ε/(− ln δ)) > 1. Solving for t′ gives
(t′ − t) ln δ ≥ ln(δ − (1− δ)(1 + w/u))− ε
− ln δ
t′ ≤ t+ ln(δ − (1− δ)(1 + w/u))
ln δ
+ ε.
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we can pick ε < max{1, dK(δ, u, w)e −K(δ, u, w)}. In that case,
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because t′ is an integer, it must be that t′ ≤ t+K(δ, u, w) for λ close enough to one.
Lemma 1.2.3 implies that for λ close enough to one, if the mechanic is hired at period
0, with positive probability she must be hired in at least L + 1 periods (with greater than
probability λt
′(t′+1)/2 at each such period t′) in the first KL+ 1 periods on the equilibrium
path, which means there must exist history ht̃ at t̃ ≤ KL + 1 on the equilibrium path
that includes L + 1 engine replacements and no tune-ups. This also implies that at each
of these hirings, the mechanic must have performed a tune-up with at least probability β∗
(see (1.2.2)). Yet this implies that the posterior of the motorist receiving the (L + 1)th
engine replacement at period tL+1 if he observes the full history must have been at least
ΥL(µ0) > p∗. Thus, hiring was not a best response for that motorist with at least probability
λtL+1(tL+1+1)/2, a contradiction.
1.2.4 Proof of Theorem 1.2.6




[λk−t − (1− λk(k+1)/2)].
Note the following useful properties about the function f .
Fact 1.2.1. f(t, n;λ) is strictly decreasing in t, and strictly increasing in λ.
Fact 1.2.2. Let any ε > 0 be given. For any t ∈ {0, 1, ...}, n ∈ {2, 3, ...}, there exists
λ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any λ ∈ (λ′, 1), f(t, n;λ) > n− 1− ε.
Let n∗ be an integer strictly greater than 1 + w/u. Pick λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
f(Ln∗, n∗ + 1;λ∗) ≥ 1 + w/u. (1.2.7)
Let λ ∈ (λ∗, 1) be given. Suppose by contradiction that for any δ∗ ∈ (0, 1), there
always exists δ ∈ (δ∗, 1) such that there exists a sequential equilibrium (σ∗g , (σ∗t )t, (µt)t)
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(note that µt (with a subscript instead of superscript t) denotes motorist t’s beliefs about
the mechanic’s type and the history, instead of µt, which is simply the belief on the type),
where the mechanic is hired with positive probability on the equilibrium path. Without
loss of generality, let the first such period be 0.
Let σ̄g be the strategy identical to σ
∗
g except that at any history containing a tune-
up, the mechanic does the right repair with certainty (it may be that σ∗g = σ̄g). Lemma
1.2.2, reproduced here as Lemma 1.2.4 for convenience, shows that deviating to σ̄g is a best
response at any history (the only histories at which σ̄g may differ from σ
∗
g are those with
tune-ups, and for those histories doing the right repair is always a best response).
Lemma 1.2.4. Let a sequential equilibrium (σ∗g , (σ
∗
t )t, (µt)t) satisfying Assumption 1 and
Criterion 1 be given. At any history ht containing a tune-up, it is a best response for the
mechanic to perform the correct repair.
I use a technique here similar to the proof of Corollary 1.2.1 to simplify calculation
of continuation payoffs. For σ̄g, calculation of the expected stage payoffs following a tune-
up is simple (due to Lemma 1.2.4, it is the probability of being hired times u) and due to
Criterion 1, they can be used as upper bounds on the expected stage payoffs following an
engine replacement (shown below).
For the remainder of the proof, suppose that the mechanic deviates to σ̄g; since by
Lemma 1.2.4 such a deviation is a best response at any history, the continuation payoffs
are identical at all histories. At any history ht, let ρka(h
t) be the probability that the
mechanic is hired at period k > t conditional on doing repair a ∈ {c, e} at ht, and let
v̄ka(h
t) denote the expected stage payoff at period k conditional on a. Criterion 1 requires
that ρkc (h
t) ≥ ρke(ht). Since the mechanic performs all correct repairs following a tune-up,
v̄kc (h
t) = ρkc (h
t)u ≥ ρke(ht)u ≥ v̄ke (ht).
Lemma 1.2.5. Let the assumptions of Theorem 1.2.6 and λ ∈ (λ∗, 1) be given. For δ
close enough to one, if there exists a sequential equilibrium where the mechanic is hired with
positive probability at period 0, then there exists a history ht̃ on the equilibrium path at some
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period t̃ ≤ Ln∗ where the mechanic is hired with probability greater than 1 − λt̃(t̃+1)/2 and
ht̃ contains L engine replacements and no tune-ups such that the posterior after observing
the full history is µt̃(ht̃) ≥ ΥL(µ0).
Proof. The proof is by induction. Let t1 > 0 be the first period after 0 at which the mechanic
is hired with greater than probability 1− λt1(t1+1)/2, conditional on the mechanic doing an
engine replacement in period 0.
I now show that t1 ≤ n∗ for δ close enough to one. The continuation payoff of a
















where h0 is the empty history at period 0. Since the mechanic is hired, the incentive
constraint
−(1− δ)w + δVc(h0) ≤ (1− δ)u+ δVe(h0)

















for any n ≤ t1. Suppose by contradiction that t1 > n∗. After some rearrangement of (1.2.8),
picking n = n∗ + 1 gives
n∗∑
k=1
δk[λk − (1− λk(k+1)/2)]u ≤ u+ w. (1.2.9)





δk[λk − (1− λk(k+1)/2)] = f(0, n∗ + 1) < 1 + w/u,
so (1.2.9) contradicts (1.2.7) for λ > λ∗ and δ close enough to one. Thus, the mechanic
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must be hired at period t1 with probability greater than 1 − λt1(t1+1)/2 and t1 ≤ n∗ at a
history ht1 with one engine replacement and no tune-ups.
Now for some j ≥ 1, let htj be a history at tj ≤ jn∗ on the equilibrium path where
the mechanic is hired with probability greater than 1−λtj(tj+1)/2, such that htj has j engine
replacements and no tune-ups. I show that there exists period tj+1 ≤ tj + n∗ such that
the mechanic is hired with probability greater than 1− λtj+1(tj+1+1)/2. Since the mechanic
is hired at htj with greater than probability 1− λtj(tj+1)/2, the mechanic must perform an
engine replacement with positive probability when it is needed (by the same argument as





















δk−tj [λk−tj − (1− λk(k+1)/2)]u ≤ u+ w. (1.2.10)






δk−tj [λk−tj − (1− λk(k+1)/2)] = f(tj , n∗ + 1) < 1 + w/u,
so (1.2.10) contradicts (1.2.7) for λ > λ∗ and δ close enough to one. Then there exists a
history htj+1 following htj on the equilibrium path for some tj+1 ≤ tj + n∗ ≤ n∗(j + 1)
where the mechanic is hired with probability greater than 1 − λtj+1(tj+1+1)/2 with j + 1
engine replacements (where the good mechanic must have performed a tune-up with at
least probability β∗) and no tune-ups. For δ close enough to one, this induction proves
the existence of such a history on the equilibrium path containing any number of engine
replacements j ≤ L such the posterior upon observing the full history is at least Υj(µ0), if
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motorist 0 hires with positive probability.
Lemma 1.2.5 shows the existence of some history ht̃ at some t̃ ≤ Ln∗ on the equilib-
rium path whose full observation yields posterior µt̃(ht̃) ≥ ΥL(µ0) > p∗ and the mechanic
is hired with probability greater than 1 − λt̃(t̃+1)/2, which requires that the motorist hire
even if he observes the full history. Yet if he observes the full history, hiring cannot be a
best response, a contradiction.
1.3 Proofs of Chain Store Game Results
1.3.1 An Equilibrium for the Limited History Chain Store Game with T = 1
I construct a sequential equilibrium (σ∗, µ∗). Let any history ht be given. The
strategies are as follows. The incumbent always fights when htt−1 ∈ {∅, h0} (where h0 is
the empty history at period 0), always acquiesces when htt−1 = A, and acquiesces with
probability βF ≡ (1 − b)/(1 − µ0) when htt−1 = F . For any t, competitor t never enters
when ĥtt−1 ∈ {∅, h0}, always enters when ĥtt−1 = A, and enters with probability αF ≡
1 − (1 − δ)/(δc) when ĥtt−1 = F . Competitor t has belief µ0 that the incumbent is tough
when ĥt ∈ {h0,∅, F}, and of course knows that the incumbent is weak when ĥt = A.
The competitor’s strategy is clearly a best response at ĥt ∈ {h0,∅, A}. When
ĥt = F , the competitor’s payoff for entering is
µ0(b− 1) + (1− µ0)(βF b+ (1− βF )(b− 1))









= µ0(b− 1) + (1− b)(b− (b− µ0))
= 0,
so both In and ∅ are best responses.
Since strategies and beliefs only depend on the last period, continuation payoffs also
depend only on the last period. For the incumbent, let VIn be the continuation payoff at
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some period after the competitor enters, and let Va be the continuation payoff following
action A by the incumbent. Since VIn must simply be the value of the best action,
VIn = max {δVA,−(1− δ) + δVF }
= max {δVIn ,−(1− δ) + δ (αFVIn + (1− αF )c)}
= max
{





















Since δ ∈ (0, 1), it must be that VIn = 0. This means that the payoffs for playing A and F
are equal to 0 (see (1.3.1)), so any strategy by the incumbent is a best response.
The beliefs at ĥt ∈ {A,F} are off the equilibrium path, so it remains to checked
that they are consistent with small perturbations. Let some ε ∈ (0, 1) be given. Let (σk)k
be a sequence of strategy profiles,1 where under σk, competitor t plays In with probability
εk when ĥt ∈ {∅, h0} and plays ∅ with probability εk when ĥt = A, and the incumbent
plays A with probability εk when ĥt = ∅ and plays F with probability εk when ĥk = A.
Otherwise σk is the same as σ
∗, and beliefs µk are entirely determined by Bayes’ rule. Then
limk→∞(σk, µk) = (σ
∗, µ∗).
1.3.2 Proof of Theorem 1.3.1
Let any sequential equilibrium be given. I bound the payoff for the following (possi-
bly deviation) incumbent strategy: for some K, fight for every period 0, ...,K, then acquiesce






k′ = λζ̃(K) (note that competitor 0’s history is always empty, so
1This is not to be confused with the sequence of competitor strategies for all periods in a single strategy
profile.
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Suppose by contradiction that conditional on all competitors 1, ...,K seeing their
full history, there are greater than L periods with entry with positive probability on the
equilibrium path. That means the incumbent’s equilibrium strategy has her acquiescing
with at least probability b at each of those histories (otherwise the competitors would not
enter when they observe those full histories). The (L+1)th competitor entering observes the
full history and must have a posterior greater than or equal to ΥL(µ0) > p∗ and therefore
will not enter, a contradiction.
Thus, conditional on all competitors 1, ...,K seeing their full history, the average
































= [λζ̃(K)c− (1− λζ̃(K))]δL(1− δK+1)− (1− δL)
= [λζ̃(K)δL(1− δK+1)c− (1− λζ̃(K))δL(1− δK+1)]− (1− δL). (1.3.2)
The incumbent receives at least 0 for acquiescing in periods beyond K, so (1.3.2) is a lower
bound for the average discounted payoff for all periods, and therefore also vI(µ
0, δ, λ). Let
any ε′ ∈ (0, 1) and any ε′′ > 0 be given. There exists K∗ such that for all K > K∗,
δL+K+1c < ε′′. Since limλ→1 λ
ζ̃(K) = 1, there exists λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all K > K∗
and λ ∈ (λ∗, 1),
vI(µ
0, δ, λ) ≥ [(1− ε′)δL(1− δK+1)c− ε′]− (1− δL)
= [δLc− δL+K+1c− ε′δL(1− δK+1)c− ε′]− (1− δL).
> [δLc− ε′′ − ε′δL(1− δK+1)c− ε′]− (1− δL).
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Pick ε′, ε′′ such that ε′ + ε′δL(1− δK+1)c+ ε′′ = ε. Then for λ ∈ (λ∗, 1),
vI(µ
0, δ, λ) ≥ δLc− (1− δL)− ε.
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Appendix 2
Proofs for Chapter 2
2.1 Proofs for Sections 2.2 and 2.3
2.1.1 Proof of Lemma 2.2.1
Given that the short-run players are playing public strategies given by vector σ̃2,
player 1’s payoffs of playing any particular action does not depend on player 1’s full (private)
history. Let






denote the value of choosing a1 at full history ha2 and then choosing a best response at
all subsequent histories, where V (σ1, σ̃2|ha2a1y) is the value of playing strategy σ1 given
player 2 strategies σ̃2 at full history ha2a1y. Define H̄
t : Ht → 2Ht so that H̄t(ht) is the set
of full histories at period t whose public component (those visible to player 2 at period t) is
equal to ht. Consider any two histories h, ȟ ∈ H̄t(ht) for some public history ht. Because
future player 2s cannot condition on the events of period t−K or earlier,
Va1(σ̃2|ha2)





V (σ1, σ̃2|ha2a1y) (2.1.1)











V (σ1, σ̃2|ȟa2a1y) = Va1(σ̃2|ȟa2)(2.1.2)
for all a1 ∈ A1.




Pσ̃(ha2) is the probability of ha2 being realized in equilibrium given σ̃. By (2.1.2), σ̄1 is a
best response to σ̃2. Because the equilibrium conditional probability of each public history
is the same between (σ̄1, σ̃2) and σ̃, i.e. Pσ̄1,σ̃2(h
t|θ) = Pσ̃(ht|θ) for each ht ∈ H, θ ∈ Θ,
player 2 has the beliefs µ̃ are also consistent with (σ̄1, σ̃2). Furthermore, the expected (from
the perspective of player 2) play by player 1 is also identical. Thus, σ̃2 is a best response
to σ̄1.
2.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2.3.3
Proof of Part 1
The proof is constructive, following the example of Proposition 7.3.1 in Mailath
and Samuelson (2006b) where possible. Let any w ≡ (φ, µ, γ) ∈ B(W ) ⊂ W be given.
I construct a wPBE strategy profile σ for the variant game G∞φ,µ. Define functions Q :
B(W )→ A,U : B(W )→W so that (φ, µ,Q(w)) is enforced by U(w).
Specify the wPBE strategy profile σ as follows. Recursively define Ut(w) ∈ W as
follows: U0(w) = w, Ut(w) = U(Ut−1(w)). Let any full semipublic history ht ∈ Y K+t be
given — note that ht contains the initial history h0 ∈ Y K . Denote (φt, µt, γt) = Ut(w)







ta2) for each t, h
t ∈ Ht, a2 ∈ A2.
First I show that V (σ|h0) = γ(h0) for initial history h0. Then
γ(h0) = V((φ, µ,Q(w)),U(w))(h0) = V((φ, µ,Q0(w)),U1(w))(h0) (2.1.3)












·V((φ1, µ1, α1),U2(w))(h0y0) (2.1.6)






























0ht|h0, θ0)γt(htt−K , ..., htt−1)), (2.1.11)
where Pσ(h
s|h0, θ0) is the probability of history hs occurring under strategy profile σ in
game Gφ,µ conditional on initial history h
0 and the normal type θ0. Taking the limit t→∞
gives







0hs|h0, θ0)u1(σ(h0hs, θ0)) = V (σ|h0, θ0). (2.1.12)
To show that σ is a wPBE strategy profile, beliefs must be consistent with σ. Short-
run players do not know the full history nor do they know player 1’s type; thus, beliefs map
from public histories to probability distributions over elements of the set Θ×H. However,
since player 1 is playing a public strategy, beliefs on the full history do not affect player
2’s payoffs, so they can be ignored aside from knowing the public history; the only belief
that matters is the belief on the type θ. Together, a belief on θ and the public history
ht characterize player 2’s maximization problem. I show that beliefs (µt)∞t=0 on the type
are consistent with σ. The conditional probability Pσ(h
0|θ) of initial history h0 at period
0 is given by φ(h0|θ). Suppose that for some t the conditional (given θ) probability of
public history ht satisfies Pσ(h
t|θ) = φt(ht|θ). Then the conditional probability of history
















αt(a|ht, θ)ρ(y|a) = φt+1(ht+1|θ),
where τ(ht+1) ≡ {ht ∈ Ht : ∀k ∈ {K−1, ..., 1}, ht+1−k−1 = h
t
−k} is the set of period t histories
that match the oldest K − 1 periods of ht+1. Then by induction Pσ(ht|θ) = φt(ht|θ) for all
130











so the consistency requirement is satisfied. For histories not on the equilibrium path, wPBE
does not impose any requirement beyond that a belief is defined, which is provided by µt.
Finally, I show that there are no profitable one-shot deviations. For short-run players
this follows from (2.3.3) in Definition 2.3.13. For all ht, play at period t is given by σt(ht, θ) =
αt(ht, θ) and beliefs by µt; substituting αt for α and µt for µ, (2.3.3) immediately implies
there is no profitable deviation for the short-run player. The long-run player also has no
profitable one-shot deviations due (2.3.5) in Definition 2.3.13, as is now shown. For any
period t, (φt, µt, αt) is enforced by (φt+1, µt+1, γt+1). Then for all ht ∈ Ht and at2 ∈ A2,










for all a′1 ∈ A1. By the same argument as (2.1.3) through (2.1.12), it can be shown that
γt+1(a) is the continuation payoff of action profile a being played in period t. Thus, there
are no profitable one-shot deviations for player 1.
For all w ≡ (φ, µ, γ) ∈ W , I have shown that γ(h0) is the value (to player 1) of
a wPBE strategy profile for variant game G∞φ,µ conditional on initial history h
0. Thus,
w ∈ Dφ,µ ⊂ D, and so B(W ) ⊂ D.
Proof of Part 2
I prove that D ⊂ B(D) because Part 1 implies that if D is self-generating, B(D) ⊂ D
and so B(D) = D.
Let any w0 ≡ (φ0, µ0, γ0) ∈ D be given. Then by Definition 2.3.9 and Lemma 2.2.1,
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there exists a public wPBE (σ, µ) for variant game G∞φ0,µ0 such that V (σ|h
0) = γ(h0) for
initial history h0. Define history distribution φt so that φt(ht|θ) = Pσ(ht|θ). Because this is











Define belief mapping µt such that µt(θ|ht) = µ(θ|ht); (2.1.14) shows that µt is consistent




ta2, θ) = σ(h
ta2, θ) for each h
t ∈ Ht, a2 ∈ A2, θ ∈ Θ. Also define payoff functions
γt(ht) ≡ V (σ|ht).



















so inducibility is satisfied: (φt+1, µt+1) ∈ Υ(φt, µt, αt). Incentive compatibility for the long-
run and short-run players is a straightforward implication of σ not having profitable one-shot
deviations. Thus, xt ≡ (φt, µt, αt) is enforced by wt+1 ≡ (φt+1, µt+1, γt+1). Furthermore,



























so (φt, µt, γt) is decomposed by xt and wt+1 (see Definition 2.3.14). Since the period t+ 1
continuation game is strategically equivalent to the G∞φt+1,µt+1 variant game, w
t+1 ∈ D.
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Thus, since w1 ∈ D and w0 is generated by w1, w0 ∈ B(D) so D ⊂ B(D).
2.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3.4
I start with a useful lemma that establishes B is additive in the sense of set unions,
and therefore monotonic in the sense of set inclusion.
Lemma 2.1.1. Let any two sets W,W ′ of HBPs be given. Then B(W ∪W ′) = B(W ) ∪
B(W ′).
Proof. I first show that B(W ∪ W ′) ⊂ (B(W ) ∪ B(W ′)). Let any w ∈ B(W ∪ W ′) be
given. Then there exist HBA x and HBP w̃ ∈ (W ∪W ′) which decompose w. Without
loss of generality, suppose w̃ ⊂ W . Since w is decomposed by x and w̃, then w ∈ B(W ) ⊂
(B(W ) ∪B(W ′)). Thus B(W ∪W ′) ⊂ (B(W ) ∪B(W ′)).
Now let w ∈ (B(W ) ∪ B(W ′)) be given. Without loss of generality, suppose w ∈
B(W ), so then there exist HBA x and HBP w̃ ∈W which decompose w. Since w̃ ∈ (W∪W ′),
it is also true that w ∈ B(W ∪W ′), so (B(W ) ∪B(W ′)) ⊂ B(W ∪W ′).
The following lemma is a virtually identical adaptation from the APS version, so
the proof is omitted (see Lemma 7.3.2 of Mailath and Samuelson (2006b)).
Lemma 2.1.2. If W is compact, B(W ) is closed.
F† is compact and the set of HBPs decomposable on F† is also feasible: B(F†) ⊂ F†.
Proposition 2.3.3 and Lemma 2.1.1 imply that, for any m, D(δ) ⊂ Bm(F†) ⊂ F†. Repeatedly
applying B therefore gives a decreasing sequence {Bm(F†)}∞m=0. Then




I adapt the proof of Proposition 7.3.3 of Mailath and Samuelson (2006b) to my
setting, showing that F†∞ ⊂ B(F†∞), which by Proposition 2.3.3 proves the result. For any
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w ≡ (φ, µ, γ) ∈ F†∞, w ∈ Bm(F†) for all m ∈ {1, 2, ...}, and there exists (xm, w̃m) such that
xm ≡ (φ, µ, αm) ∈ X, w̃m ∈ Bm−1(F†), and w is decomposed by xm and w̃m.
Because the sequence (xm, w̃m)∞m=0 is bounded, without loss of generality assume
that it converges to a limit (x∗, w̃∗) ≡ ((φ, µ, α∗), (φ̃∗, µ̃∗, γ̃∗)), using a convergent subse-
quence if necessary by the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem. I show that w̃∗ ∈ F†∞, that x∗ is
enforced by w̃∗ and that w is decomposed by x∗ and w̃∗.
Suppose by contradiction that w̃∗ /∈ F†∞. By Lemma 2.1.2, F†∞ is closed, so there
exists ε > 0 such that B̄ε(w̃
∗) ∩ F†∞ = ∅, where B̄ε(w̃) is defined as follows:1
B̄ε((φ̃, µ̃, γ̃)) ≡ {(φ′, µ′, γ′) : ∀h ∈ Y K ,∀θ ∈ Θ, φ′(h|θ) ∈ [φ̃(h|θ)− ε, φ̃(h|θ) + ε],
µ′ ∈Mφ′ , µ′(θ|h) ∈ [µ̃(θ|h)− ε, µ̃(θ|h) + ε], γ′ ∈ B̄Γε (γ̃)}
where B̄Γε (γ̃) is the closed ball in Γ (which is a |Y |K-dimensional Euclidean space) of radius
ε with center γ̃. There exists m′ such that for all m > m′, w̃m ∈ B̄ε(w̃∗) and because









m=1{Bm(F†)} has the finite intersection property and B̄ε(w̃∗)∪F†
is compact, so the aforementioned collection has a non-empty intersection (by Theorem
4.7.15 of Corbae, Stinchcombe, and Zeman (2009)): B̄ε(w̃
∗) ∩ F†∞ 6= ∅, a contradiction.
It is easy to see that x∗ ∈ X because X is closed and all xm ∈ X. Since xm is
enforced by w̃m for all m, taking the limit it is straightforward to show that x∗ is enforced
by w̃∗. Similarly it is clear that limm→∞ V(x
m, w̃m) = γ = V(x∗, w̃∗), w is decomposed by
x∗ and w̃∗. Thus, F†∞ is self generating and bounded, so F
†




1The “closed ball with center w̃ and radius ε” is not well defined in the space W ≡ M × Γ because M is
not a Euclidean space.
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2.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3.5
I prove that each element of V(W ) is a wPBE player 1 payoff for the full game G∞.
Let any v ∈ V(W ) be given. By Definition 2.3.18, there exists HBP (φ, µ, γ) ∈ D such that
v ∈ E(φ,µ,γ). This means there exists a strategy profile σ̌ ∈ Σ∗γ of the γ-antegame such that
the distribution of outcomes matches φ, i.e. Pσ̌(h|θ) = φ(h|θ) for each h ∈ Y K (where Pσ̌(·)
is defined as it was just after (2.1.10)), and with value V (σ̌) = v. Let µ̌ be the associated
beliefs of the equilibrium with strategy profile σ̌.
As in the proof of part 1 of Proposition 2.3.1, define functions Q : D→ A,U : D→ D
so that (φ, µ,Q(w)) is enforced by U(w). Recursively define Ut(w) ∈W for t ∈ {K,K+1, ...}
as follows: UK(w) = w, Ut+1(w) = U(Ut(w)). Denote (φt, µt, γt) = Ut(w) and Qt(w) =
Q(Ut(w)) = αt for all t.
For the full game G∞, define public strategy profile σ ∈ Σ̂ such that σt2(h) = σ̌t2(h)
and σ1(t, ha2) for each date-history (t, h) ∈ H and each a2 ∈ A2. For periods t ≥ K, define
σ2(t+K,h) = α
t+K
2 (h) and σ1(t+K,ha2) = α1(t+K,ha2, θ0) for each (t+K,h) ∈ H, a2 ∈
A2. Define (φ
t+K , µt+K , γt+K) = Ut(w). Define beliefs µ∗ such that µ∗(θ|t, h) = µt(θ|h) for
all t ≥ K.
Note that Pσ̌(h|θ) = Pσ((K,h)|θ) = φK(h|θ). Suppose that for some some t ≥ K,
Pσ((t, h)|θ) = φt(h|θ). Since (φt+1, µt+1, γt+1) = U((φt, µt, γt)) ∈ B({(φt, µt, γt)}), the HB
















Pσ((t, h)|θ)σ2(a2|t, h)σ1(a1|t, ha2, θ)ρ(y|a2, a1)
= Pσ((t+ 1, h
′y)|θ).
Then by induction, Pσ((t, h)|θ) = φt(h|θ) holds true at all t ≥ K. The direct analogue
of (2.1.13) shows that µ∗(θ|h) is consistent at t ≥ K, and the analogous steps of (2.1.3)
through (2.1.12) show that V (σ|t, h) = γt(h). The incentive compatibility requirements of
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Definition 2.3.13 directly imply the absence of profitable one-shot deviations in (σ, µ∗) for
t ≥ K.
The arguments above also show that continuation payoffs V (σ|t, hK) for play be-
ginning at period K with public history h is given by γ(hK). The fact that σ̌ is a wPBE of
the γ-antegame means that by incentive compatibility at for player 1 at period K − 1 with
history hK−1,










for each a′1 ∈ A1, so substituting σ1(hK−1a2) for σ̌1(hK−1a2) and V (σ|hK−1yK−1) for
γ(hK−1yK−1) proves that σ is incentive compatible for player 1 at period K − 1. By
backward induction, it is straightforward to show that σ̌ being a wPBE of the γ-antegame
implies incentive compatibility for σ in the full game and V (σ̌|ht) = V (σ|ht) for each
t ∈ {0, ...,K − 1} and ht ∈ Ht. Because player 2 observes the full history for periods
0, . . . ,K − 1, beliefs carry over from the antegame to the full game without modification
(µ̌(θ|h) = µ∗(θ|h) for all t ∈ {0, ...,K − 1}, h ∈ Ht, θ ∈ Θ). Thus, σ is a wPBE of the full
game and v = V (σ̌|∅) = V (σ|∅), so v ∈ E.
I now prove V(D) = E, and since the above arguments have shown V(D) ⊂ E, I show
E ⊂ V(D). Let v ∈ E and the associated public wPBE (σ, µ∗) of the full game G∞ be given
(so that v = V (σ)). At period K, the equilibrium distribution of histories conditional on
type θ is Pσ((K,h
K)|θ). Define history distribution φK so that φK(hK |θ) = Pσ((K,hK)|θ),
define belief mapping µK so that µK(θ|hK) = µ∗(θ|(K,hK)), and payoff function γK(hK) =
V (σ|(K,hK)).
I show that w ≡ (φK , µK , γK) ∈ DφK ,µK . Define strategy profile σ̃ ∈ Σ∗φK ,µK of the
(φK , µK)-variant game as follows. Set σ̃2(t, h) = σ2(t+K,h) and σ̃1(t, ha2) = σ1(t+K,ha2)
for all h ∈ Y K , a2 ∈ A2. Define beliefs µ̃∗(t, h) = µ(t + K,h). Since beliefs and strategies
are the same (shifted by K periods), the lack of profitable deviations in (σ, µ) for periods
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K,K + 1, ... implies a lack of profitable deviations for (σ̃, µ̃∗) for periods 0, 1, .... Thus,
(σ̃, µ̃∗) is a wPBE of the (φK , µK)-variant game. Since σ|(K,h) = σ̃|(0,h), V (σ̃|(0, h)) =
V (σ|(t, h)) = γK(h). Then by Definition 2.3.9, w ∈ DφK ,µK ⊂ D.
For the γK-antegame, define strategy profile σ̌ ∈ ΣγK so that σ̌(ht) = σ(ht). For
the antegame, define beliefs µ̌∗ so that µ̌∗(h) = µ∗(h) for all t ∈ {0, ...,K − 1}, h ∈ Ht.
Since the short-run players in periods 0, ...,K − 1 observe the full history in the full game
G∞, the beliefs µ̌ in the γK-antegame are consistent with σ̌. Since there are no profitable
deviations in (σ, µ) and the maximization problems are identical in the antegame at every
history t ∈ {0, ...,K − 1}, h ∈ Ht, there are also no profitable one-shot deviations in σ̌,
so (σ̌, µ) is a wPBE of the γ-antegame with distribution of period K histories φK . Thus,
v ∈ E(φK ,µK ,γK), and so v ∈ V(D).
2.1.5 Proof of Proposition 2.3.6
Let any stationary wPBE (σ∗, µ∗) be given. Note that this is a Markov chain on
the state space of histories.
Lemma 2.1.3. Let some finite state space Ω ≡ {ω1, . . . , ωn} and a Markov chain {Xt} on
that state space with transition matrix Q be given. Let some initial probability distribution
on the states π0 ≡ (π01, . . . , π0n) be given, and let π∞ be the time average distribution of Xt,








Then π∞ is stationary, i.e. π∞ = π∞Q.
Proof. Every Markov chain on a finite state space has at least one stationary distribution
(Furman, 2011). For aperiodic states, the limit (2.1.15) exists (see Property 2.17 of Gallager




















π0Qs + π0Qt − π0
)
,


































as the time average probability of history h ∈ Y K generated by the Markov chain specified
by σ∗ conditional on type θ as given in (2.1.15); note that the initial distribution of this
Markov chain is π0(h|θ) = PKσ (h|θ). Define φ so that φ(h|θ) ≡ π∞(h|θ), and define belief
mapping µ so that µ(θ|h) ≡ µ∗(θ|h). Note that µ ∈ Mφ because µ∗ satisfies Bayes’ rule
on the equilibrium path. Define action mapping α so that α2(h) ≡ σ∗2(h) and α1(ha2, θ) ≡
σ∗1(ha2, θ). I show that x ≡ (φ, µ, α) is enforced by w ≡ (φ, µ, γ). Lemma 2.1.3 shows that


















so inducibility is satisfied: (φ, µ) ∈ Υ(φ, µ, α). Defining payoff function γ so that γ(h) ≡
V (h), the lack of profitable one-shot deviations in σ∗ immediately implies incentive com-
patibility for both players, so x is enforced by w. Finally,













so w is decomposed by x and itself.
2.2 Proofs for Section 2.4
2.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
Although player 1 observes all her past shocks, all of them except the current shock
can be ignored in equilibrium. The following definition and lemma (essentially the same as
Definition 4 and Lemma 2 in BMM) show this formally.
Definition 2.2.1. A strategy σ̃1 is a current shock strategy if for all h̃ ∈ H̃1, containing
non-shock history ha2 ∈ H×A2 and shocks z01 , . . . , zt1,
σ1(ha2, z
0




1) = σ1(ha2, z̄
t−K





for almost all zt1 ∈ Z1 and any z̄01 , . . . , z̄
t−1
1 ∈ Z1.
Lemma 2.2.1. If σ̃1 is a best response to σ̃2, then σ̃1 is a current shock strategy.
Proof. Let a player 1 history h̃ ∈ H̃t1, containing non-shock history ha2 ∈ Ht×A2 and shocks
z01 , . . . , z
t




be the value of playing the strategy σ1 starting at period t+ 1, following the realizations of
at+12 and z
t+1




1 ) be the best response. The
payoff (at period t) of playing action a1 after player 2 action a
t
2 is
























Note that the decision problem is independent of all shocks before period t. For any two
actions a1, a
′





for some constant ζ. Thus, for almost all realizations of zt1, player 1 has a unique best
response and thus σ̃1 does not condition on z
0
1 , . . . , z
t−1
1 .
The following result is an extension of Lemma 1 of BMM.
Lemma 2.2.2. Every essentially sequentially strict wPBE is quasi-Markov perfect.
Proof. Let any two full semipublic histories ht, h̄t which lead to the same quasi-Markov state
for player 2 be given. I will show that sequential strictness implies the same behavior at
the two histories.
Let some k ≥ K and k-length sequence yk ∈ Y k be given. Since players at periods
t+K + 1, t+K + 2, ... cannot observe period t, it is clear that the value function V (htyk)
does not depend on ht.
Now, let a (K − 1)-length sequence yK−1 ∈ Y K−1. For each at+K−12 ∈ A2, the
decision problem facing player 1 at htyK−1at+K−12 (at period t+K−1) is independent of ht,
and because the equilibrium is essentially sequentially strict, the set of maximizing actions is






1 ) for almost all z
t+K−1
1 . By Definition 2.4.1, player 2 has the same
beliefs µ(htt−1y
K−1) = µ(h̄tt−1y
K−1) at both public histories (the shock zt+K−12 does not
affect the belief since it is independently drawn). Since player 1’s subsequent action is
identical at both histories with probability one, player 2’s decision problem is the same
at both histories, giving σ2(h
tyK−1, zt+K−12 ) = σ1(h̄




Now suppose that for any k ∈ {0, ...,K − 2}, V (htyk+1) = V (h̄tyk+1), where yk ∈







1 for almost all z
t+k
1 ∈ Z1; similarly, player 2 has the same
beliefs at htt−(K−k) · · · h
t
t−1y
k and h̄tt−(K−k) · · · h̄
t
t−1y
k, yielding the same unique maximizing




V (h̄tt−(K−k) · · · h̄
t
t−1y
k). By backwards induction, I have
σ2(h
t
t−K · · · htt−1zt+k2 ) = σ2(h̄
t
t−K · · · h̄tt−1zt+k2 ) and σ1(h
ta2z
t+k




for almost all zt+k2 ∈ Z2, z
t+k
1 ∈ Z1. Thus, strategies are the same within a quasi-Markov
state for player 2. An almost identical argument shows the same for quasi-Markov states of
player 1, and so the equilibrium is quasi-Markov perfect.
Consider player 1’s decision at some period t. Suppose player 1 is indifferent between
distinct actions a1 and a
′
1 at public history h ∈ Ht, player 2 action a2 and shock realization
z1; borrowing notation from the proof of Lemma 2.2.1 (specifically (2.2.1)), I can write this
as

















as the integral term in (2.2.1). Substituting into (2.2.2) and rearranging yields
ε(za11 − z
a′1
1 ) = (1− δ)[u1(a2, a
′
1)− u1(a2, a1)] + δ
∑
y∈Y
[ρ(y|a2, a1)− ρ(y|a2, a′1)]V ∗(σ̃2|hy).
(2.2.3)
This implies that the set of shocks z1 such that (2.2.3) holds is Lebesgue measure zero, so
the profile is essentially sequentially strict. Lemma 2.2.2 shows that every essentially strict
equilibrium is quasi-Markov perfect, so the wPBE is quasi-Markov.
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2.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4.2
Proposition 2.4.1 shows that every wPBE in any perturbed game is quasi-Markov.
Thus, for any sequence (ψk, εk)k where limk→∞ ε
k = 0, the limit of any sequence of wPBEs
of the (ψk, εk)-perturbed game must converge to a quasi-Markov equilibrium.
2.3 Proofs for Section 2.5
2.3.1 Proof of Proposition 2.5.1
First, suppose δ < 12 and let any quasi-Markov equilibrium be given. For any period
t, let
ât1 =
C (1− δ)u1(c, C) + δV t+1(C) ≥ (1− δ)u1(c,D) + δV t+1(D)D otherwise
be a best response at period t following player 2 playing c (note that the best response is
independent of the history), where V t+1(·) is the continuation payoff at period t+ 1. Note
that ât1 is also a best response after player 2 plays d. Note that
V t(htc) = (1− δ)u1(c, ât1) + δV t+1(ât1), V t(htd) = (1− δ)u1(d, ât1) + δV t+1(ât1)
so V t(htc) = V t(htd) + (1− δ). Since V t(hta2) is independent of ht,
V t(C)− V t(D) = (σt2(C)− σt2(D))V t(htc) + ((1− σt2(C))− (1− σt2(D)))V t(htd)
= (σt2(C)− σt2(D))V t(htc) + (σt2(D)− σt2(C))V t(htd)
= (σt2(C)− σt2(D))[V t(htc)− V t(htd)]
= (1− δ)(σt2(C)− σt2(D)).
Note that if C is a best response at any period t following player 2 action a2,
(1− δ)u1(a2, C) + δV t+1(C) ≥ (1− δ)u1(a2, D) + δV t+1(D)
δ(V t+1(C)− V t+1(D)) ≥ (1− δ)(u1(a2, D)− u1(a2, C)) = 1− δ
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δ(1− δ) ≥ δ(V t+1(C)− V t+1(D)) ≥ 1− δ,
a contradiction, so player 1’s strict best response is always D. For history D at any period,
the belief on the commitment type is 0 so player 2’s best response is d. Similarly, at period 0,
for µ0 < 12 , player 2’s best response is d, so (d,D) is played every period and the equilibrium
payoff is 1. For µ0 > 12 , player 2’s best response at period 0 is c, so (c,D) is played in period
0 and then (d,D) every period for every period after that. For µ0 = 12 , player 2 is indifferent
at period 0, any mixture for player 2 is possible in period 0, and (d,D) is played after that.
Thus, (2.5.2) has been proven.
I begin by introducing notation and some useful preliminary lemmas. For brevity,
for any history distribution φ, denote φ(C|θ0) simply as φ; for any action mapping α,
denote α2(C|h) as α2(h), and denote α1(C|h, θ0) as α1 (since player 1 does not condition
on history due to quasi-Markov perfection). Define I ≡ {(φ, µ, γ) ∈ F† : γ(C) = γ(D) + η},
where η ≡ 1−δδ , as the “indifference plane” (i.e. at each HBP in I, player 1 is indifferent
between C and D). Let F∅ ≡ {w ∈ F† : B({w}) = ∅} be the set of “useless points” in F†,
meaning those which can only generate empty sets. Ignoring those points greatly simplifies
the analysis.
Lemma 2.3.1. Define the set F̄ ≡ F†\F∅. An HBP w̃ ≡ (φ̃, µ̃, γ̃) is in the set F̄ only if
one of the following conditions is true:
1. φ̃ = 0 and γ̃(C)− γ̃(D) ≥ η;
2. w̃ ∈ I; or
3. φ̃ = 1 and γ̃(C)− γ̃(D) ≤ η.
Proof. First, suppose φ̃ = 0, and let some HBA x ≡ (φ, µ, α) enforced by w̃ be given.
Since inducibility requires α1 = φ̃ = 0, D must be a best response for player 1, and
therefore γ̃(C) − γ̃(D) ≥ η; otherwise, I have a contradiction, so B(w̃) = ∅. Second,
suppose φ̃ ∈ (0, 1), again letting some enforced HBA x ≡ (φ, µ, α) be given. Inducibility
requires α1 = φ̃ ∈ (0, 1), so both C and D must be best responses for player 1, and hence
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γ̃(C) − γ̃(D) = η, which means w̃ ∈ I. Third, suppose φ̃ = 1. Inducibility requires that C
be a best response for player 1, so Condition 3 must be satisfied.




m(F̄) = D̄ and that V(D̄) = V(D) = E, since the HBPs in F∅ cannot
generate anything.
I present some results characterizing the set of useful HBPs that can be generated
by any particular HBP. For convenience, define g : R2 → Γ so that g(vD, vC) = γ such that
γ(D) = vD, γ(C) = vC ; for further brevity, let gI(vD) ≡ g(vD, vD + η). Since beliefs are
pinned down for each history distribution and hence redundant, I often omit belief mappings
in HBPs and HBAs (i.e. write “(φ, γ)” instead of “(φ, µ, γ)”). Define φ∗ ≡ µ
0
1−µ0 . I rewrite
(2.5.4) as q(φ) = φ
∗
1−2φ , omitting µ
0 since it is taken as given. Define φ̂3 so that q(φ̂3) = 1
(this is well-defined for µ0 ∈ (0, 12 ]). Also define r : (0,∞)→ R as the inverse of q(·):








It is straightforward to show that q(·) and r(·) are strictly increasing for φ ∈ [0, 12) and
φ ∈ (0,∞), respectively.
Lemma 2.3.2. Suppose µ0 ∈ (0, 12 ]. Let any HBP w̃ ≡ (φ̃, γ̃) be given. Then
B̄(w̃) =

{(q(φ̃), gI((1− δ) + δγ̃(D)))} φ̃ ∈ [0, φ̂3)
{(1, γ) : γ(D) = (1 + δ) + δγ̃(D),
γ(C) ∈ [γ(D) + η, 2(1− δ) + δγ̃(C)]} φ̃ = φ̂3
{(1, g((1− δ) + δγ̃(D), 3(1− δ) + δγ̃(D)))} φ̃ ∈ (φ̂3, 12)
{(φ, γ) : γ(D) ∈ [(1− δ) + δγ̃(D), 3(1− δ) + δγ̃(D)],
γ(C) = 3(1− δ) + δγ̃(D)} ∩ F̄ φ̃ = 12
{(0, γ) : γ(C) = γ(D) = 2(1− δ) + δγ̃(C)} φ̃ ∈ (12 , 1].
Proof. I consider each case sequentially. Let some HBA x ≡ (φ, µ, α) enforced by w̃ and
the HBP w ≡ (φ, µ, γ) decomposed by x and w̃ be given.
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First, suppose φ̃ ∈ [0, φ̂3). Inducibility requires that α1 = φ̃ < 12 , so player 2’s payoff
for playing c at history D is
u2(c, α1(θ0)) = 3φ̃+ 0 · (1− φ̃) < 2φ̃+ 1 · (1− φ̃) = u2(d, α1(θ0));
thus, d is strict best response, so α2(D) = 0 and γ(D) = (1 − δ) + δγ̃(D). At history C,
player 2 is indifferent if
E[u2(c, α1)|C] = 3µ+(1−µ)[φ̃·3+(1−φ̃)·0] = E[u2(d, α1)|C] = 2µ+(1−µ)[φ̃·2+(1−φ̃)·1]
µ[3− 2] + (1− µ)[3φ̃− 2φ̃− (1− φ̃)] = µ+ (1− µ)[2φ̃− 1)] = 0
µ[2− 2φ̃] = 1− 2φ̃ (2.3.2)
Substituting Bayes’ rule for µ gives
µ0
µ0 + (1− µ0)φ
[2− 2φ̃] = 1− 2φ̃
µ0[2− 2φ̃] = (1− 2φ̃)[µ0 + (1− µ0)φ]















Thus, if φ > q(φ̃), player 2 strictly prefers d, and if the inequality is reversed strictly prefers
c. Hence, if φ > q(φ̃), γ(C) = γ(D) = (1− δ) + δγ̃(D) < γ(D) + η, and thus w ∈ F∅ (note
that q(φ̃) > φ̃ ≥ 0). Similarly, if φ < q(φ̃), γ(C) = 2(1−δ)+δγ̃(C) ≥ 2(1−δ)+δ[γ̃(D)+η] =
3(1− δ) + δγ̃(D) > γ(D) + η, so w ∈ F∅ (note that q(φ̃) < 1). Thus, w ∈ F̄ only if φ = q(φ̃)
and γ(C) = γ(D) + η.
Suppose φ̃ = φ̂3. By the same argument as the previous paragraph, γ(D) = (1 −
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δ) + δγ̃(D). q(φ̂3) = 1, so if φ < 1 then γ(C) = 2(1 − δ) + δγ̃(C) > γ(D) + η and again,
w ∈ F∅. If φ = 1, then player 2 is indifferent so any α2(C) ∈ [0, 1] is enforceable, but
if I want w ∈ F̄ I must choose α2(C) sufficiently high such that γ(C) ≥ γ(D) + η; thus,
γ(C) ∈ [γ(D) + η, 2(1− δ) + δγ̃(C)].
Suppose φ̃ ∈ (φ̂3, 12). As before γ(D) = (1 − δ) + δγ̃(D). Furthermore, player 2
strictly prefers c at history C, so γ(C) = 2(1 − δ) + δγ̃(C) > γ(D) + η. Hence if w ∈ F̄,
φ = 1.
Suppose φ̃ = 12 . Then player 2 strictly prefers c at history C so γ(C) = 2(1 −
δ) + δγ̃(C), but is indifferent at history D. Thus, any α2(D) is enforceable, giving γ(D) ∈
[(1− δ) + δγ̃(D), 3(1− δ) + δγ̃(D)].
Finally, suppose φ̃ ∈ (12 , 1]. Player 2 strictly prefers c at either history, so γ(D) =
γ(C) = 2(1− δ) + δγ̃(C), and w ∈ F̄ implies φ = 0.
Define Wφ ≡ {(φ, γ) ∈ F̄} as the set of “useful” HBPs with history distribution φ.
The following corollary restates some of the results of Lemma 2.3.2 in a more directly useful
way.
Corollary 2.3.1. Suppose µ0 ∈ (0, 12). Let any HBP w ≡ (φ, γ) ∈ I be given. Suppose
there exists w̃ ≡ (φ̃, γ̃) such that w ∈ B̄({w̃}). Then either φ = q(φ̃) or φ̃ = 12 . Conversely,
for any φ′ ∈ q(0), any HBP w̃′ ≡ (r(φ′), γ̃′) ∈Wr(φ′) generates an HBP in Wφ′: (φ′, gI((1−





′, gI(3(1 − δ) + δγ̃(D) − η)) ∈ B(w̃′). For φ′ ∈ (0, 1), the sets B(w̃′) above are
singletons.
Define the minimum and maximum “relevant” payoffs3 at each history distribution
following the mth iteration of the B̄(·) operator (recall that the minima and maxima exist
3By relevant, I mean the following for a given (φ, γ) ∈ F̄. If φ = 0, γ(C) does not affect what can be
generated; if φ = 1, γ(D) does not affect what can be generated; if φ ∈ (0, 1), γ(C) = γ(D) + η so player 1
is indifferent and either γ(C) or γ(D) is “binding.”
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because B̄m(F†) is closed by Lemma 2.1.2):
vmφ ≡
min{γ(D) : (φ, γ) ∈ B̄m(F†)} φ ∈ [0, 1)min{γ(C) : (1, γ) ∈ B̄m(F†)} φ = 1
v̄mφ ≡
max{γ(D) : (φ, γ) ∈ B̄m(F†)} φ ∈ [0, 1)max{γ(C) : (1, γ) ∈ B̄m(F†)} φ = 1.




and v01 = η, v̄
0
0 = 3 for all φ̃ ∈ (0, 1]. Note that because {B̄m(F̄)}m is a decreasing sequence
(in the sense of set inclusion), {vmφ }m is weakly increasing and bounded, and so it follows
that
v∞φ =
min{γ(D) : (φ, γ) ∈ D̄} φ ∈ [0, 1)min{γ(D) : (1, γ) ∈ D̄} φ = 1.
The following result characterizes the output of the V(·) operator.
Lemma 2.3.3. Let µ0 ∈ (0, 12 ] and w ≡ (φ, γ) ∈ D̄(δ, µ
0) be given. Then
V({(φ, γ)}) =

{(1− δ) + δγ(D)} φ < φ̂3
[(1− δ) + δγ(D), 3(1− δ) + δγ(D)] φ = φ̂3
{2(1− δ) + δγ(C)} φ > φ̂3.
If µ0 > 12 , then
V({(φ, γ)}) =
3(1− δ) + δγ(D) φ = 02(1− δ) + δγ(C) φ > 0. (2.3.3)
Proof. For any v ∈ V({(φ, γ)}), there exists a PBE (σ∗, µ∗) of the γ-antegame such that
V (σ∗) = v and the distribution of outcomes matches φ: σ∗1(∅) = φ (recall that player 1
does not condition on player 2’s action due to quasi-Markov perfection).
First consider the µ0 ∈ (0, 12 ] case. Suppose φ < φ̂3, and suppose by contradiction




∗(∅))|∅] = 3µ0 + (1− µ0)[3φ+ 0 · (1− φ)]
≥ E[u2(d, σ∗(∅))|∅] = 2µ0 + (1− µ0)[φ · 2 + (1− φ) · 1] (2.3.4)
µ0 + (1− µ0)[3φ] ≥ (1− µ0)[1 + φ] (2.3.5)
µ0 ≥ (1− µ0)[1− 2φ] (2.3.6)
µ0
1− µ0
= φ∗ ≥ 1− 2φ (2.3.7)
φ∗
1− 2φ
= q(φ) ≥ 1, (2.3.8)
which is a contradiction because φ < φ̂3 implies q(φ) < q(φ̂3) = 1, due to the monotonicity
of q(φ′). Thus, player 2 strictly prefers d. Since (φ, γ) ∈ D̄ and φ < 1, γ(D) ≥ γ(C)−η and
so D is a best response at period 0 for player 1. Thus, V (σ∗) = (1− δ)u1(d,D) + δγ(D) =
(1− δ) + δγ(D).
Suppose φ = φ̂3. Then q(φ) =
φ∗
1−2φ = 1 so replacing the inequality in (2.3.8) with
“=”and working backwards, doing the same to each equation until (2.3.4), shows that player
2 is indifferent between c and d. For player 1, D is a best response since φ̂3 < 1. Thus,
I can pick any σ∗2(∅) ∈ [0, 1], so V({(φ, γ)}) = {V (σ∗) : σ∗2(∅) ∈ [0, 1], σ∗1(∅) = φ̂3} =
[0 · (1− δ) + δγ(C), 2(1− δ) + δγ(C)].
Suppose φ > φ̂3. Then q(φ) < 1, and performing the analogous steps in the previous
paragraph shows that player 2 strictly prefers c to d. Since σ∗1(∅) = φ > φ̂3 ≥ 0, C is a
best response, so V (σ∗) = (1− δ)u1(c, C) + δγ(C) = 2(1− δ) + δγ(C).
Now I turn to the simpler µ0 > 12 case. Player 2 strictly prefers c no matter what
player 1’s strategy is. If φ = 0, then D is a best response, so V (σ∗) = (1 − δ)u1(c,D) +
δγ(D) = 3(1− δ) + δγ(D). If φ > 0, then C is a best response: V (σ∗) = (1− δ)u1(c, C) +
δγ(C) = 2(1− δ) + δγ(C).
Now consider the first case listed in (2.5.3): suppose µ0 ∈ (0, 19 ]. The function q has
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two fixed points for µ0 < 19 , one fixed point for µ
0 = 19 , and no fixed points for µ
0 > 19 (this
turns out to be the reason why µ0 > 19 has only one stationary equilibrium instead of two).




which can be rearranged to get
0 = 2φ2 − φ+ φ∗.














since φ∗ = 18 for µ
0 = 19 , µ
0 ≤ 19 is sufficient and necessary for the discriminant to be
non-negative, and therefore for the existence of a fixed point. Define φ̂1, φ̂2 ∈ Φ as the fixed
points of q(·) such that φ̂1 < φ̂2 for µ0 < 19 and φ̂1 = φ̂2 for µ
0 = 19 .
Lemma 2.3.4. Suppose µ0 ∈ (0, 19 ]. For any φ ∈ [φ̂1, 1), v
∞
φ = 1. Furthermore, v
∞
1 = 1/δ,
and v∞φ′ ≥ 1 for all φ′ ∈ [0, φ̂1). Finally, v̄∞φ = 2 − η for all φ ∈ [φ̂1, 1). Furthermore,
v̄∞1 = 2 and v̄
∞
φ′ ≤ 2 for all φ′ ∈ [0, φ̂1).




= φ φ ∈ {φ̂1, φ̂2}
> φ φ ∈ (φ̂1, φ̂2)
< φ φ ∈ (φ̂1, 1).
(2.3.10)
I show that for every φ′ ∈ [φ̂1, 1), r(φ′) ∈ [φ̂1, 1) and hence r(φ′) ≥ q(0), satisfying the
corresponding condition in Corollary 2.3.1 that used below. First, (2.3.10) immediately
shows this to be true for φ ∈ {φ̂1, φ̂2}. Suppose that φ̂1 < φ < φ̂2; the monotonicity of r(·)
and (2.3.10) imply r(φ̂1) = φ̂1 < φ < r(φ) < r(φ̂2) = φ̂2. Finally, suppose that φ̂2 < φ < 1;
again the monotonicity of r(·) and (2.3.10) imply r(φ̂2) = φ̂2 < r(φ) < φ < 1.
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Building on the previous paragraph, Corollary 2.3.1 implies that for every φ ∈ [φ̂1, 1),
vm+1φ = min{γ(D) : (φ, γ) ∈ B̄
m+1(F̄)}
= min{min{γ(D) : (φ, γ) ∈ B̄(B̄m(F̄) ∩Wr(φk))},
min{γ(D) : (φ, γ) ∈ B̄(B̄m(F̄) ∩W1
2
)}}
= min{min{(1− δ) + δγ(D) : (r(φ), γ) ∈ B̄m(F̄))},
min{3(1− δ) + δγ(D)− η : (12 , γ) ∈ B̄
m(F̄))}}





Note that v0φ = 0 for all φ ∈ [0, 1). Suppose that for some m and some ζ
m ∈ R, vmφ = vm1
2
=
ζm for all φ ∈ [φ̂1, 1). Then
vm+1φ = min{(1− δ) + δv
m





= min{(1− δ) + δζm, 3(1− δ) + δζm − η}
= (1− δ) + δζm.
By induction, for each m, there exists ζm+1 = (1 − δ) + δζm such that vmφ = ζ
m for all
φ ∈ [φ̂1, 1). Hence, v∞φ = limm→∞ ζ
m = 1.
Similarly, note that v̄0φ = 3− η for all φ ∈ [0, 1). Suppose for some m, v̄mφ = ζ̄m for
all φ ∈ [φ̂1, 1). Then
v̄m+1φ = max{(1− δ) + δv̄
m
r(φk)
, 3(1− δ) + δv̄m1
2
− η}
= max{(1− δ) + δζ̄m, 3(1− δ) + δζ̄m − η}
= 3(1− δ) + δζ̄m − η.
By induction, for each m, there exists ζ̄m+1 = 3(1− δ) + δζ̄m− η such that v̄mφ = ζ̄m for all
φ ∈ [φ̂1, 1). Hence, v̄∞φ = limm→∞ ζ̄m+1 = 3(1− δ) + δ limm→∞ ζ̄m − η which can be solved
to get v̄∞φ = limm→∞ ζ̄
m = 3− 1δ = 2− η.
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Next, Lemma 2.3.2 and the above result give
vm+11 = min{γ(C) : (1, γ) ∈ B̄
m+1(F̄)}
= min









min{(1− δ) + δγ̃(D) + η : (φ̂3, γ̃) ∈ B̄m(F̄) ∩Wφ̂3},






= min{(1− δ) + δζm + η, 3(1− δ) + δζm} = (1− δ) + δζm + η,
so
v∞1 = limm→∞












v̄m+11 = max{3(1− δ) + δγ̃(D) : (φ̃, γ̃) ∈ B̄
m(F̄), φ̃ ∈ [φ̂3, 12 ]}
= max{3(1− δ) + δv̄m
φ̃
, φ̃ ∈ [φ̂3, 12 ]} = 3(1− δ) + δζ̄
m
so v̄∞1 = 3(1− δ) + δ limm→∞ ζ̄m = 3(1− δ) + δ(2− η) = 2.
Finally, let vm ≡ min{vmφ′ : φ′ ∈ [0, 1)} and v̄m ≡ max{v̄mφ′ : φ′ ∈ [0, φ̂1)}. Lemma
2.3.2 shows that for any (φ, γ) ∈ B̄m+1(F̄),
γ(D) ≥ min{(1− δ) + δγ̃(D) : (φ̃, γ̃) ∈ B̄m(F̄)}
≥ min{(1− δ) + δvm, 2(1− δ) + δvm1 }





min{(1− δ) + δvm, 2(1− δ) + δvm1 }
= min
{
(1− δ) + δ lim
m→∞





m ≥ 1, which proves the last part of the lemma.4 Turning to the maxima,
v̄m+10 = max{max{3(1− δ) + δv̄
m
φ : φ ∈ [12 , 1)}, 2(1− δ) + δv̄
m
1 }
v̄m+1φ ≤ max{(1− δ) + δv̄
m, 3(1− δ) + δv̄m1
2
− η} ∀φ ∈ (0, φ̂1)
so
v̄∞0 = max{3(1− δ) + δ(2− η), 2(1− δ) + 2δ} = 2
v̄m+1φ ≤ max{(1−δ)+δv̄
∞, 3(1−δ)+δ(2−η)−η} = max{(1−δ)+δv̄∞, 2−η} ∀φ ∈ (0, φ̂1).
If (1− δ) + δv̄∞ > 2− η, then v̄∞ = max{v̄∞0 ,max{v̄
m+1
φ : φ ∈ (0, φ̂1)} = max{2, (1− δ) +
δv̄∞}. If v̄∞ > 2, then v̄∞ = (1−δ)+δv̄∞ =⇒ v̄∞ = 1, a contradiction. Thus, v̄∞ = 2.
Lemmas 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 imply that
minV(D̄) = min{min{(1− δ) + δγ(D) : (φ, γ) ∈ D̄, φ ≤ φ̂3},
min{2(1− δ) + δγ(C) : (φ, γ) ∈ D̄, φ > φ̂3}}
= min{min{(1− δ) + δv∞φ , φ ≤ φ̂3},min{2(1− δ) + δ(v∞φ + η) : φ ∈ (φ̂3, 1)},
2(1− δ) + δ(v∞1 − η)}
= min{(1− δ) + δ · 1, 2(1− δ) + δ(1 + η)} = 1.
Thus, the first minimum listed in (2.5.3) has been proven.
Now, suppose µ0 ∈ (19 ,
1
2). This eliminates the fixed points φ̂1, φ̂2 of q(·) (and so it
turns out the only stationary equilibrium is at φ = 12). I still define φ̂3 so that q(φ̂3) = 1.
Lemma 2.3.5. Let µ0 ∈ (19 ,
1








∆q(φ) ≡ q(φ)− φ = φ
∗
1− 2φ
− φ = φ
∗ − φ(1− 2φ)
1− 2φ
=
φ∗ − φ+ 2φ2
1− 2φ
.
It is clear that for φ ∈ [0, 12), because if ∆q(φ) ≤ 0 for some φ, there would exist φ
′ ∈ [0, 12)
such that







but φ∗ > 18 because µ
0 > 19 . The first and second derivatives of ∆q(·) are
∆q′(φ) = 2φ∗(1− 2φ)−2 − 1
∆q′′(φ) = 8φ∗(1− 2φ)−3 > 0
for φ < 12 , so ∆q(·) is strictly convex. Furthermore, setting ∆q
′(φ) = 0 gives
2φ∗(1− 2φ)−2 − 1 = 0
(1− 2φ)−2 = 1
2φ∗






and for φ∗ ∈ (18 ,
1
2), such a solution φ ∈ [0,
1
2) to (2.3.11) exists. Thus, ∆q(φ) ≥ ∆q for some
∆q > 0, so for any k,
qk(φ) = φ+ ∆q(φ) + ∆q(q(φ)) + ∆q(q2(φ)) + · · ·+ ∆q(qk−1(φ)) ≥ φ+ k∆q,
so there exists finite k̄ such that qk̄(φ) ≥ 12 .
Having established its finite existence with Lemma 2.3.5, let
L(µ0) ≡ min
k
qk(0) such that qk(0) ≥ 12 .
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Define pk ≡ qk(0) for k ∈ {0, ..., L}. Define Sk ≡ (pk, pk+1) for k ∈ {0, ..., L − 1} and
SL ≡ (pL, 1).
Lemma 2.3.6. Suppose µ0 ∈ (19 ,
1
2 ]. If p
L = 12 , then v
∞
pL






(1− δ) + δv∞pL−1 pL < 1(1− δ) + δv∞
pL−1
+ η pL = 1.
Finally, min{v∞φ : φ ∈ [0, φ̂3]} = v∞pL−1 and
min{v∞φ : φ ∈ (φ̂3, 1)} =




v∞pL + η pL < 1v∞
pL
pL = 1.
Proof. Note that λk1 above in (2.5.5) is defined so that λ
k
1 = (1− δk)+δk[3(1− δ)+δλk1−η].
Also define λL2 so that λ
L




[1− δL + 3δL(1− δ)].
For brevity in this proof, unlike that of Lemma 2.3.4 I skip ahead to the minimum
generating limits, e.g. instead of writing “vm+1
S0
= 3(1 − δ) + δvm1
2
− η,” I take the limit as
m→∞ as shown in (2.3.12) below.
First, by Corollary 2.3.1,





to see why, note that Wφ ⊂ I and r(φ) < 0 = p0 = r(p1) for any φ ∈ S0, so there does
not exist φ′ such that q(φ′) = φ. For each k ∈ {1, ..., L}, for any φ ∈ Sk, r(φ) ∈ Sk−1. To
see this, recall that r(·) is monotonic and that pk < φ < pk+1 for k < L (the argument
here is easy to adapt for k = L), so r(pk) = pk−1 < r(φ) < pk = r(pk+1). Corollary 2.3.1
shows that v∞
Sk
= min{(1 − δ) + δv∞
Sk−1
, 3(1 − δ) + δv∞1
2
− η}. Suppose (by contradiction)
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that 3(1− δ) + δv∞1
2
− η < (1− δ) + δv∞
Sk−1
. Then
3(1− δ) + δv∞1
2





= δ[3(1− δ) + δv∞1
2
].
(1− δ)[3(1− δ) + δv∞1
2
] < η =
1− δ
δ
3δ(1− δ) + δ2v∞1
2
< 1 (2.3.13)








< 1 =⇒ vm1
2
< 1, which is
easily shown to be contradicted by Lemma 2.3.2.5 Thus, v∞
Sk
= (1− δ) + δv∞
Sk−1
, and in fact
the argument above shows that for any φk−1 ∈ Sk−1, φk ∈ Sk, I have v∞
φk
= (1− δ) + δv∞
φk−1
.
An almost identical argument shows that v∞
pk
= (1− δ) + δv∞
pk−1
. Note that because v∞p0 ≤
3(1− δ) + δv∞1
2







Suppose pL < 1. I show that v∞1 = v
∞
SL






L−1. By Lemma 2.3.2,
v∞1 = min{(1− δ) + δv∞φ̂3 + η,min{3(1− δ) + δv
∞


















v∞1 = (1− δ) + δv∞SL−1 + η = v
∞
SL + η. (2.3.15)
The next paragraph proves the result for pL = 12 .
Suppose pL = 12 . By Lemma 2.3.2,




− η,min{3(1− δ) + δvφ : φ ∈ (12 , 1)}, 2(1− δ) + δv
∞
1 }(2.3.16)
5Besides the fact that this implies a continuation payoff less than the minmax, this can be seen by simply
letting vm ≡ min{min{vmφ : φ ∈ [0, 1)}, v
m
1 } and generating the lowest payoff given by Lemma 2.3.2 at any
φ as the new lower bound vm+1 ≥ (1− δ) + δvm, which converges to 1 as m→∞.
155
= min{3(1− δ) + δv∞1
2
− η, 2(1− δ) + δv∞1 },





= 12 . Suppose by contradiction
that
v∞1 = 3(1− δ) + δv∞1
2
< (1− δ) + δv∞SL−1 + η (2.3.17)
(see (2.3.14)). It is straightforward to show that
2(1− δ) + δv∞1 = 2(1− δ) + δ[3(1− δ) + δv∞1
2









− η = v∞
S0





for each k, and
v∞1
2
= v∞pL = (1− δ
L) + δLv∞p0 = (1− δ
L) + δL[3(1− δ) + δv∞pL − η] = λ
L
1 ,
where the last step is because the above equation matches the characterization for λL1 at
the beginning of the proof. Returning to (2.3.17) I have
3(1− δ) + δv∞1
2
= 3(1− δ) + δv∞pL < (1− δ) + δv
∞
SL−1 + η = (1− δ) + δv
∞
pL−1 + η = v
∞
pL + η
3(1− δ)− η < (1− δ)v∞pL
3− 1
δ
= 2− η < v∞pL ,






≤ 2 − η by Corollary 2.3.1. Thus,
to summarize, for pL = 12 , I now also have v
∞








for all k ∈ {0, ..., L} and v∞
pL
= λL1 . It is then straightforward to
check that the lemma has been proven for pL = 12 .
For the rest of the proof suppose 12 < p
L < 1. The pL = 1 case follows almost exactly
the same argument, adding or subtracting “η” as appropriate where “v∞
pL
” is mentioned and
ignoring the consequently empty set SL. By Lemma 2.3.2, the first step of (2.3.16) holds
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here as well. Suppose (by contradiction) that











(1 − δL) + δLv∞p0 = (1 − δ
L) + δL[3(1 − δ) + δv∞
pL
], it then matches the characterization of
λL2 at the beginning of the proof: v
∞
pL
= λL2 . Since
1
2 ⊂ S
k−1 as shown near (2.3.14),
v∞1
2
= v∞SL−1 = (1− δ
L−1) + δL−1v∞S0 = (1− δ
L−1) + δL−1[3(1− δ) + δv∞SL−1 − η]
due to (2.3.12); therefore v∞1
2





Thus, I can write (2.3.18) as
v∞p0 = 3(1− δ) + δv
∞
pL = 3(1− δ) + δλ
L
2 < 3(1− δ) + δv∞1
2







The following lemma proves that (2.3.19) is a contradiction.
Lemma 2.3.7. λL2 ≥ λ
L−1
1 − 1−δδ2 .
Proof. Suppose by contradiction the opposite:
δ2
1− δL+1
[1− δL + 3δL(1− δ)] < δ
2
1− δL
[(1− δL−1) + 3δL−1(1− δ)− δL−1η]− (1− δ).
I spare the reader the tedious algebra that yields
1− 3δL+1 + 2δL+2 < 0. (2.3.20)
Note that at δ = 1 the left hand side is equal to 0. Taking the derivative of the left hand
side with respect to δ gives
−3(L+ 1)δL + 2(L+ 2)δL+1 = −(3L+ 3)δL + (2L+ 4)δL+1.
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Since 3L+ 3 ≥ 2L+ 4, the derivative is strictly negative for δ ∈ (0, 1), so the left hand side
of (2.3.20) is strictly positive for δ ∈ (0, 1), a contradiction.











for each k ∈ {0, ..., L}. Then v∞p0 = 3(1− δ) + δv
∞
pL−1
− η, and some
rearrangement gives v∞
pL−1





> v∞p1 = v
∞
S1





min{v∞φ : φ ∈ [0, φ̂3]} = v∞pL−1 . It is also easy to see that min{v
∞




Since I showed earlier that v∞1 = v
∞
pL
+ η, the lemma is proven for pL < 1.
By Lemmas 2.3.3 and 2.3.6, if pL < 1 I have
minV(D̄) = min{min{(1− δ) + δv∞φ : φ ≤ φ̂3},
min{2(1− δ) + δ(v∞φ + η) : φ ∈ (φ̂3, 1)}, 2(1− δ) + δv∞1 } (2.3.21)
= min{(1− δ) + δv∞pL−1 , 2(1− δ) + δ(v
∞
pL + η), 2(1− δ) + δ(v
∞
pL + η)}
= min{(1− δ) + δv∞pL−1 , 2(1− δ) + δ((1− δ) + δv
∞
pL−1 + η)}
= min{(1− δ) + δv∞pL−1 , (1− δ)(3 + δ) + δ
2v∞pL−1} (2.3.22)
If pL = 1, I have
minV(D̄) = min{min{(1− δ) + δv∞φ : φ ≤ φ̂3},
min{2(1− δ) + δ(v∞φ + η) : φ ∈ (φ̂3, 1)}, 2(1− δ) + δv∞1 } (2.3.23)
= min{(1− δ) + δv∞pL−1 , 2(1− δ) + δ(v
∞
pL−1 + η), 2(1− δ) + δv
∞
pL}
= min{(1− δ) + δv∞pL−1 , 2(1− δ) + δ((1− δ) + δv
∞
pL−1 + η)}
= min{(1− δ) + δv∞pL−1 , (1− δ)(3 + δ) + δ
2v∞pL−1}, (2.3.24)
where (2.3.24) matches (2.3.22). Suppose by contradiction that



















δ − η. Continuing,
minV(D̄) = (1− δ) + δv∞pL−1 =

(1− δ) + δλL−11 pL > 12



















(1− δ) + δλL−11 pL > 12λL1 pL = 12 .
With respect to the maxima v̄∞φ , the conclusions of Lemma 2.3.4 with almost iden-
tical arguments to the proof thereof, giving max{v̄∞φ : φ ∈ [0, φ̂3)} = 2, max{v̄∞φ : φ ∈
[φ̂3, 1)} = 2− η and v̄∞1 = 2. Thus,
maxV(D̄) = max{(1− δ) + δmax{v̄∞φ : φ ∈ [0, φ̂3)}, 3(1− δ) + δmax{v̄∞φ : φ ∈ [φ̂3, 1)},
2(1− δ) + δv̄∞1 }
= max{(1− δ) + 2δ, 3(1− δ) + δ(2− η), 2(1− δ) + 2δ} = 2.
Now consider the µ0 > 12 case (the µ
0 = 12 case is handled at the end of the proof).
I use the following analogue of Lemma 2.3.2.
Lemma 2.3.8. Suppose µ0 ∈ (12 , 1]. Let any HBP w̃ ≡ (φ̃, γ̃) be given. Then
B̄(w̃) =

{(1, g((1− δ) + δγ̃(D), 3(1− δ) + δγ̃(D))} φ̃ ∈ [0, 12)
{(φ, γ) : γ(D) ∈ [(1− δ) + δγ̃(D), 3(1− δ) + δγ̃(D)],
γ(C) = 3(1− δ) + δγ̃(D)} ∩ F̄ φ̃ = 12
{(0, γ) : γ(D) = γ(C), γ(C) = 2(1− δ) + δγ̃(C)} φ̃ ∈ (12 , 1].
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Proof. I consider each case sequentially. Let some HBA x ≡ (φ, µ, α) enforced by w̃ and
the HBP w ≡ (φ, µ, γ) decomposed by x and w̃ be given.
Suppose φ̃ ∈ [0, 12). Inducibility requires α1 = φ̃ <
1
2 , so player 2 has d as a strict
best response by the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 5.2, and D must also be a best
response for player 1. Thus, γ(D) = (1− δ)u1(d,D) + δγ̃(D) = (1− δ) + δγ̃(D). At history
C, player 2 has a belief greater than 12 for the commitment type, so arguments in the proof
of Lemma 5.2 show that c is a strict best response. Then γ(C) = (1− δ)u1(c,D) + δγ̃(D) =
3(1− δ) + δγ̃(D).
Suppose φ̃ = 12 . Player 2 is now indifferent at historyD, so can choose any α2 ∈ [0, 1],
which yields γ(D) = (1 − δ)[α2u1(c,D) + (1 − α2)u2(d,D)] + δγ̃(D) = (1 − δ)[3α2 + (1 −
α2)] + δγ̃(D). The same reasoning as above gives γ(C) = 3(1− δ) + δγ̃(D).
Suppose φ̃ ∈ (12 , 1]. Player 2 strictly prefers c at both histories C and D, while C
is a best response for player 1. Thus γ(D) = γ(C) = (1− δ)u1(c, C) + δγ̃(C) = 2(1− δ) +
δγ̃(C).
Lemma 2.3.8 gives
vm+10 = min{min{3(1− δ) + δv
m
φ − η : φ ∈ [12 , 1)}, 2(1− δ) + δv
m
1 }




− η ∀φ ∈ (0, 1)
vm+11 = min{3(1− δ) + δv
m
φ : φ ∈ [0, 12 ]}.
Then v∞1
2
= 3(1− δ) + δv∞1
2
− η, which yields v∞1
2
= 3− 1δ = 2− η. So for all φ ∈ (0, 1),







= 3(1− δ) + 3δ − 1− 1− δ
δ
= 2− η.
I can then write
v∞0 = min{3(1− δ) + δ(2− η)− η, 2(1− δ) + δv∞1 }
= min{2− η, 2(1− δ) + δv∞1 }
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v∞1 = min{3(1− δ) + δv∞0 , 3(1− δ) + δ(2− η)}
= min{3(1− δ) + δv∞0 , 2}
Suppose by contradiction v∞1 < 2. Then
v∞0 = min{2− η, 2(1− δ) + δ[3(1− δ) + δv∞0 ]}
= min{2− η, 2(1− δ) + 3δ − 3δ2 + δ2v∞0 }
= min{2− η, 2 + δ − 3δ2 + δ2v∞0 }.
If v∞0 < 2− η, then v∞0 = 2 + δ − 3δ2 + δ2v∞0 which can be solved for
v∞0 =
2 + δ(1− 3δ)
1− δ2
> 2,
a contradiction; thus v∞1 < 2 implies v
∞
0 = 2 − η. Yet v∞1 = 3(1 − δ) + δv∞0 = 3(1 − δ) +
δ(2 − η) = 2, a contradiction. Thus, v∞1 = 2. Also suppose by contradiction v∞0 < 2 − η;
then v∞0 = 2(1− δ) + δv̄∞1 = 2. Hence, v∞0 = 2− η.
To summarize: v∞φ = 2− η for all φ ∈ [0, 1) and v∞1 = 2. Plugging this into (2.3.3)
in Lemma 2.3.3 shows that minV(D̄) = 2.
Turning to the maxima, Lemma 2.3.8 implies
v̄m+10 = max{max{3(1− δ) + δv̄
m
φ − η : φ ∈ [12 , 1)}, 2(1− δ) + δv̄
m
1 }




− η ∀φ ∈ (0, 1)
v̄m+11 = max{3(1− δ) + δv̄
m
φ : φ ∈ [0, 12 ]}
Then for all φ ∈ (0, 1), v̄m+11
2




− η, which in the limit gives
v̄∞φ = 3(1− δ) + δv̄∞φ −
1− δ
δ




Note that v̄00 = v̄
0
φ = 3−η and v̄01 = 3. Suppose for some m that v̄m1
2




Suppose by contradiction that max{3(1− δ) + δv̄mφ − η : φ ∈ [
1
2 , 1)} > 2(1− δ) + δv̄
m
1 . Then




− η > 2(1− δ) + δv̄m1 (2.3.25)
(1− δ)− η > δ(v̄m1 − v̄m1
2
)
−η > δ(v̄m1 − η − v̄m1
2
),
but since the left hand side is strictly negative and the right hand side is non-negative, I reach
a contradiction. Note that the left hand side of (2.3.25) is equal to v̄m+11
2
. Thus by induction,








v̄∞0 = 2(1− δ) + δv̄∞1 , v̄∞1 = 3(1− δ) + δv̄∞0 .
Solving these two equations gives


















Finally, by Lemma 2.3.3,
maxV(D̄) = max{3(1− δ) + δv̄∞0 ,
max{2(1− δ) + δ(v̄∞φ + η) : φ ∈ (0, 1)}, 2(1− δ) + δv̄∞1 }
= max
{
3(1− δ) + δ 1− δ
1− δ2
(2 + 3δ), 2(1− δ) + δ(v̄∞1
2
+ η),






3(1− δ) + δ 1− δ
1− δ2





It is straightforward to show that the first term is strictly greater than the other two for
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δ ∈ (12 , 1), so
maxV(D̄) = 3(1− δ) + 1− δ
1− δ2




Now suppose µ0 = 12 . Note that φ
∗ = 1, so q(0) = 11−2·0 = 1, φ̂3 = 0, L = 1 and








φ : φ ∈ (0, 1)}
and v∞1 = v
∞
pL
= (1 − δ) + δλL−11 . Using the same arguments as for the µ0 ∈ (19 ,
1
2) case
above, I have minV(D̄) = (1− δ) + δλL−11 . For the maxima, the same arguments as those
above for µ0 ∈ (12 , 1] hold, so maxV(D̄) =
1−δ
1−δ2 (3 + 2δ).
2.3.2 Purifiability of Quasi-Markov Equilibria
This section shows that for almost all priors µ0 and discount factors δ > 12 , there
exists a purifiable equilibrium giving the minimum and maximum payoffs given in Proposi-
tion 2.5.1.6 For each case, I construct the unperturbed equilibrium strategy profile σ∗ and
a sequence of perturbed game strategy profiles (σ̃k)k, each corresponding to the (ψ, ε
k)-
perturbed game where ψ is the uniform distribution on [0, 1]|A| and (εk)k is some sequence
where εk > 0 and εk → 0. I show purifiability (according to Definition 2.4.3) by proving
that for small enough εk, σ̃k is a wPBE of the (ψ, εk)-perturbed game, and that (σ̃k)k con-
verges in outcomes to σ∗. (I omit proofs that the unperturbed strategies σ∗ are wPBEs of
the unperturbed game since the proofs are essentially simpler versions of the proofs for the
perturbed equilibria.)
2.3.2.1 Stationary Equilibrium with Payoff 2 (0 < µ0 ≤ 1)
The equilibrium for the unperturbed game is defined as follows:
6The δ < 1
2




1 h = ∅
1 h = C





Define the sequence (σ̃k)k of equilibria in the sequence of perturbed games:
σ̃k2 (∅, z2) ≡ σ̃k2 (t, C, z2) ≡ 1 σ̃k2 (t,D, z2) ≡
0 ∆z2 ≤ ζk21 ∆z2 > ζk2
σ̃k1 (t, z1) ≡
0 ∆z1 ≤ ζk11 ∆z1 > ζk1
where I define ζk1 , ζ
k
2 by the system of equations
7







1 ≡ εkζk2 .
For convenience, define the expected outcomes
α̃k2(h) ≡
ˆ
σ̃k2 (t,D) dψ(z2) =
1 h = C1
2(1− ζ
k
2 ) h = D
α̃k1 ≡
ˆ





for any t ≥ 1. Also define the beliefs at history C at any period t:
µ̃k ≡ µ
0
µ0 + (1− µ0)α̃k1
. (2.3.26)
I now show that these strategies are mutual best responses. Define V a22 (p, ᾱ1, z2)
as the expected payoff for player 2 of action a2 given posterior belief p, expected player 1
7Though these equations are clearly easy to solve, leaving them in this form makes it simpler to confirm
that the strategies are best responses.
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action ᾱ1, and shock z2:
V c2 (p, ᾱ1, z2) = 3p+ (1− p)[3ᾱ1] + εkzc2
V d2 (p, ᾱ1, z2) = 2p+ (1− p)[2ᾱ1 + (1− ᾱ1)] + εkzd2 .
Then define ∆V2 as the benefit of playing c over d:
∆V2(p, ᾱ1, z2) ≡ V c2 (p, ᾱ1, z2)− V d2 (p, ᾱ1, z2)
= 3p+ (1− p)[3ᾱ1]− 2p− (1− p)[2ᾱ1 + (1− ᾱ1)] + εk(zc2 − zd2)
= p+ (1− p)[2ᾱ1 − 1] + εk∆z2. (2.3.27)
At history D, the belief is p = 0 so
∆V2(0, α̃
k
1 , z2) = 2α̃
k
1 − 1 + εk∆z2 = 2 · 12(1− ζ
k
1 )− 1 + εk∆z2 = −εkζk2 + εk∆z2,
which makes it clear that σ̃k2 (t,D, z2) is a best response. At history C, the posterior is
µ̃k ≥ µ0, so for small enough εk, ∆V2(µ̃k, α̃k1 , z2) is positive for all z2 and thus σ̃k2 (t, C, z2)
is a best response. The same is true at the empty history ∅ at period 0.
Define V a11 (t, z1) as the payoff to player 1 of playing action a1 at period t:
V C1 (t, z1) = (1− δ)u1(a2, C) + δV (t+ 1, C) + εkzC1
V D1 (t, z1) = (1− δ)u1(a2, D) + δV (t+ 1, D) + εkzD1
where V (t+ 1, h) is the continuation payoff for the start of period t+ 1 with history h. The
benefit ∆V1(t, z1) of playing C over D is
∆V1(t, z1) ≡ V C1 (t, z1)− V D1 (t, z1)
= −(1− δ) + δ(V (t+ 1, C)− V (t+ 1, D)) + εk(zC1 − zD1 )
= −(1− δ) + δ(ᾱt+12 (C)− ᾱ
t+1
2 (D)) + ε
k∆z1 (2.3.28)
where ᾱt+12 (h) is the strategy of next period’s player 2 at history h. In this equilibrium,
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∆V1(t, z1) = −(1− δ) + δ(α̃k2(C)− α̃k2(D)) + εk∆z1
= −(1− δ) + δ(1− 12(1− ζ2)) + ε
k∆z1











= −εkζ1 + εk∆z1,
showing player 1’s strategy is a best response.
Finally, I show that (σ̃k)k converges in outcomes to σ
∗ as given in (2.4.1). For
σ̃k2 (∅, z2) = σ̃k2 (t, C, z2) = 1 = σ∗2(∅) = σ∗2(t, C), the convergence is trivial. For history D,























= 1− 1− δ
δ
= σ∗2(t,D).
















2.3.2.2 Stationary Equilibrium with Payoff 1 (0 < µ0 < 19)
For 0 < µ0 < 19 , the minimum payoff equilibrium is defined as
σ∗2(t, h) =

0 h = ∅
1−δ
δ h = C











Note that σ∗1(t) is a fixed point of r(·) ≡ q−1(·) defined in (2.5.1) and (2.3.1), respectively;
see (2.3.9) for the calculation of the fixed points. Define the sequence (σ̃k)k of equilibria in
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the sequence of perturbed games:
σ̃k2 (t, C, z2) ≡
0 εk∆z2 ≤ ζk21 εk∆z2 > ζk2 σ̃k2 (t,D, z2) ≡ 0 σ̃k1 (t, z1) ≡
0 εk∆z1 ≤ ζk11 εk∆z1 > ζk1
where I define ζk1 , ζ
k














where µ̃k is defined as in (2.3.26).
I show that the strategies are mutual best responses. Reusing the notation above in
(2.3.27), at history C the belief is p = µ̃k, so
∆V2(µ̃
k, α̃k1 , z2) = µ̃
k + (1− µ̃k)[2α̃k1 − 1] + εk∆z2
= µ̃k + (1− µ̃k)[2 · 12(1− ζ
k
1 )− 1] + εk∆z2






= −εkζk2 + εk∆z2,
which makes it clear that σ̃k2 (t, C, z2) is a best response. At the initial history ∅, the belief
is the prior µ0 < µ̃k, so for small enough εk, ∆V2(µ
0, α̃k1 , z2) is negative for all z2; similarly,
at history D, the posterior is 0 < µ̃k, giving the same result. Thus σ̃k2 (∅, z2), σ̃k2 (t,D, z2)




























0 + εkζk,t2 (µ

















0 + (1− µ0)α̃k1)
(1− µ0)α̃k1
 (2.3.29)
Note that µ0 < 1
9








(see (2.3.9) for the reasoning),
and that r(·) is strictly concave. Since the limit of the right hand side of (2.3.29) as εk → 0 is r(α̃k1), for
small enough εk a solution to (2.3.30) exists.
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are best responses. Reusing the notation in (2.3.28),
∆V1(t, z1) = −(1− δ) + δ(α̃k2(C)− α̃k2(D)) + εk∆z1
= −(1− δ) + δ(12(1− ζ
k
2 )− 0) + εk∆z1












= −εkζk1 + εk∆z1,
so player 1’s strategy is a best response.
Finally, I show that (σ̃k)k converges in outcomes to σ
∗. For
σ̃k2 (∅, z2) = σ̃k2 (t,D, z2) = 0 = σ∗2(∅) = σ∗2(t,D),




























Footnote 8 shows that
´
σ̃k1 (t, z1) dψ(z1) = limk→∞ α̃
k
1 converges to a fixed point of r(·);
since σ∗1(t) is also a fixed point of r(·), I can pick σ̃k that converges to σ∗1(t).
2.3.2.3 Non-Stationary Minimum Payoff Equilibrium (19 < µ
0 ≤ 12)
For 19 < µ
0 ≤ 12 , the minimum payoff equilibrium is defined as follows. Define
L(µ0), q(φ, µ0) as stated in Proposition 2.5.1 (I will usually omit the “µ0” argument in both
for brevity). I restrict attention to priors µ0 such that L(µ0) > 12 (the set of priors µ
0 ∈ (19 ,
1
2 ]
such that this is not true is Lebesgue measure zero). The equilibrium strategies are
σ∗2(t, h) =

0 h = ∅
1−δ
δ (t+ 1) mod L 6= 0, h = C
0 (t+ 1) mod L 6= 0, h = D
1 (t+ 1) mod L = 0
σ∗1(t) = q
L−1−[(t+1) mod L](0, µ0).
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Define the sequence (σ̃k)k of equilibria in the sequence of perturbed games:
9
σ̃k2 (t, h, z2) ≡
0 εk∆z2 < ζ
k,(t+1) mod L
2 (h)
1 εk∆z2 > ζ
k,(t+1) mod L
2 (h)
σ̃k1 (t, z1) ≡
0 εk∆z1 < ζ
k,(t+1) mod L
1
1 εk∆z1 > ζ
k,(t+1) mod L
1











for the empty history, ζk,12 (∅) ≡ 1. For convenience and clarity, define:
α̃k,l1 ≡
ˆ















µ0 + (1− µ0)α̃k,(l−1) mod L1
(2.3.31)
for some t such that l = (t + 1) mod L. Define the thresholds as follows. Let ζk,l2 (D) ≡ 1




2 (C) as the solutions to the system of
equations10
0 = 2µ̃k,L−1 − 1 + εkζk,L−12 (2.3.32)
0 = −(1− δ) + 12δ(1− ζ
k,L−1
2 (C)) + ε
kζk,L−21 . (2.3.33)
9For the sake of simpler notation, I can and do ignore the measure zero set of cases where ∆zi =
ζ
k,(t+1) mod L
i ; it is straightforward to fill in best responses for these remaining cases.





δ(1− 3εk)(1− µ0) + 2εk(1− εk)(1− µ0)
+((δ(1− 3εk)(1− µ0) + 2εk(1− εk)(1− µ0))2 + 8(εk)2(1− µ0)(−2εk(1 + µ0)
+δ(−1 + 3µ0 + 3εk(1 + µ0))))1/2
)
.
Note that for small enough εk, the discriminant is non-negative and thus a real solution exists.
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Then for each l ∈ {1, ..., L− 2}, define (backward inductively) ζk,l−11 , ζ
k,l
2 as solutions to the
equations11
0 = µ̃k,l + (1− µ̃k,l)(2α̃k,l1 − 1) + ε
kζk,l2 (2.3.34)
0 = −(1− δ) + 12δ(1− ζ
k,l
2 (C)) + ε
kζk,l−11 (2.3.35)
(note that µ̃k,l is a function of ζk,l−11 ). Define ζ
k,0
2 (C) ≡ ζ
k,0













I show that these are mutual best responses. Abusing notation, let “l” mean any
period t ≥ 1 such that (t + 1) mod L = l. For each l ∈ {0, ..., L − 1}, the benefit to player
2 of playing c over that of d is
∆V2(µ̃
k,l, α̃k,l1 , z2) = µ̃
k,l + (1− µ̃k,l)[2α̃k,l1 − 1] + ε
k∆z2
= µ̃k,l + (1− µ̃k,l)[2 · 12(1− ζ
k,l
1 )− 1] + ε
k∆z2
= µ̃k,l − (1− µ̃k,l)ζk,l1 + ε
k∆z2
For l = L− 1 and history C, I have
∆V2(µ̃
k,L−1, α̃k,L−11 , z2) = µ̃
k,L−1 − (1− µ̃k,L−1) + εk∆z2
= 2µ̃k,L−1 − 1 + εk∆z2;









(εk(2(1− µ0) + δ(εk(1 + µ0)− 3(1− µ0))) + δ(1− µ0)ζk,l1 )
2
+4(εk)2δ(1− µ0)(2δµ0 + εk(3δ − 2)(1 + µ0)− δ(1− µ0)ζk,l1 )
)1/2)
.
For small enough εk, the discriminant is non-negative.
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solving (2.3.32) for µ̃k,L−1 and substituting gives
∆V2(µ̃






− 1 + εk∆z2
= −εkζk,L−12 + ε
k∆z2,
so σ̃k2 (L − 1, C, z2) is a best response. For both the empty history ∅ and history D, the
belief is less than µ̃k,lfor all l ∈ {0, ..., L− 1}, so for small enough εk, ∆V2is negative for all
z2 and so σ̃
k
2 (∅, z2) = σ̃k2 (l,D, z2) = 0 is a best response. For 1 ≤ l < L− 1 and history C,
I have
∆V2(µ̃
k,l, α̃k,l1 , z2) = µ̃




= −εkζk,l2 + ε
k∆z2.
Applying the same algebra given in footnote 8 (replacing ζk1 , µ̃







0 + (1− µ0)α̃k,l−1]
2(1− µ0)α̃k,l−1
, (2.3.36)
where r(·) ≡ q−1(·) is defined in (2.3.1). Since qL(L) > 12 , for small enough ε
k, player 1’s









qL(ãk,L−1) = qL(0) > 12 .
Then for small enough εk, ∆V2(0, α̃
k,0
1 , z2) = 2α̃
k,0
1 − 1 + εk∆z2 > 0 for all z2. Turning to
player 1, for 0 ≤ l < L− 2, I have
∆V1(l, z1) = −(1− δ) + δ(α̃k,l+12 (C)− α̃
k,l+1
2 (D)) + ε
k∆z1
= −(1− δ) + 12δ(1− ζ
k,l+1
2 ) + ε
k∆z1












= −εkζk,l1 + ε
k∆z1
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so σ̃k1 (l, z1) is a best response. For l = L− 1,
∆V1(t, z1) = −(1− δ) + δ(α̃k,02 (C)− α̃
k,0
2 (D)) + ε
k∆z1
= −(1− δ) + εk∆z1
which is negative for all z1 for small enough ε
k.
Finally, I show convergence in outcomes. (I continue to abuse notation by letting
“l” denote any period t such that l = (t + 1) mod L.) For l = 0, ζk,02 (C) = ζ
k,0
2 (D) = 1 so´
σ̃k2 (l = 0, h, z2) dψ(z2) = 0 = σ
∗
2(l = 0, h). For l ≥ 1 at history h ∈ {∅, D}, ζ
k,l
2 (h) = 1
and so ˆ
σ̃k2 (l, h, z2) dψ(z2) = 0 = σ
∗
2(l, h).
For player 1 and l = L− 1, ζk,L−11 = 1 so
ˆ
σ̃k1 (l = L− 1, z1) dψ(z1) = 0 = σ∗1(l = L− 1).




























For player 1 and l < L− 1, (2.3.36) shows that limk→∞ α̃k,l−11 = limk→∞ q(α̃
k,l




σ̃k1 (l, z1) dψ(z1) = q
L−1−l(α̃L−11 ) = q
L−1−l(0) = σ∗1(l).
2.3.2.4 Non-Stationary Maximum Payoff Equilibrium (12 < µ
0 ≤ 1)
The maximum payoff equilibrium is defined as follows:
σ∗2(t, h) =

1 even t, h ∈ {C,D}
0 even t, h = D
1 odd t
σ∗1(t) =
0 even t1 odd t.
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Since σ∗2 is sequentially strict, purifying it is straightforward. Define the strategies the same
way for the perturbed games, ignoring the shocks: σ̃ki (t, h) ≡ σ∗i (t, h) for all i, t, h.
For player 2, the posterior belief at each date-history is given by
p =

µ0 even t, h = C
1 odd t, h = C
0 h = D
so the benefit of playing c over d is given by
∆V2(p, ᾱ1, z2) = p+ (1− p)[2ᾱ1 − 1] + εk∆z2
=

µ0 − (1− µ0) + εk∆z2 even t, h = C
−1 + εk∆z2 even t, h = D
1 + εk∆z2 odd t, h = C
µ0 + (1− µ0) + εk∆z2 odd t, h = D;




−(1− δ) + εk∆z1 even t−(1− δ) + δ + εk∆z1 odd t,
so because δ > 12 , for small enough ε
k, σ̃k1 is a best response for all z2 at each period. Since
σ̃k gives identical outcomes to σ∗, convergence in outcomes is trivial.
2.3.3 Proof of Proposition 2.5.2
By Proposition 2.3.6, there exists self-generating HBP (φ, µ, γ) and enforced HBA
(φ, µ, α) such that γ(CK) = V (CK). Suppose by contradiction that γ(IK) < 2 (recall that
IK = {CK}). This implies that α2(IK) < 1, for otherwise player 2 would always play c at
IK , yielding γ(IK) ≥ (1 − δ)u(c, C) + δV (IK) = 2(1− δ) + δγ(IK) which gives γ(IK) ≥ 2,
a contradiction. Thus d is a best reply for player 2 at IK , so the payoff of playing d is
U2(d|IK) = 2µ(IK) + (1− µ(IK))[2α1(IKd) + (1− α1(IKd))] ≥ U2(c|IK)
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= 3µ(IK) + (1− µ(IK)) · 3α1(IKc),
where U2(c|IK) is the payoff of playing c. Solving for α1(IKc) gives
−µ(IK) ≥ (1− µ(IK))[3α1(IKc)− 2α1(IKd)− (1− α1(IKd))]
= (1− µ(IK))[3α1(IKc)− α1(IKd)− 1]


























I now show that either α1(IKd) = 0 or α2(IK) ≥ 1+η2+λ . Suppose by contradiction
that α1(IKd) > 0 and α2(IK) <
1+η
2+λ . Since C is a best response at IKd, γ(IK) ≥ γ(I0) + η.
Then I have
γ(IK) = α2(IK) max{(1− δ)u1(c, C) + δγ(IK), (1− δ)u1(c,D) + δγ(I0)}
+(1− α2(IK))[(1− δ)u1(d,C) + δγ(IK)]
≤ α2(IK)[(1− δ)u1(c,D) + δγ(IK)] + (1− α2(IK))[(1− δ)u1(d,C) + δγ(IK)]
= (1− δ)α2(IK)(2 + λ) + δγ(IK)
γ(IK) ≤ α2(IK)(2 + λ) < 1 + η ≤ γ(I0) + η,




µ0 + (1− µ0)φ(IK)
,









) = 2[µ0 + (1− µ0)φ(IK)]− 3µ0














Inducibility (see (2.3.2)) requires
φ(IK) = [α2(IK)α1(IKc) + (1− α2(IK))α1(IKd)]φ(IK)
+[α2(IK−1)α1(IK−1c) + (1− α2(IK−1))α1(IK−1d)]φ(IK−1)
≤ [α2(IK)α1(IKc) + (1− α2(IK))α1(IKd)]φ(IK) + φ(IK−1) (2.3.39)








1− 1 + η
2 + λ
)}









Rearranging (2.3.39) and substituting (2.3.40) and (2.3.38) gives
φ(IK−1) ≥ (1− [α2(IK)α1(IKc) + (1− α2(IK)α1(IKd)])φ(IK)
≥
[








































Inducibility also requires that 1+η3(2+λ)
µ0
















, for all K > K∗ the right hand side of (2.3.41) is greater
than 1, a violation of Definition 2.3.3 and a contradiction.
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2.3.4 Proof of Proposition 2.5.3
By Proposition 2.3.6, for any stationary public PBE (σ, µ), there exists a self-
generating HBP (φ, µ, γ) and enforced HBA (φ, µ, α) such that σ2(h) = α2(h), σ1(ha2) =
α1(ha2), and V (σ|h) = γ(h) for all h ∈ Y K and a2 ∈ A2. Define η ≡ 1−δδ . I start with the
following useful result.
Lemma 2.3.9. γ(I0) = 1 or γ(Ik) ≥ γ(I0) + ηmin{λ, 1} for all k ∈ {1, ...,K}.
Proof. I write this proof for the λ ≤ 1 case; for the λ > 1 case, the arguments are the
same after replacing “λ” with “1.” Suppose by contradiction that γ(I0) > 1 and there exists
k ∈ {1, ...,K} such that γ(Ik) < γ(I0) + λη. Then at histories ha2 for h ∈ Ik−1 and
a2 ∈ {c, d}, C is not a best reply, so α1(Ik−1a2) = 0. At Ik−1 the belief is µ(Ik−1) = 0 since
the history contains D. Denote player 2’s ex-ante payoff of playing a2 at a history in Ik′
as Ua22 (Ik′). Then player 2’s payoff of playing c is U
c
2(Ik−1) = 0 while the payoff for d is
Ud2 (Ik−1) = 1 > U
c
2(Ik−1), so d is the strict best response: α2(Ik−1) = 0. Thus,
γ(Ik−1) = (1− δ)u1(d,D) + δV (I0) = (1− δ) + δγ(I0) ≤ γ(I0) < γ(I0) + λη.
By induction γ(Ik′) = (1− δ) + δγ(I0) for each k′ ∈ {0, ..., k − 1}. Thus, γ(I0) = (1− δ) +
δγ(I0) =⇒ γ(I0) = 1, a contradiction.
Proposition 2.5.2 shows that there exists some K̄ such that for all K > K̄, γ(CK) ≥
2. For the rest of the proof, assume K > K̄, and so γ(CK) ≥ 2.
Suppose γ(IK) > γ(I0) + λη. Since player 1’s best response at IKc is C, I have
γ(IK) = (1 − δ)u1(c, C) + δγ(IK) = 2(1 − δ) + δγ(IK), which implies γ(IK) = 2. Then
player 1’s best response at history CK−1c (at period K−1) is C, so player 2’s best response
at CK−1 is c: V (CK−1) = (1−δ)u(c, C)+δγ(IK) = 2. By backwards induction, V (Ck) = 2
for all k ∈ {0, ...,K − 1}, so V (∅) = 2.
Now suppose γ(IK) < γ(I0) + λη. I consider the λ ≤ 1 and λ > 1 cases separately,
reaching contradictions in both for large enough K.
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Case 1. λ ≤ 1: Lemma 2.3.9 implies that γ(I0) = 1. Since δ > max{λ,1}1+max{λ,1} =
1
2 , I have
γ(I0) > γ(IK)− λ
1− δ
δ






= 2− λ ≥ 1, (2.3.42)
a contradiction.
Case 2. λ > 1: Since δ > λ1+λ ,
γ(I0) > γ(IK)− λ
1− δ
δ






= 2− 1 = 1;
then by Lemma 2.3.9, C is a best response for player 1 at Ikd for each k ∈
{1, ...,K}. SinceD is player 1’s strict best response at IKc, it is also the strict best
response at IK−1c; then player 2’s strict best response at IK−1 is d: α2(IK−1) = 0.
Thus
γ(IK−1) = (1− δ)u1(d,C) + δγ(IK) = δ(IK). (2.3.43)
Since γ(IK−1) < γ(IK) < γ(I0) + λη, α1(IK−2c) = 0 and α2(IK−2) = 0, so by
the same reasoning γ(IK−2) = δγ(IK−1) = δ
2γ(IK). Applying this argument
backward yields
γ(I0) = δ























The limit of the right hand side as K → ∞ is 1, so for large enough K I have
γ(IK) < 2, a contradiction.
For the remainder of the proof suppose that γ(IK) = γ(I0)+λη. I first show that γ(IK) = 2.
Suppose not: γ(IK) > 2 (recall γ(IK) ≥ 2 because K > K̄). Then
γ(IK) ≤ (1− δ)u1(c, C) + δγ(IK) = 2(1− δ) + δγ(IK)
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which gives γ(IK) ≤ 2, a contradiction.
Lemma 2.3.10. Let any j ∈ {0, ...,K − 1} be given. Then the following hold:
1. σ2(C
j) ≥ α2(Ij). If α2(Ij) ∈ (0, 1), then σ2(Cj) = 1.
2. V (Cj) ≥ γ(Ij).
Furthermore, if γ(IK) = 2 and α2(IK−1) > 0, then V (∅) = 2.
Proof. Since (σ, µ) is purifiable, by Proposition 2.4.2 there exists a sequence (ψk, εk)k, such
that ψk ∈ ∆∗(Z) and εk → 0, and a sequence of strategy profiles (σ̃k)k, such that σ̃k is
a PBE of the (ψk, εk)-perturbed game, which converges in outcomes to σ. By Proposition
2.4.1, each σ̃k is essentially sequentially strict and hence quasi-Markov.
Note that the decision problem for player 1 is the same at histories CK−1a2 and
DCK−1a2. Thus, for almost all z1 ∈ Z1, σ̃k1 (CK−1c, z1) = σ̃k1 (DCK−1c, z1). I now show that
this means player 2 must play c at least as much at CK−1 as at DCK−1. Let Ũ2(a2, σ̃
k
1 |h, z2)
denote player 2’s payoff for playing a2, given player 1 strategy σ̃
k
1 at history h and realized
shock z2. Then
∆Uk2 (h, z2) ≡ Ũ2(c, σ̃k1 |h, z2)− Ũ2(d, σ̃k1 |h, z2)
=
ˆ
[[µk(h) · 3 + (1− µk(h))(3σ̃k1 (hc, z1) + 0 · σ̃k1 (hc, z1)) + zc2]
−[µk(h) · 2 + (1− µk(h))(2σ̃k1 (hd, z1) + (1− σ̃k1 (hd, z1)) + zd2 ]] dψ(z1)
=
ˆ
[µk(h) + (1− µk(h)) · (3σ̃k1 (hc, z1)− σ̃k1 (hd, z1)− 1) + zc2 − zd2 ] dψ(z1)
=
ˆ
[µk(h)(1− (3σ̃k1 (hc, z1)− σ̃k1 (hd, z1)− 1))
+(1− µk(h))(3σ̃k1 (hc, z1)− σ̃k1 (hd, z1)− 1) + zc2 − zd2 ] dψ(z1)ˆ
[µk(h)(2− (3σ̃k1 (hc, z1)− σ̃k1 (hd, z1))) + (3σ̃k1 (hc, z1)− σ̃k1 (hd, z1)− 1)
+zc2 − zd2 ] dψ(z1).
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Define ∆Ûk2 (h) ≡
´
(2− (3σ̃k1 (hc, z1)− σ̃k1 (hd, z1)))µk(h) dψ(z1), ∆Ǔk2 (h) ≡
´
(3σ̃k1 (hc, z1)−
σ̃k1 (hd, z1)− 1) dψ(z1) and ∆z2 = zc2 − zd2 , so that
∆Uk2 (h, z2) = ∆Û
k
2 (h) + ∆Ǔ
k
2 (h) + ∆z2.
Note that ∆Ǔk2 (C
K−1) = ∆Ǔk2 (DC
K−1). Then for any z2 ∈ Z2,
∆Uk2 (C
K−1, z2) = ∆Û
k
2 (C
K−1) + ∆Ǔk2 (C
K−1) + ∆z2
= ∆Ûk2 (C
K−1) + ∆Ǔk2 (DC
K−1) + ∆z2
= ∆Ûk2 (C
K−1) + ∆Uk2 (DC
K−1, z2), (2.3.44)
where the last step is because µ(DCK−1) = 0 =⇒ ∆Ûk2 (DCK−1) = 0. Since
∆Uk2 (C
K−1, z2) ≥ ∆Uk2 (DCK−1, z2)
for every z2, σ̃
k
2 (C
K−1, z2) ≥ σ̃k2 (DCK−1, z2) for almost all z2, and so σ2(CK−1) ≥ α2(IK−1).
Suppose that σ2(DC














K−1, z2) ≤ ∆Ǔk2 (DCK−1) + εk.
There must exist some k∗ such that Ek2(DC
K−1) < 0 < Ēk2 (DC




K−1) = limk→∞ Ē
k
2 (DC
K−1) = 0; otherwise, (σ̃k)k would not converge in






{∆Uk2 (CK−1)− εk} = lim
k→∞
{∆Ûk2 (CK−1) +Ek2(DCK−1)}. (2.3.45)








(2− (3σ̃k1 (CK−1c, z1)− σ̃k1 (CK−1d, z1)))µk(CK−1) dψ(z1)
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= (2− (3σ1(CK−1c)− σ1(CK−1d)))µ(CK−1)
≥ (2− 2σ1(CK−1c))µ(CK−1) > 0
since σ1(C










so there exists κ such that for k > κ, player 2 strictly prefers c for all shocks z2 ∈ Z2. Since
σ̃k → σ, σ(CK−1) = 1.
The above arguments imply that V (σ̃k|CK−1) ≥ V (σ̃k|IK−1). Applying the same
argument inductively backward proves conditions 1 and 2 in the statement of the lemma
for all j ∈ {0, ...,K − 1}.
Finally, I prove the last statement of the lemma. Suppose γ(IK) = 2 and α2(IK−1) >
0. This implies that α1(IK−1c) > 0, i.e. C is a player 1 best response at IK−1c. Furthermore,
the decision problem facing player 1 at history CK−1a2 is identical to the one at IK−1a2,
so σ1(C
K−1a2) = α1(IK−1a2). The arguments above prove that σ2(C
K−1) = 1. Thus, the
continuation payoff for CK−1 is V (CK−1) = (1− δ)u1(c, C) + δV (CK) = 2(1− δ) + 2δ = 2.
This means that the decision problem facing player 1 at CK−2a2 is identical to that at
CK−1a2, C
Ka2 and IK−1a2, so σ1(C
K−2a2) = α1(IK−1a2). Applying essentially the same
argument as above shows σ2(C
K−2) = 1, so V (CK−2) = 2. Continuing backwards shows
that V (∅) = 2.
I now consider the λ ≤ 1 and λ > 1 cases separately, concluding the proof.
Case 1. λ ≤ 1: I now show that α2(I0) ∈ (0, 1) (i.e. player 2 mixes the period after a play
ofD). First, I show that α2(I0) < 1. Otherwise, γ(I0) ≥ (1−δ)u1(c,D)+δγ(I0) =
3(1− δ)+ δγ(I0), which implies γ(I0) = 3 > γ(Ik)−λη, a contradiction. Because
α2(I0) < 1, it must be that player 1 plays D at I0c sometimes (otherwise d
would not be a best response for player 2). If D is a player 1 best response at
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I0c, it is also a best response at I0d; then γ(I0) = (1 − δ)[α2(I0)u1(c,D) + (1 −
α2(I0))u1(d,D)] + δγ(I0) so
γ(I0) = 3α2(I0) + (1− α2(I0)).
It must then be that α2(I0) > 0 for otherwise γ(I0) = 1; but above I have
supposed γ(I0) = γ(IK)− λη = 2− λη > 1, a contradiction. Recall that Lemma
2.3.9 shows C is a player 1 best response at I0c (since γ(I0) > 1). Lemma 2.3.10
implies that because C is a best response at I0c, it is also a best response at ∅c
(in period 0): V (C) ≥ γ(I1) ≥ γ(I0) + λη = 2. Lemma 2.3.10 also shows that
because α2(I0) ∈ (0, 1), σ2(∅) = 1. Thus, the equilibrium payoff for player 1 is
V (∅) = (1− δ)u(c, C) + δV (C) ≥ 2.
Case 2. λ > 1: I prove that α2(IK−1) > 0 for large enough K. Suppose by contradiction
that α2(IK−1) = 0. Since player 1 is indifferent at IK−1c, she strictly prefers C
at IK−1d, so
γ(IK−1) = (1− δ)u1(d,C) + δγ(IK) = δγ(IK) < γ(IK).
Then player 1 must strictly prefer D at IK−2, so
γ(IK−2) = (1− δ)u1(d,C) + δγ(IK−1) = δγ(IK−1) = δ2γ(IK) < γ(IK).
Applying the same argument backward gives γ(I0) = δ
Kγ(IK), so for K large
enough, γ(I0) < 1, a contradiction. Second, suppose by contradiction that
γ(IK) > 2 (recall that Proposition 2.5.2 shows γ(IK) ≥ 2). Then
γ(IK−1) ≤ (1− δ)u1(c, C) + δγ(IK) = 2(1− δ) + δγ(IK) < γ(IK).
By the same argument leading to (2.3.43), D is then a strict best response at
IK−2c, so γ(IK−2) = δγ(IK+1) < γ(IK), so by backward induction γ(I0) =
δK−1γ(IK+1). For large enough K, γ(I0) < 1, a contradiction. Since γ(IK) = 2
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and α2(IK−1) > 0, Lemma 2.3.10 proves the proposition.
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Appendix 3
Proofs for Chapter 3
3.1 Proof of Lemma 3.3.1
Suppose by contradiction that Ľ(g, š) is nondecreasing in š. Then the term Ľ(g,š)
q(Ľ(g,š))
is nondecreasing in š, so the square root term in (3.3.1) is strictly increasing. But then the
right hand side of (3.3.1) is strictly decreasing, a contradiction.
3.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3.1
First, note that choosing any qi ∈ (0, ηE[s−i] + g) is strictly dominated by choosing
qi. Eliminating these actions, there is a one-to-one mapping between qi and q̂i, so we can
rewrite the profit function in terms of q̂i:
ui(a) = p(a)q̂i − c(q̂i + κs−i + g)− ηsi
= (r − q̂i − q̂−i)q̂i − c(q̂i + κs−i + g)− ηsi,
so long as q̂i > 0. If q̂i = 0, then ui(a) = −ηsi, so if q̂i = 0 is a best response, then si = 0 is
also a best response.
Suppose that when Q is sufficiently fine, there is an interior solution (i.e., q̂i > 0 is




− q̂i + (r − q̂i − q̂−i)− c
q̂i =
1
2(r − c− q̂−i).
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Define the function q(q̂−i) ≡ 12(r − c− q̂−i). A corner solution (q̂i = 0) is a best response if
0 ≥ ui(q(q̂−i)) = (r − q(q̂−i)− q̂−i)q(q̂−i)− c(q(q̂−i) + κE[s−i] + g)− ηs∗i
where I abuse notation by letting s∗i denote the mixed attack action conditional on delivering
positive quantity. Note that by symmetry, E[s−i] = E[s
∗
i ] = ρs
∗
i where ρ is the probability
of delivering positive quantity. Solving for q̂−i yields
0 ≥ (r − 12(r − c− q̂−i)− q̂−i) ·
1
2(r − c− q̂−i)− c(
1
2(r − c− q̂−i) + κE[s
∗
i ] + g)− ηs∗i .
q̂−i ≥ r − c− 2
√
cκE[s∗i ] + ηs
∗
i + cg.
Thus, s∗ and g are positive, there exists some threshold for the opposing delivered quantity
q̂i at which choosing q̂i = 0 is a best response. Denote this threshold as L(g) ≡ r − c −
2
√
cκE[s∗i ] + ηs
∗
i + cg.
Define q̂int as the unique fixed point of q(·), which can be solved for as follows:
q̂int = 12(r − c− q̂
int)
q̂int = 13(r − c).
Define ∆sui as the change in the payoff from choosing si = 1 over si = 0:
∆sui ≡ ui(si = 1, (q, s−i))− ui(si = 0, (q, s−i)).
Because E[q−i] − g ≥ κ in any equilibrium, I can write ∆sui ≡ κq̂i − η,. Due to (3.2.1),
∆sui > 0 for q̂i = q̂
int > qm.
A pure strategy equilibrium is possible under two circumstances when Q is suffi-
ciently fine:
1. q̂inti ≥ L(g): Both firms choose quantity delivered q̂int and to attack, which are
mutual best responses by the arguments above.
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2. L(g) = 0: Both firms choose quantity 0 and to not attack. By the definition of L,
when the opposing firm delivers quantity q̂−i = L, q̂i = 0 is a best response. It is also
clear that ∆sui = −η < 0, so si = 0 is a best response.
The rest of the proof considers the remaining case where 0 < L(g) < q̂int. I start by solving
for the values of g where this holds:
1
3(r − c) > r − c− 2
√
cκE[s∗i ] + ηs
∗
i + cg.
Since both firms attack when L(g) = q̂int, I can write
√
cκ+ η + cg > 13(r − c)
cκ+ η + cg > 19(r − c)
2
cg > 19(r − c)







2 + η − cκ
]
. (3.2.1)
For g satisfying (3.2.1) and L(g) > 0, there is no pure strategy equilibrium in terms of quan-
tities, so they must be mixing. Since firm i only has multiple best responses in quantities
when E[q̂−i] = L(g), this must hold in equilibrium. Hence, (3.3.2) is proven.
Suppose that attacking is a best response for the firms (when producing drugs).
Note that
∆sui ≡ ui(si = 1, (q, s−i))− ui(si = 0, (q, s−i))
= (r − q̂i − q̂−i + min{κ, q̂−i})q̂i − c(q̂i + κE[s−i] + g)− η
−[(r − q̂i − q̂−i)q̂i − c(q̂i + κE[s−i] + g)]
= min{κ, q̂−i}q̂i − η.
In equilibrium, q̂−i = L(g), and firm i chooses to attack only when also choosing q̂i =
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q(L(g)). Attacking is a best response if
0 ≤ ∆sui = min{κ, L}q(L)− η.
Consider the following two cases:
Case 1. L(g) ≥ κ: I show that 0 ≤ κq(L)− η. Suppose not. Then
0 > κq(L)− η
= 12κ(r − c− L)− η
≥ 12κ(r − c− κ)− η
> 12κ(r − c− κ)−
1
4κ(r − c)








0 > 14(r − c)−
1
2κ
κ > 12(r − c),
a contradiction of (3.2.2).
Case 2. L(g) < κ: Then 0 ≤ Lq(L)− η. Rearranging gives
0 ≤ L · 12(r − c− L)− η
0 ≤ −L2 + (r − c)L− 2η,














The “+” expression is greater than 13(r−c) = q̂
int, so that upper bound is clearly
not binding. Focusing on the lower bound, I have
L = r − c− 2
√
cκE[s∗i ] + ηs
∗






(r − c)2 − 8η
]
(3.2.2)
From (3.2.2) we can see that for all g satisfying
r − c− 2
√




(r − c)2 − 8η
]
,


















r − c− 2
√






r − c− 2
√
cκE[s∗i ] + η + cg
))
=
r − c− 2
√
cκE[s∗i ] + η + cg√
cκE[s∗i ] + η + cg
=
r − c√
cκE[s∗i ] + η + cg
− 2
r − c√
cκE[s∗i ] + η + cg
= 2 + E[s∗i ]
(r − c)2
cκE[s∗i ] + η + cg




(r − c)2 = (4 + 4E[s∗i ] + E[s∗i ]2)(cκE[s∗i ] + η + cg)
= 4cκE[s∗i ] + 4cκE[s
∗
i ]
2 + cκE[s∗i ]
3




0 = cκE[s∗i ]
3 + 4(cκ+ η + cg)E[s∗i ]
2 + 4(cκ+ η + cg)E[s∗i ] + 4(η + cg)− (r − c)2,
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firms strictly prefer to not attack in equilibrium, E[s∗i ] = s
∗
i = 0.
I finally turn to the case of g in between (3.2.3) and (3.2.4). Note that L = Ľ(g, s∗i ).




(r − c)2 − 8η
]
as the right hand side of (3.2.2). Then (3.2.2)
implies that attacking is a strict best response when Ľ(g, 1) > B0 and that not attacking
is a strict best response when Ľ(g, 0) < B0. If both are best responses, then Ľ(g, s
∗
i ) = B0.
Thus, (3.3.3) is proven.
3.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3.3
As noted at the beginning of Proposition 3.3.1, hiring any quantity qi ∈ (0, κE[s̄−i]+
g) is strictly dominated by choosing qi = 0. Thus, I can work simply with delivered quan-
tities q̂i = qi − (κE[s̄−i] + g) without loss of generality. The payoff of firm i is




V̄ + F (θ̄)Ṽ
]
.











Writing ui in terms of delivered quantities gives
ui = (r − q̂i − q̂−i)q̂i − cq̂i − c(κE[s̄] + g)− ηE[s̄]












r − q̂i − q̂−i
,











Substituting (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) gives
0 = (1− δ)(r − c− q̂−i − 2q̂i)− δf(θ̄)
θ̄
r − q̂i − q̂−i
∆V




The restriction to symmetric strategies means that q̂i = q̂−i, yielding




which can be rearranged to








(r + 2c)2 + 24 δ1−δf(θ̄)θ̄∆V
12
.
It is straightforward to verify that the“−” solution yields the one-shot equilibrium in Propo-
sition 3.3.1 for ∆V = 0, and so is correct. Thus, (3.3.8) and (3.3.9) are proven.
θ̄ must solve the following maximization problem:
max
θ̄
(1− δ)ui(q̂(θ̄)) + δ[(1− F (θ̄))V̄ + F (θ̄)Ṽ ] (3.3.3)
where I omit the index i from the delivered quantity q̂(θ̄) given by (3.3.9). If the solution
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is interior (θ̄ ∈ (0,∞)), it satisfies the first order condition





Note that if θ̄ is interior, then ∆V > 0 (otherwise a corner solution would be optimal). Since
γ(θ̄) is single peaked at ln θ̄ = −12ζ
2, q̂(θ̄) has a single minimum θ̄ = exp(−12ζ
2). Thus, for
any θ̄′ > exp(−12ζ
2), there exists θ̄′′ ≤ exp(−12ζ
2) yielding a higher value for (3.3.3).
Applying symmetric strategies gives
ui(q̂) = (r − 2q̂)q̂ − cq̂ = (r − c− 2q̂)q̂ = −2q̂2 + (r − c)q̂,
which can be differentiated to obtain
∂ui
∂q̂
= −4q̂ + (r − c).




Substituting into (3.3.4) gives




































































Substituting (3.3.6) into (3.3.5) yields
0 = δ
(
4q̂(θ̄)− (r − c)








4q̂(θ̄)− (r − c)







4q̂(θ̄)− (r − c)





thereby proving (3.3.10). Rearranging (3.3.7) gives





4q̂(θ̄)− (r − c)
.
Note that because γ(θ̄) is single peaked at exp(−12ζ
2), for all θ̄ < exp(−12ζ
2), the numerator
of the right hand side is increasing in θ̄ while the denominator is decreasing, so the entire
right hand side is increasing. The left hand side is clearly strictly decreasing in θ̄, so (3.3.10)
has a unique solution.
3.4 Proof of Lemma 3.3.2
Suppose by contradiction that B̄(W ) /∈ B({W̄}). Let V ′ < W̄ be some element of
W such that B̄(W ) ∈ B({V ′}). Define Ṽ ′ ≡ (1−δT )uN+δTV ′ and W̃ ≡ (1−δT )uN+δT W̄ .
By Definition 3.3.1, there exists ᾱ ∈ ∆A enforced by p̄ and V ′. Denote (q̄, s̄) as the expected
actions of ᾱ.
First, suppose that p̄ ∈ {0,∞} (a corner solution). From Corollary 3.3.1, it is
straightforward to see that (1− δ)v̄N + δmax{W̄ , W̃} is decomposed by ᾱ, p̄, W̄ (since ᾱ is
the static Nash equilibrium given ḡ) and that
(1− δ)v̄N + δmax{W̄ , W̃} > (1− δ)v̄N + δmax{V ′, Ṽ ′} = B̄(W ),
a contradiction.
Second, suppose that p̄ ∈ (0,∞) (an interior solution). From Proposition 3.3.3,
q̄i = C0 −
√
C1 + γ(θ̄)(V ′ − Ṽ ) + κs̄i + ḡ.
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Since W̄ − W̃ > V ′ − Ṽ ′, there exists θ̄W̄ < θ̄ such that
q̄i = C0 −
√
C1 + γ(θ̄W̄ )(W̄ − W̃ ) + κs̄i + ḡ.
Since attacks are observable, s̄ is also enforceable. Thus, ᾱ is enforced by p̄W̄ ≡ θ̄W̄ p(ᾱ)
and W̄ , so they can decompose payoff
(1−δ)ui(ᾱ)+δ[(1−F (θ̄W̄ ))W̄+F (θ̄W̄ )W̃ ] > (1−δ)ui(ᾱ)+δ[(1−F (θ̄))V ′+F (θ̄)Ṽ ′] = B̄(W ),
a contradiction.
3.5 Proof of Corollary 3.3.2
Lemma 3.3.2 and part 3 of Proposition 3.3.2 immediately imply (3.3.13). To see
that Ē is the payoff of a T -GPE, construct the following T -GPE: in the reward state,
always play action profile Q(Ē ), switching to the punishment state for prices below U(Ē ).
By Lemma 3.3.2, Q(Ē ) is enforced by U(Ē ) and Ē . Definition 3.3.1 implies that there are
no profitable one-shot deviations in the reward state, and there are clearly no profitable
one-shot deviations in the punishment state since firms play the static Nash equilibrium
without intertemporal incentives. By the one-shot deviation principle, this T -GPE is an
equilibrium, and since Q(Ē ),U(Ē ), Ē decompose Ē , its payoff is Ē .
3.6 Proof of Lemma 3.3.3
Recursively define the sequence {Vm}m as follows: V0 ≡ V and Vm+1 = B̄({Vm}).
First, suppose there exists m such that Vm+1 ≤ Vm. Pick the lowest such m. If Vm+1 = Vm,
then {Vm} ⊂ B̄({Vm}) is a self-generating set, so Vm ≥ V0 = V is an equilibrium payoff,
and hence Ē ≥ Vm ≥ V . Now suppose that Vm+1 < Vm. Then B̄({V0, ..., Vm}) = Vm,
yet by Lemma 3.3.2, B̄({V0, ..., Vm}) = B̄(max{V0, ..., Vm}) = B̄({Vm}) = Vm+1 < Vm, a
contradiction.
Now suppose that Vm+1 > Vm for all m. It is clear from Definitions 3.3.1 and 3.3.2
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that {Vm}m is bounded (to see why, note that from (3.3.6), Vm+1 is a linear combination of
Vm and some feasible payoff v ≤ F̄ for all m), so there exists some limit V ∗ = limm→∞ Vm.
The following lemma and proof is virtually identical to its analogue in Abreu, Pearce,
and Stacchetti (1990), so its proof is omitted (see Lemma 7.3.2 of Mailath and Samuelson
(2006)).
Lemma 3.6.1. If W is compact, then B(W ) is closed.
Define the set W ≡ {V ∗, V0, V1, ...}. By Definition 3.3.2, {V1, V2, ...} ⊂ B(W ).
Since limm→∞ Vm = V
∗ and W is compact, Lemma 3.6.1 implies V ∗ ∈ B(W ). Since there
exist no α, p̄, Vm that decompose V
∗, there must be α, p̄, V ∗ that decompose V ∗. Hence
{V ∗} ⊂ B({V ∗}) and so V ∗ ∈ E , implying that V < Ē .
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